Former NATO adviser on security matters, Dutch Major General Frank van Kappen was among first western analysts, who had clearly called things by their proper names. «Putin leads hybrid war in Ukraine» - stated the General already on April 26[1]. The term «hybrid war» means wide spectrum of hostile acts, where the role of military component is rather small. Political, information and psychological and economic influence become main means for inflicting casualties to the enemy. Such methods help to achieve significant results: inflict territorial, political and economic losses to the enemy, disorganize system of state governance, and demoralize society.

In 2014, after one hundred years since World War I and seventy-five years since World War II, Europe faced new aggression of hybrid nature. February 20 was a beginning of this aggression, indicated by the start of Crimean peninsula annexation by the Russian Federation; despite it was an integral part of Ukraine. Valeriy Gerasimov, head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, said a lot by the estimations made a year before Crimean campaign. In February 2013, in his report “Main tendencies of the forms and methods of the military forces applying. Actual tasks of the military science for their improvement” V. Gerasimov stated: «In XXI century, there is a tendency to fade differences between war and peace status. Wars are not already declared and if started they are conducted not according to usual for us template. “Rules of war” have changed significantly. Non-military means become more important in achievement of political and strategic goals, which in certain cases have proven to be far more effective in comparison with the power of arms. Correlation of non-military and military actions makes 4:1». Accent at used confrontation methods shifts toward wider deployment of political, economical, information, humanitarian and other non-military actions. To new forms and kinds of warfare belong “reduction of military and economic potential of the state by distruction of its critical military and civil infrastructure in the shortest period of time»[2].

The borders between military and non-military threats are being diluted. Speaking about “non-military actions”, one should look on energy resources and energy infrastructure as the most important of them. Traditionally, Russia is rich for the energy resources, where hydrocarbons are not simply a commodity.

Since 2000, high oil prices have been stimulating both economic development of the RF and the dangerous processes in mentality of its political establishment, feeling the complex of the Cold War loser. Desire of global revanсhe, re-establishment of multipolar world, where Russia should become main of poles, combined with an idea of “land gathering” on the post-Soviet space, stimulated a search of ways and means to fulfill the desired wish.  If in the Soviet period it was through buildup in arms, in terms of globalized world economy, hydrocarbons and pipelines are able to supplement military arsenal. The core idea of Russian foreign policy in times of V.Putin is to return Russia its status of superpower similar to USSR. As far back as in 2005, V.Putin espressed an opinion, that Soviet Union breakdown in 1991 was a “biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. Thus, Russia under Putin aims to restore the Soviet status quo ante on the international arena. Therefore, Russia’s energy strategy is directed on supporting achievement of this ambitious geopolitical goal[3].

Analysis of Russia’s behavior in 2000-s shows that the RF had been consecutively approaching to deploy energy resources as energy weapon, carefully disguising its actions under commercial disputes with buyers of Russian hydrocarbons on the post-Soviet space. Very few people consider the fact that official document “Energy strategy of the RF until 2020” starts with constatation: “Russia owns substantial deposits of energy resources and powerful fuel-energy complex, which is the basis for development of economy, an instrument for internal and foreign policy»[4]. Russia’s president V.Putin signed this document in August 2003. Thereafter two large-scale gas crises occurred in Russian-Ukrainian relations – in 2006 and 2009. The European countries also experienced their influence, as Russia had cut off gas transit via Ukraine to Europe.

Intentions to use energy resources as a political instrument are confirmed both by the statements of the Russian high-ranking officials and by the number of reccomendations for Kremlin from developers of concept documents for Russian government.

Mikhail Margelov, a special envoy of the Russian President to Africa and simultaneously a Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia had expressed himself very openly on the instruments of Russian foreign policy in November 2011. «…oil and gas policy should become not only a significnat part, but one of the most important instruments of the Russian foreign policy».

Following reccomendations had shown very demonstratively conceptual approaches for updated Energy strategy of Russia until 2030: «…main priorities of energy policy for concerned period are <…> effective deployment of Russian energy potential with regard to international economic and political relations <…>, ensuring of geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of Russia in Europe and neigbouring countries, as well as in Asian-Pacific region»[5].

