The summit Ukraine – EU on November 24, 2016 was marked by signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Energy Partnership between the European Union together with the European Atomic Energy Community and Ukraine. That means that something was achieved unlike visa-free process. But status of the document indicates that the relationships between the EU and Ukraine, which is a member of the Energy Community initiated by the EU, a party in the Eastern Partnership which is an initiative of the EU, and has an Association Agreement with the EU, are not harmonised, in spite of the existing two- and multilateral documents affecting energy sector – the Energy Community Treaty and the Association Agreement.

"Particular attention will be paid to upgrading the Strategic Partnership on energy with Ukraine. This will address issues related to Ukraine's importance as a transit country as well as those related to Ukraine's energy market reforms, such as the upgrade of its gas network, the setting up of an appropriate regulatory framework for the electricity market and increasing energy efficiency in Ukraine...", – this was defined in the EU's Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy from February 25, 2015. This year the European Commission said in another document (Energy Union. 1 Year On" from 25 February 2016), that "expect to see more cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours, more on the Southern Gas Corridor, deepened energy dialogue with key partners including the US, Norway and Canada, as well as the launch of the Ukraine Strategic Energy Partnership". Though we are the last in the list of key partners, however relations with Ukraine are defined as strategic partnership.

So, the launch took place. What was done, that was launched. Unlike to the signed 11 years ago the Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of energy between the European Union and Ukraine which was a breakthrough and a guide in energy relations then, a new Memorandum does not make such impression. If the previous Memorandum was signed by Viktor Yushchenko (then the President of Ukraine), Tony Blair (then the Prime Minister of Great Britain, which at that period held the Presidency of the Council of the EU) and José Manuel Barroso (then the Head of the European Commission), the current Memorandum was signed at the level of the Ukrainian Minister (Igor Nasalik) - the Vice-President of the European Commission (Maroš Šefčovič). The fact of signing only Memorandums, as 11 years ago, and now, which are not legally binding documents, indicates that Kiev and Brussels carry out running in a circle. But the times have changed. They are not like in the middle of the last decade. The new EU document "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy ", adopted in June 2016, gives an accurate description of the current times: "Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory." Non-traditionall responses to new challenges are needed.

In my opinion, it should be drafted and signed a kind of the Association Agreement between Ukraine (as well as other member states of the Energy Community) and the newly created Energy Union of the EU (by the analogy with the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU) as higher level of bilateral energy relations, which were recognized in the strategic documents of the EU on the establishment of the Energy Union. But now we can't talk about this already. A rush for a quick "energy-diplomatic-bureaucratic-PR" success for pretty TV pictures overcame.

We have what we have. It makes no sense now to lay much hopes on the EU which is undergoing transformation (I don't want to say "destruction"). Brussels considers Ukraine as a problem on the eastern border, not realizing that now the EU is also increasingly becoming a problem for Kyiv. Extremely controversial decision of the European Commission on the OPAL gas pipeline, forcing "Nord stream – 2" by Russian-German efforts, ignoring the Polish project "Northern Gate", which is interested for Ukraine as an opportunity to get Norwegian gas - these are not a complete list of problems generated by Brussels for Kyiv. There are also issues for which the EC has no specific political line, as, for example, for construction by Russia of the Ostrovets NPP in Belarus with the violation of the Espoo Convention, that causes a negative reaction as in a number of EU countries, primarily in Lithuania, and in Ukraine.

All of the above once again confirms that Ukraine needs the Energy Strategy and energy diplomacy that would be based on it and the National Security Strategy; the tip of such diplomacy should be aimed not at inventing new papers but on strengthening energy security under the Russian aggression and hybrid threats. Discussions on a new energy strategy have been carrying on in government and expert circles of Ukraine since 2014. It is extremely difficult to develop it under conditions of inner turbulence, quite dynamic changes in energy sector, serious geo-economic and geopolitical transformations in Europe, and also given the fact that the country is under external aggression. In my view, long-term strategy is hardly possible. Rather, we need a transition strategy, the basic task of which should be bringing the country to the level of energy sustainability in circumstances of internal and external instability.

