Amid the ongoing crisis in the gas sector, a solution was adopted and implemented that later turn into a serious problem for the country. The only thing that can be noted on the positive side is the fact, that despite the extreme conditions, the domestic gas supply to national consumers and gas transit to Europe were not interrupted.

However, it was reported that in the last days the decision has been adopted on the maximum utilization of gas from underground storage and minimizing its pipeline imports from Russia. On the one hand - a clear decision on the background of the accumulated debt before "Gazprom" and domestic non-payment for gas. As of February 17, 2014 the total debt of fuel and energy companies for gas before the National Joint Stock Company "Naftogaz of Ukraine" was about 23.5 billion USD. (or about 2.66 billion dollars at the rate 8.83 USD/UAH , as of February 21, 2014 ). As of 14 February "Naftogaz of Ukraine" paid "Gazprom" a part of the debt for supplied gas in 2013 from the total sum of debt of $2.7 billion. Thus, the debt of "Naftogaz" to "Gazprom" declined to 1.42 billion dollars.

Against this background in order to avoid increasing of the current debt, it was decided to use the maximum gas from underground gas storage (UGS). However, three weeks of cold weather with low temperatures led to significant devastation of UGS. If by the middle of January in the UGS was 13.1 billion cubic meters of gas, as for now there is only 9.1 billion cubic meters. If during the warm half of January, the daily withdrawal of gas from underground storage facilities was approximately 60 million cubic meters, now the figure is 100-105 million cubic meters a day (!), Although the average temperature in February is much higher than in the first half of January.

This means that under the case of continuing increased gas withdrawal from UGS at the end of the heating season in mid-April, its rest will amount to about 5 billion cubic meters – the lowest balances for the whole history! According to the sources of "Naftogaz", level of gas withdrawal from underground storage facilities can be further increased, as an unofficial designation exists to "burn gas up to the maximum - if necessary - even buffer gas." This approach is based on the intention to prevent the rising of the debt before "Gazprom".

According to DT.UA sources in the Ministry of energy and coal of Ukraine, since beginning of 2014 and until February 21 Ukraine consumed 11,8 bcm of gas, where Gasprom’s pipeline gas made only 3,9 bcm.

However, there is another side of the above-described approach. If the algorithm "burning to a maximum" continues, there may be no gas at all in the UGSF (under circumstances, when in March sharply colder weather comes or the cold season continues for a longer than usual time).

The above approach does not draw objections of Gazprom, which usually raises hype about lack of gas reserves in the Ukrainian underground storage facilities. This suggests that introduced by the Naftogaz practice to maximize gas output from underground storage facilities is being approved in Moscow. Thus, the Kremlin "improves" the gas pressure mechanism to Kyiv for further talks with the new government in Ukraine, formed after the fall of Yanukovich regime or for further pressure on him, if he will remain until 2015.

There are also other issues, pending post-crisis government in addition to a parallel increase of Naftogaz debts to Gazprom and arrears of the domestic consumers to Naftogaz:

• The need to purchase large amounts of gas for underground storage facilities for the 2014-2015 heating season, which means 15-20 billion cubic meters at the highest possible price, since Russia is likely to abandon the reducing coefficient K, making it equal to 1, i.e. the price of gas may reach $400 for a thousand cubic meters;

• Blackmail from the side of Russia and extortion of the gas transportation system and underground storage facilities, as well as concessions of political and economic nature in exchange for debts cancellation;

• Pressure from the EU to ensure the necessary volumes of gas in underground storage facilities for the 2014-2015 heating season.

If suddenly the scenario of buffer gas extraction from the underground storage facilities would be approved, then it would lead to extremely serious problems with filling gas underground storage facilities not only in terms of where to get the necessary funds to purchase it, but how technologically to inject this gas without breaking transit to Europe. There may be a temporary problem of shortage of pipeline capacities at peak of simultaneous gas injection into the underground storage facilities and transit to Europe. Although this is a hypothetical scenario, but it cannot be 3ruled out if the tactics of "burnt gas" will continue.

It is unlikely that the government of Ukraine will be able to support Naftogaz in purchasing sufficient volumes of gas to pump into the underground storage facilities. There is no doubt that Russia will use the encountered problems both to further convince the EU to support the South Stream project, and in part of the EU agreement on the Belarusian scenario of transferring control over Ukraine's GTS to Gazprom, justifying it by the growing unreliability of transit via Ukraine. Stimulating the tactics of "burnt gas", the Kremlin tries again to get its desired shares, including control over GTS and UGSF, loyalty to themselves of the new government of Ukraine as well as concessions from the EU particularly in gas and generally in energy issues.