Now Russia considers basic positions of the Energy strategy until 2035 and does not hide non-commercial vision of own external energy policy: «Russia as a responsible state considers external energy policy not from the exporter’s narrow point of view, intended to maximize short-term revenues, but as a tool to solve both national and global problems»[6].

It should be noted, that energy resources use as an instrument for “ensuring geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of Russia” is not only political rethoriс, but also a practice. Following cases may be considered to show how Russia used energy resources as a pressure instrument in relations with other countries:

- unilateral disruption of Russian oil transit via Latvia in 2003;

- reduction of Gazprom’s gas supply to Belarus during winter time in 2004 and 2006;

- blockade by Transneft of Kazakh oil transit to Lithuania via Russia in 2006;

- oil supply cut off by Transneft to Lithuania in 2006.

It is evident that all mentioned cases belong to post-Soviet space. However, given Russian approaches to use energy resources for solving both “national and global problems”, it cannot be excluded that similar instruments will be deployed against EU and NATO member states. In this regard, a sudden reduction of oil supply to Czech Republic in summer 2008 is a very clear example; at time, Prag signed agreement to station on its own territory US antiballistic missile system radar.

Some «fresh ideas», which are on the table for considering in Kremlin, cover inter alia oil products cut off via Baltic countries seaports: «… the idea to remove transit countries from Russian hydrocarbons is a core of the domestic energy policy. The Baltic countries have no chance to preserve the volumes of Russiam hydrocarbon transit … What prevents Russia in nearest time to cut off completely transit via Baltic countries and to use only own ports at the Baltic Sea? ». Other idea is not new one – to cut off gas transit via Ukraine to the EU. When First Deputy Chairman of State Duma Committee on Industry openly speaks about it, it means that preparation of such a scenario is under way[7].  

A specisl focus are the cases of Russian “gas aggression” against Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. Europe used to name them “Ukrainian-Russian gas crises”. Gas supply cut off to Ukraine and interruption of gas transit via Ukraine to the EU were Russian “actions of punishment”. Ukraine was punished for the Orange revolution in 2004, Europe for supporing Ukraine.

Crisis in 2009 had wide reaching goals. It should play a role of a detonator to provoke political conflict in Ukraine on the axis East – West. It intended to case gas shortage in eastern part of the country through complete gas supply disruption (for internal consumption + gas transit to the EU), because Kiev based authorities might be unable to deliver gas from western UGSF to main industrial centers and will leave them without heating. According to Russian strategists, it should provoke “social explosion in the East and South of Ukraine”. In 2009, Russian Strategic Culture Foundation studied so called “half hard” scenario, according to which it was provided for emergency deployment of the military contingents to Ukraine combained with “provisional government”, dynamic expansion of local self-government authorities on occupied territories with reliance on early prepared “support forces” – marginal groups with critical approaches toward Kiev based authorities, creation of “independant” quasi-state institutions”. It was not an accident, that on January, 12 in 2009  Russian mass media published articles to the topic of “borders revision” in CIS and statements of Russian politicins: «State Duma of Russia member Konstantin Zatulin does not rule out that Russia will “signal at the proper moment” to eastern and southern regions of Ukraine to join Russia»[8]. This scenario failed in 2009, because Ukrainian GTS reversed gas supply and cental, eastern and southern regions of Ukraine received gas from UGSF located in the west of Ukraine. However, Russia started to implement in 2014 an improved scenario of hybrid war.

The application of economic damage with long-term consequences to Ukraine became one of the objectives of this hybrid war. From June 16, the supply of gas to Ukraine was cut off. Since July, targeted artillery strikes began to be applied on the energy and transport targets.  In Donbas, about 80% of the coal mines were put out of operation, railroads were destroyed in order to damage coal delivery to the other regions of the country, the coke plants supplying the steel industry were also destroyed. The production lines of the strategic enterprises and the coal from the rest of the functioning mines are smuggled to Russia. Thus, everything is done in the way mentioned by the head of the Geberal Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: «reducing of the military and economic potential of the state through the damage of vitally important targets of military and civil infrastructure in the short run». For the winter period 2014-2015, the Russian military experts forecast  “the war could shift on the railways, highways, pipelines, bridges”[9].