It is vital to rely on own energy sources, energy conservation, energy efficiency, minimization of energy imports, its broad diversification, removal or, if it is impossible, minimization of existing dependencies and avoiding creating new ones. It's essential to take into account the provisions of the current National Security Strategy, in particular p. 4.10 "Ensuring energy security", where certain priorities for ensuring energy security of Ukraine are clearly defined:

• diversification of sources and routes of energy supply, overcoming of dependence on Russia in energy supplies and technologies, development of renewable and nuclear energy;
• creation of conditions for reliable energy supply and transit of energy resources through the territory of Ukraine, protection of energy infrastructure against terrorist threats;
• formation of a system of energy supply to national economy and society for a special period."

These positions resonate with the provisions of the above mentioned "Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy": "...We will therefore enhance our efforts on defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications", as well as with the provisions of the latest Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Ukraine: "...cooperating on joint initiatives and on ways to diversify and enhance their security of energy supply, including protection of energy critical infrastructures and against cyber security threats". That is, on a declarative level the intentions of Ukraine and the EU look relatively harmonised. What should be done in practical terms? What can be taken as the guidances from the signed for 10-year period Memorandum? What directions and projects should become priorities for Ukraine?

The International Energy Agency in 2010 announced the advent of the "Golden Age" of natural gas as the most environmentally friendly of the fossil fuels and such that causes minimal CO2 emissions compared to other fossil fuels. The use of low-emission and emission-free types of energy sources, in particular for electricity and heat production, meets the purpose of decarbonization. It became global after the UN Climate Change Conference in 2015 and after ratification, including Ukraine, of the Paris Climate Agreement that entered into force since November 4, 2016. Although, if Trump moves to deeds not words (the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement), then the whole global low carbon strategy goes to hell along with EU and other players' relevant strategic documents which are focused on it.

Ukraine by joining the Energy Community created the basis for biparallel process "reforms – integration" in energy sector, which sets the guidlines for activities of both the Government and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The essence of this process is that reforms of energy sector contribute to integration in energy space of the EU, and this integration contributes to domestic reforms. However, this does not mean mindless adherence to Brussels' requirements and recommendations. Our national interests should prevail. We have no right to ignore those negative trends which have become apparent in the EU and clearly surfaced in the recent decision of the European Commission on the OPAL gas pipeline, which contradicts to the spirit and provisions of the Association Agreement (violates Art. 274) and since this winter will cause losses for Ukraine through reducing transit revenues. Under circumstances of extremely uncertain processes in the EU, weakening of its institutions, especially of the EC, especially in energy sector, we should determine the depth of integration in order not to fall under – in case of continuation of negative trends in the EU – additional excessive dependencies.

For us, current energy trends, taking into account strategies and practices of Eastern (Russia) and Western (the EU) neighbors as well as features of internal development, suppose some fundamental priorities:

1. Development of natural gas production for providing national needs and refusal from gas imports.
2. Development of emission-free nuclear power on the up-to-date non-russian technological base.
3. Modernization and development of modern generation with the consequent reduction of the coal share in it (up to no coal in the future).
4. Increased use of renewable energy sources, especially biomass, given the amount of biowaste in our agricultural sector.
5. Synchronization of functioning of the GTS and the IEPS of Ukraine with the EU's ones in the framework of ENTSO-G and ENTSO-E.

In the context of the identified priorities it should be raised the issue about the fact that nuclear-gas scenario of energy development looks as the most promising for us.

Based on this, policy considerations to increase national gas production to the level of 26-27 billion cubic meters in 2020 along with a set of measures to create a comfortable fiscal and investment climate, developed by "UkrGasVydobuvannya " and the Association of gas companies, should get a green light not only on the level of verbal support from the deputies and the Cabinet of Ukraine. With that, it should be paid particular attention to the need of investments for geologic exploration activities. Without replenishment of commercially recoverable gas reserves the effect of production growth by intensification of extraction with modern technologies can be quickly changed by production fall.

The issue of the GTS and UGS will be very important for the future of gas sector. In the signed Memorandum it has been once more reaffirmed the strategic role of Ukraine for the EU as the gas tranzit state. "The Sides should continue to cooperate on ensuring the safe, reliable and transparent transit of gas through Ukraine, inter alia through the full implementation of the 2009 Joint Declaration on the Modernisation of Ukraine's Gas Transit System. Bearing this in mind, the EU supports the efforts of Ukraine to remain an important gas transit country", the document says. Given this, it would be important not to act through the prism of stereotypes and while separating the GTS from Naftogaz not to separate pipes from storage facilities. They both function in the mode of organizational and technologically integrated complex. Perhaps, later in the future, such separation could be done, but the current turbulent period is not suitable for rapid decisions, even if the Memorandum states that "Ukraine is determined to implement swiftly the unbundling decision (separation of natural gas transportation activities (operator of the GTS) from the extraction and supply of natural gas) in respect of NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine". Taking into account the decision of the European Commission on the OPAL in favor of "Gazprom", it should be no hurry with that.

