First of all, I propose you to evaluate some documents. Such official documents of the Russia Federation as «National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020» and «Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation» do not accept a process of NATO enlargement. On this basis Russia formulated the objective of deterrence through the «saturation of possible military threats and dangers by political, diplomatic and other non–military means».

The gas lever is an important associated component of the "hybrid war" unleashed by Kremlin against Ukraine. In addition, "gas arguments" are powerful factors of political and psychological impact on Europe, where the loss of thermal comfort in winter is equal to a destructive earthquake.

Long-term objectives fixed by Russia are the following:

• Preservation of status-quo of the Russian supplies from Eastern Gas Corridor to the EU;

• Prevention of competitive gas flows to Europe from East and occurrence of new gas flows from the perspective hydrocarbon extraction projects;

• Bypass of Ukraine with narrowing of its transit role to zero.

   

  Mikhail Korchemkin, an American expert of Russian origin from the East European Gas Analyses (Malvern, Pennsylvania, the USA) came to the next conclusions: "Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines are designed not for the increase of Russian gas supply and the improvement of energy security in Europe. The new projects will give to Russia a possibility of the selective interruption of gas supply to Byelorussia, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. Thereby, the energy security of these countries will go down".

The examples of CH-weapon application by Russia during last decade were:

-           limitation of gas supplies for Belorussia in winter 2004 and 2006 from the  „Gazprom”;

-           limitation of gas supply for Ukraine and EU in the winter 2006 and 2009 from „Gazprom”;

-           complete freezing of oil supply from „Transneft” to Lithuania, beginning from July 2006, as „revenge action” for privatization of Lithuanian oil refinery by the Polish, instead of Russian company.

-           complete freezing from 01.01.2003 of oil transit from the side of  „Transneft” through Latvia as „revenge action” for „discrimination politics concerning Russian minority”;

-           blocking of Kazakhstan oil transit by the Russian oil transporting monopoly in direction to Lithuania 2006 with the purpose not to allow participation of competitive Kazakhstan national oil and gas company „Kazmunaigas” in a competition for privatization of Lithuanian oil processing.

What consequences will threaten to Europe?

1. By increasing risks to an unacceptable level indirect blocking of competitors’ activities and implementation of competing to Russian monopolies projects of foreign companies, which have initiated large-scale projects of conventional and unconventional hydrocarbons extraction.

2. Non-transparent, environmentally problematic deals between majors and Russian state-owned companies in regards to development of Arctic hydrocarbon deposits in exchange to refusal of Western partners from the projects in CEE

3. Transformation of countries, where extraction and energy transit projects may be implemented, competitive to Russian, in the "dark areas" of instability and risks in order to preserve the monopoly status of Russia. One can conclude that the preservation of the monopolized status quo is designed to vary volumes, directions and prices of export supplies to the EU market in order to maximize revenues and put pressure on any country by threat of blocking/cutting off supply, especially in combination with information-psychological campaign.

4. Breakdown of projects for gas transmission from the Caspian and Central Asia to the EU. Gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan is quite important for Europe. But since 1999, it can not pave its way to Europe, because Russia doesn’t want strongly opposes these projects. It has threatened to use military force in case of start of Transcaspian gas pipeline construction. Now Russia actively increases capacities of its Caspian Flotilla and conducts military exercises. The exercises coincide in time with the progress on the issue of the Transcaspian gas pipeline.

5. Russia’s dictatorship in Arctic, accelerated development of high-risky oil and gas fields of the Arctic shelf jointly with foreign companies, which have to legitimize the Kremlin’s Arctic appetites. Russia actively prepares itself to future disputes over the Arctic and its hydrocarbon resources. This is highlighted among the priorities of its foreign policy.

Such Russia’s strategy has proven to be successful:

• Nabucco project does not exist anymore;

• South Stream is, even with problems, moving on;

• Transcaspian Gas Pipeline continues to be stay in the zone of risks and uncertainty;

• To increase risks of defrozen of Karabakh conflict on Southern Caucasus where are located Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum gas pipeline and futre gas flows of Sothern Gas Corridor of the EU.

   

Around the new energy-resource flows and routes of their delivery to markets, Russia is going to create zones of instability, increased political temperature and potential military conflicts. We consider a number of potential areas, which should be put into attention from the EU and US side. Russia’s «hybrid war» against Ukraine is a confirmation of serious and strong intents of Russia to destroy European order and introduce Pax Putiniana.

In view of the above, the following conclusions can be made:

• EU single voice for external energy policy does not exist. EU common foreign and security policy is died. However Europe needs to stop Russian expansion but it’s possible with US support ONLY.

• More cooperation between NATO and the EU concerning Security of Supply and Russian influences in the CEE Region is needed

• More NATO and the EU attention to Central Asia – Caspian Region – Southern Caucasus – Black Sea chain is needed

• More the USA influence in Europe is needed.

• More cooperation in the framework V4+ (incl. Ukraine) is needed

• Polish idea of Energy Union is needed in the framework of CEE countries under support of the USA

   

  Next possible steps are needed:

• Acceleration of procedure of taking of Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014 by Bob Corker for finalization it;

• Blocking by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States deal between Rosneft and Morgan Stanley concerning buying by Russians Oil trader division of the Bank and Heidmar Holdings LLC (oil tankers fleet);

• Temporary freezing of ExxonMobil activity in Russian Arctic Region (cooperation with state owned Rosneft);

• Investigation of banks from the EU countries (first of all from Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Holland and UK) and Switzerland activities concerning deals with Russian state owned (and not only) companies and banks;

• Investigation of activities of the EU companies which are involved into Russian South Stream pipeline project in the context of cooperation with Gazprom and Russian politicians.