In 2010, Center for Global Stusies “Strategy XXI” with grant support of NATO made project «Energy resources and their delivery infrastructure: the potential for inappropriate operation in Europe». In the framework of the project, the analysis of the basic official documents of the Russian Federation was effectuated, in particular “National Security Strategy”, Military Doctrine, Energy Strategy and others. In addition, the actions of the Russian Federation during gas crisis 2009 were analyzed. Today we have renewed this analysis, when “gas component” appeared in the hybrid war against Ukraine: disruption of gas supply from June 14, thus four months ago. Here one can find some key conclusions. 

1.        European Comission officially has left open the question "what happened in January 2009: Russia cut off gas supplies to the EU or Ukraine interrupted transit? ».  EC limited itself by ascertaining:  “On the night of 6 to 7 January, all supplies from Russia via Ukraine to the EU were suspended. Deliveries of Russian gas to Europe were absent from 7 to 20 January”[10]. None of the European companies (except Slovak Slovensky Plynarensky Priemysel (SPP))[11], which bought Russian gas and threatened to Gazprom by court claims to compensate loss, did not not applied such claims in arbitration court after the crisis. Such approaches from the European entities created "the effect of the temptation" for the further use of gas as a political tool, which we see now.

2.        None of the crises, nor in 2006, nor in 2009, we failed to prevent or resolve by legal means. Crises were resolved by political means. The reached settlements had complex nature and can be considered as a kind of ad hoc solutions.

3.        End-users, national governments of consumer-countries and the European Commission did not have complete informational picture of the crisis course, based on data from the tool control, as an integrated system of objective control of gas flow does not exist. The misinformation and surrogate artificially fulfill information space in a lack of objective data.

4.     The provisions of a number of official documents of the Russian Federation («National Security Strategy of Russian Federation until 2020», «Military Doctrine», «Energy strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030», «Program of effective and systematic use of foreign policy factors for a long-term development of the Russian Federation») contain ambiguous statements and do not contribute to the strengthening of confidence to Russia as a predictable partner. «National Security Strategy of Russian Federation until 2020» and «Military Doctrine» do not not perceive NATO enlargement process and the performance of its global functions, and, on this basis, the objectives of deterrence are formulated in the abovementioned Russian documents through the "neutralization of possible military dangers and military threats by political, diplomatic and other non-military means", as well as creation of controlled buffer zones on Russian borders. This increases the probability of use of energy and infrastructure capacities of the Russian Federation as non-military deterrents in the case of strained relations with individual countries and with NATO.

5.     Large-scale projects of non-transit pipeline systems of gas exports, initiated by Russia, are able to create surplus of pipeline capacity. In the absence of an integrated gas infrastructure within the EU, it poses a threat of manipulation with volumes, directions and prices of gas exports to maximize the revenues of the monopolist. In a situation of critical deterioration of relations between Russia and NATO or between Russia and one of the countries (group of countries) of the Alliance, it may be a mechanism of the synchronized heterogeneous pressure by projection of limit/stop the hydrocarbon flow threat, combined with information and psychological campaign and cyber-attacks.

6.     The main political and economic goal of Russia became the direct and / or covert acquisition of assets by the Russian energy companies in the EU, the inclusion of "Gazprom" to the gas networks in the EU countries, the acquisition of control of UGSF, the implementation of politically motivated pipeline projects, getting of hidden preferences and concessions in the EU, as well as blocking of undesirable for the RF solutions. Exercising activities on the territory of EU member-states, especially in Germany and Austria, the management centers of strategic projects are submitted outside the EU - in Switzerland.

7.     Memorandum on Early warning mechanism 2009 at the level of Russia - the European Commission was elaborated in bilateral format. Such a mechanism is unlikely to be able to prevent or resolve the trilateral gas crisis similar to those that occurred in 2006 and 2009.