The basic priority becomes development of electric power industry. Electricity is enjoying growing demand because of its versatility and mobility. Revolutionary technological innovations have already been emerged in the field of electricity storage and electricity use in transport. Now the world is entering a period of transition of a significant part of transport on the basis of the internal combustion engines to emission-free environmentally friendly electric vehicles. The main issue arises where to get electricity? And not just electricity, but environmentally friendly, with its low emission or emission-free production.

Therefore, a key priority for electricity should be development of nuclear generation and construction of new transmission capacities both within the country and for export electricity. The project "Energy bridge Ukraine - European Union" of NNEGC "Energoatom" is a promising one, after which realization the second unit of Khmelnitsky NPP will be connected to the Burshtyn Energy Island and using the restored 750 kV Khmelnytsky NPP-Rzeszow (Poland) power line and existing Khmelnytsky NPP-Albertirsa (Hungary) power line Ukraine will be able to export additional volumes of electricity to the EU .

Given the importance of nuclear generation for ensuring energy security, it is necessary to realize the program of increasing the efficiency of Ukrainian NPPs with consideration of nuclear safety aspects in accordance with the standards of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). This will increase electricity production and expand "Energoatom's" export opportunities to the EU, for what the "Bridge" is needed. Continued cooperation with the alternative supplier of nuclear fuel from Sweden (Westinghouse Electric Sweden) will be very important to further diversify nuclear fuel supplies. This year Ukraine delivered two records: zero gas imports from Russia and sharp increase in the supply of nuclear fuel from an alternative source from 6-7% (the recent years level) to 36%. Obviously, it is needed to achieve nearly the parity of supply with consideration of the complex issues of nuclear safety. The Memorandum EU-Ukraine provides that "Ensuring the highest level of nuclear safety remains a key priority for both sides", "The Sides should also cooperate in the diversification of nuclear fuel supplies for VVER nuclear reactors, including those based on indigenous reserves, with special attention to the issue of licensing of the fuel from different providers." In this context, the September agreement of "Energoatom" and Westinghouse, regarding the expansion of cooperation to optimize operation of Ukrainian NPPs and regarding technology transfer to improve security, needs to be practically implemented. Significant importance has cooperation "...towards achieving the synchronous operation of Ukraine’s unified energy system with the Central European Energy grid in the long run and improving asynchronous operations in the short run where appropriate."

Under the Russian aggression of hybrid type, the need to protect critical energy infrastructure, particularly from cyber-attacks, increases significantly. We already had a serious precedent in 2015, when the integrated power system of Ukraine was subjected to cyber attacks, the culmination of which was on December, 23. Also there were attempts of cyber attacks on the GTS. Fortunately, they were unsuccessful, but against a background of increasing Russian cyberactivity we are not insured from repeated attacks on our energy systems, especially when they work at the peak of the consumer needs in winter. In this context, Ukraine's joining the work of the NATO centers of excellence on energy and cybersecurity gains more importance. By the way, it is also focused on cooperation with NATO in the Global Strategy of the EU: "The EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats..."

Now it is important to complete the work on the Energy Strategy, taking into account that relevant ellaborations were made during 2014-2015 as part of the projects, performed by expert groups under the auspices of the NISS and the Razumkov Centre. By this time final works over integrated version have been undergoing with joint efforts. These works are accompanied by attempts of using administrative resources to bring to the scene an archaic scenario – the coal one, which is outdated not only in the context of global energy trends but also specifically in the Ukrainian case due to coal mining from deep horizons and thin layers and that is more - on uncontrolled territories.

The focus on certain strategic areas will give the opportunity to create beyond the horizon of 2020 a more balanced energy system that could futher not only be transformed into self-sufficient one, but also to act as contributor to Europe's energy security after 2025. But we'll think about Europe later, and as much as it thinks about us. Then, the energy partnership with have chances to move from kvazistrategic to really strategic.