Decisions of the summit, among other things, will determine the prospects of relations with Ukraine in the coming years. Although Kyiv does not have to expect some sort of fateful NATO decisions, however, the signals about membership prospects, the Alliance's assessment of Ukraine's progress through Euro-Atlantic integration, the overall context of NATO policy will mark the realism of our Atlantic aspirations.

Signals and expectations

After the NATO Summit in 2016, a number of important issues, both from the side of the Alliance and Ukraine, should be noted in the context of the prospect of our state's membership. These signals are mostly positive for Ukraine, but not exclusively touch upon our country.

Firstly, the Alliance has demonstrated readiness for further expansion if the country is ready to become a member. Since June 5, 2017,Montenegro has become the 29th NATO member, despite an attempt of a coup in the fall of 2016 that would have prevented joining.Nevertheless, Allies have adopted a positive decision for a small Balkan country.

For Ukraine, this should signal that membership in NATO is possible, if it is really the state's goal on achieving which all possible efforts are concentrated, not declaratively, but in practice.

Secondly, NATO claims that it is not going to stop at this and is ready for further waves of enlargement, and Macedonia may be the 30th member of the Alliance, as soon as it agrees with Greece on the official name of the country. Although Macedonia is now included in the list of aspirant countries for accession, together with Ukraine, but visiting Skopje in January 2018, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg sent Macedonia, unlike Ukraine, a clear signal about the prospects for membership: "Consent on this issue(solving the issue of a country's name)is crucial for your country's accession to NATO".

Thirdly, as soon as Ukraine clearly outlined its position on NATO membership, the Alliance reacted and, in March 2018, included our country in the list of aspirant countries.

This happened after the Verkhovna Rada in June 2017 amended the legislation on foreign policy, defining the purpose of "gaining membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," and after the address of President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko to Jens Stoltenberg in February 2018. Consequently, concrete actions, not declarations, give practical result.

Fourthly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly at the spring session of 2018 in its Declaration called on the Heads of State and Government of the Allies at the Brussels Summit to outline clear membership prospects for all aspirant countries, and for our country "to confirm the support of aspirations for membership."

Finally, at a NATO Headquarters meeting on June 7 with Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted the prospect of Ukraine to join the Alliance: "The principle of open doors - one of NATO's basic principles - is relevant both for Ukraine and for other countries". Although such a response by the Secretary General is not concrete, it actually repeats the decision of the Bucharest Summit that Ukraine has the opportunity to acquire membership in NATO.

However, despite a number of these positive signals, Ukraine should not expect the Brussels summit to bring a long-awaited Membership Action Plan (MAP), no matter how we would want it. After all, NATO seeks to keep a "window of opportunity" for maintaining a dialogue with Russia, and the MAP for Ukraine will unequivocallyclosethis window.Additionally, NATO-Ukraine progress has been explicitly blocked by Hungary.

Besides, Georgia is more ready for the MAP, and therefore a good outcome of the Brussels summit could be the provision of the MAP to Georgia, which would demonstrate the Alliance's readiness for further expansion in general and in the post-Soviet space in particular.

Ukraine, going by Georgia's path, could join the Enhanced Opportunity Partnership group, which also includes Sweden, Finland, Jordan, and Australia.This would give an additional impetus to the process of the Euro-Atlantic integration of our state.

So, what can Ukraine expect?

It is to be expected that NATO will once again express its full support in counteracting Russia's aggression, preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity, and also acknowledging the contribution of our state to Euro-Atlantic security. Since the Alliance is increasingly openly recognizing the presence of threats from Russia, it would be logical to consider not only contribution but also integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic security system in order to counteract common threats.

It would be hoped that the Alliance will condemn Russia's violations of human rights in the occupied Ukrainian territories in the Crimea and the Donbass, as well as illegal detention, trials, and sentences against Ukrainian citizens on the territory of Russia.

Although the "Normandy format" and the Minsk Agreements' futility are becoming increasingly apparent, but in the absence of an alternative, the Alliance will probably emphasize the need for their implementation, with a focus on Russia as a side of the conflict. The summit may also discuss prospects for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, and its need may be fixed in the final declaration.

Of course, NATO will pay much attention to counteracting corruption in Ukraine and help strengthen our country's defense capability and carry out wide-ranging reforms based on European and Euro-Atlantic standards. The Alliance will likely mark the implementation of the YNP by Ukraine and will emphasize the need for the sustainability of the results of the reform.

With regard to the prospects for Ukraine's membership in NATO, the Alliance is likely to confine stating the new status of Ukraine as an "aspirant country" and expressing support for its aspirations for membership.

Ukraine's accession to the Enhanced Opportunity Partnership group is unlikely, although such a move would be logical in conjunction with the provision of the MAP to Georgia. The absence of such steps will be perceived by Russia as a "carte blanche" to increase its aggression against Ukraine, other post-Soviet countries and throughout Europe as it was 10 years ago.

The main thing is not to repeat past mistakes.