8.     The gas crisis of 2009 was followed by conducting a large-scale information and psychological campaigns and PR-support of Gazprom’s actions by authoritative international PR-agencies (Gavin Anderson, GPlus Europe, Ketchum). It paid off. In the European mass consciousness, the stamps injected by Russian propaganda had anchored:  "Ukraine interrupted transit to Europe", “Ukraine is unstable transit link”, “Nord Stream and South Stream are the solution of transit problems”. Particularly common is the propaganda thesis about the "stealing" of gas by Ukraine. Even the Commissioner G. Oettinger used the corresponding expression in August 2014, trying to project the situation in winter 2015[12].

It should be noted that the surplus of pipeline infrastructure contains a potential threat to the markets, especially those that do not have the diversification of energy sources. Russian energy strategy just involves an increase in pipeline surplus due to the policy of diversification of energy export routes: “the significance of the European direction in total exports of Russian energy resources will steadily decline due to diversification of energy export markets in the east”. Taking into account, that in 1973 the Arab states managed to success with oil embargo with 9% reduce in oil supply, the availability of the significant capacities reserve means the possibility of the ratable supply limitation. This means that transit flows will be unstable. It can be concluded that the main aim of the creation of a diversified system of Russian gas exports is to vary the volumes, directions and exporting prices on the internal non-integrated EU market. It sould provide the revenues maximization, as well as exerting of pressure on the one or another member state of the EU and NATO, by the threat of limit / stop the hydrocarbon flow, especially when combined with the information and psychological campaign. Michael Korchemkin, American expert of Russian origin from the East European Gas Analyses (U.S.) has come to the similar conclusions: “The gas pipelines Nord Stream and South Stream are designed NOT to increase supply of Russian gas and NOT to increase the stability of energy supply to Europe. Gazprom’s new projects will provide Russia with the ability of selective cut of gas flow to Buelorussia, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. Thus, the energy security of THESE countries will be reduced”.

The consequences of the gas crisis in Europe can largely be compared with the consequences of the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Therefore, the continent requires the elaboration of the confidence-building measures, in a similar way, as was the case in the military sphere in the seventies-eighties years of the last century. What can be proposed as the limiting measures in the use of energy resources as the “energy weapon”?

1.     NATO, European Commission, IEA, Energy Community Secretariat have to strengthen cooperation in the sphere of energy security. The conceptualization of energy security is necessary not only through the prism of the commercial  disputes of economic entities, but also through the prism of energy resources and infrastructure use as the instruments of political influence, which the authoritarian states are inclined to exert for the realization of their strategical goals.

2.     To prevent in future the disruption of energy resources supply and the use of energy infrastructure as the means of “energy warfare”, the confidence-building measures system should be initiated, as was the case in the military sphere in seventies-eighties.  Ensuring of stability and security in Europe, the process of armed forces and armaments reduction were held by the fact of confidence regime establishment, based on the exchange of information, including enough sensitive data (size, structure of Armed Forces, types and kinds of weapons and military equipment, the dislocation).

3.     Providing access to the telemetrical data on the physical parameters of energy flows traffic would help to increase the transparency of the "export - transit - import" chain. Biparametrical online monitoring system of telemetrical data (Working Pressure, Daily Gas Volume) must be installed that would be supplied from the respective gas metering stations (GMS) by mutual consent of the parties. These parameters should be accessible to all sides of the Russia - Ukraine - EU technological chain. Comparison of the parameters will allow the identification of problem areas on the overall way of gas flows moving and clearly establish responsibility for violations of traffic.

We must pay tribute to the Energy Charter Secretariat. Since the beginning of March, that is, almost immediately after the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Energy Charter began to draw attention to the increased risk for gas supplies to Europe. Establishing a contact group, the Secretary General of the Energy Charter U.Rusnak proposed the Energy Charter as a platform for the exchange of information and strenthening of transparency on transit flows. However, stakeholders, including the European Commission, did not support this initiative of data exchange on the gas flows in real time.

Gas transmission system of Ukraine has a particular importance for the EU. Its value is determined not only by the transit role. UGS are essential with its overall active volume of 31 billion cubic meters. They allow ensuring gas supply during peak consumption in the EU in the winter. No less importantance also has a high level of trunk pipelines interconnectibility that provides uninterrupted gas supply in the event of an accident or other emergency. This is something that do not have the other routes of transportation, called by "Gazprom" as an alternative to the Ukrainian gas pipelines: Yamal-Europe, «Blue Stream», «Nord Stream», «South Stream». An accident on any of these directions will automatically lead to the cut of gas supply. For instance, in 2007 in Ukraine two serious technical accidents on the trunk pipeline Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod took place. No more than two weeks were needed to liquidate the consequences of two accidents. Nevertheless, the gas supply to the EU did not stop even for a minute: the parallel branches of two other gas pipelines “Soyuz” and “Progress” were involved instead of the trouble pipeline. In the same way, it was in 2014, when in May and June the acts of sabotage were conducted on the gas pipeline Urengoy - Pomary – Uzhhorod, which did not lead to interruption of gas supplies to the EU. It should be mentioned, that for the complete disruption of gas transit to the EU through the territory of Ukraine, the simultaneous explosion of GTS in 29 points at the same time should be effectuated, that is almost impossible mission.

Universal formula of protection against the use of energy resources as "energy weapon" is as follows: integrated pipeline infrastructure + reverse use of existing pipelines + strategic reserves + diversification of sources and routes of energy supply.

The strategic gas reserves will have a key importance. The EU and Ukraine in cooperation with the IEA should consider establishing of the Eastern European segment of the EU strategic gas reserves, using the capacitites of the Western Ukrainian UGSF with the inclusion of these storages to the strategic gas reserves system, if any will be established in the EU. Ukrainian UGSF system could play the base role in the east of the EU/ECT space, for Central European countries, which are the most vulnerable to the Russian gas supply.

In due time, the OECD contries protected themselves from the “oil weapon” through the establishing of strategic oil reserves system. Now, the time has come for the gas sector to develop the similar system.

The EU and the U.S. through the common efforts (including G7 format) should incline Russia to accept as the conditions, required for cancelation of sanctions, the following provisions:

- return of Russia to the format of Energy Charter Treaty  with its ratification;

- access of the international monitoring group of experts to the frontier GMS for the control of exporting gas flows traffic to the EU and Energy Community countries;

- demonopolization of  Russian gas sector and admission of the Russian independent gas producers on the export markets;

- ensuring of free gas transit from the Central Asia to the EU through the territory of Russia;

- transition to the scheme of Russian gas delivery to the European consumers according to DAF on the eastern border of Ukraine, which simultaneously is the eastern border of Energy Community Treaty.

EU should restore for Ukraine the package of proposals in terms of realization of the Memorandum on cooperation in the energy sphere from 12.01.2005 on the equipment of the trunk pipelines with gas metering stations in the points of Ukrainian-Russian border crossing, according to the project elaborated in 2005-2006 and approved by the European Commission, EBRD and EIB.

Under the auspices of  IEA and Energy Charter, it is rational to elaborate the project of multilateral agreement on early warning mechanism based on biparametric system of data exchange on the transborder gas flows traffic.

The Russian Federation will not stop in its expansionist actions as it does not stop after its military aggression in Georgia and six year later begins the aggression against Ukraine. New artificially disguised confrontational steps of Moscow in Central Asia, the Caspian region, the South Caucasus are waiting for Europe, where communications and resources are. The Caspian region and the Caucasus could become the next theatre of military operations, as there the gas extraction and transportation projects are competitive to Russian supplies in Europe. Thus, the military solution is possible and Russia is aggressively inclined. In fact, the EU and NATO will be helpless in these regions. In this regard, the EU should consider the projects of gas supply from Iran and Turkmenistan (through Iran and Turkey) as alternatives. It is reasonable to refuse finally the South Stream project.  

In recent days, Russia has reduced the intensity of the military component in its hybrid war against Ukraine. Quite possibly, that to compensate it Russia will enforce the application of non-military means against Ukraine, including using the energy resources as a tool of pressure up to gas transit disruption through the territory of Ukraine to the EU.