WARS — XXI: RUSSIA’S POLYHYBRESSION
In blessed memory of
Volodymyr Bezkorovainy,
Bohdan Hawrylyshyn,
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For those who have systemic thinking

The Doomsday Clock is now at 2 minutes 30 seconds to midnight.

* This book is devoted to three prominent Ukrainians, each of whom was an experienced professional in their field and were known in Ukraine, Europe and around the world.


Bohdan Hawrylyshyn (Богдан Гаврилишин), October 19, 1926 – October 24, 2016, Canadian, Swiss and Ukrainian economist, thinker, benefactor and advisor to the governments and large companies worldwide. He was a full member of the Club of Rome, a founder of the European Management Forum in Davos (now World Economic Forum).

Wars-XXI: Russia’s Polyhybression.

Based on the researches of the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” in the framework of Antares project

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Antares* – research project of the non-military components of new generation wars, the wars of the 21st century, implemented by the Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”. The project was launched in 2014 by the research “Hybrid war in Eastern Europe. Non-military dimension. Energy component”. In 2015, a report was prepared with consequent publication of the brochure «Energy component of new generation warfare». In 2016, “Putin’s Hybression. Non-military aspects of new generation wars” brochure was published. The forerunner of this research was the Center’s project “Energy resources and their delivery infrastructure: the potential for inappropriate operation in Europe”, realized in 2010 with support of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine.

The project proposes an energy-centered approach to explaining the phenomenon of war, its energy forms. Also, research on the use of energy resources and energy infrastructure as a tool for keeping the hidden warfare, was carried out.

The Antares project gives the chance to play a puzzle of new generation war phenomenon of Russia’s hybrid type aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s multi-frontal crypto war against the West.

The publication is intended for a wide range of experts and researchers who are focused on understanding the issues of the new generation wars and modern Russia.

*Antares – the one who opposes Ares (Mars), the god of war in the ancient pantheon

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Passing more than a quarter of century after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Western countries are facing a threat from the East. The ongoing Russian onslaught against Ukraine is the centre of gravity of the threat. Zbigniew Brzezinski once famously observed that “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”1 Ukraine’s 2014 Euromaidan – Revolution of Dignity overthrew a corrupt Russian supported president and has begun to lay its path to the European integration. Kremlin has launched an extensive and aggressive warfare against Ukraine, employing all possible means to wear down the country. In March 2014, Russia occupied Ukraine’s Crimea with Russian special forces units, which soldiers wore no insignia and were named as “little green men”. That was one of the most known Russian applied method of “hybrid warfare”.

The concept of hybrid warfare is best understood as an array of covert and deniable activities. It blends “hard and soft power” and is also supported by combination of tools, including some military and some non-military ones, to influence the internal policy and people’s mind of a targeted country, and by doing so - to confuse the international society. The hybrid warfare is a vague in both source and intent, therefore making it hard for nations and multinational institutions to give a timely and appropriate response.

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1 "The Premature Partnership," Foreign Affairs, no. 2, March-April 1994, p. 80
President of the Centre for Global Studies «Strategy XXI» Mykhailo Gonchar and his team of experts have written a timely book “War – XXI: Russia’s Polyhybression” for the national and international security communities. The book provides in details the concept of hybrid aggression against Ukraine and other nations applied by Russia, what expressively named as a “hybression” and “polyhybression”. This work is in my view the first major study of the Russian contemporary warfare that Kremlin has been exercising against Western democracies.

The biggest value of the book is an introduction of well-analyzed indicators and modus operandi of “polyhybression as a variety of the new generation war through the energy-centered approach”. It provides readers with a number of sufficient evidences to illustrate how Kremlin has militarized the non-military assets in pursuing its political objectives, firstly an energy sector, which embraces information manipulations, cyber attacks, political sleight-of-hand and in many cases above all of these – affected by corruption.

The “War – XXI: Russia’s Polyhybression” is based on a remarkable range of sources and it is an extraordinary study of the new generation of Russian warfare for those who have to carry out the work in the service for nations, military scholars, students and security experts.
ORIGINS OF THE WAR. INTRODUCTION.

If, according to Clausewitz, War is the continuation of politics by other means, then politics, as the art of the possible, is the precursor of war when the window of opportunity is closed. Within the framework of the energy-centered approach, politics and war in relations between states can be presented as harmonized and dis-harmonized forms of coexistence of energy potentials, respectively. The changing nature of politics causes dis-harmonization of relations in the world arena, which inevitably sooner or later leads to their conflict solution through war. War, through the prism of the energy-centered approach, is a predatory way of acquisition of the enemy’s energy potential by subjugating the enemy in order to increase one’s own power in geopolitical and geo-economic dimensions. Another case is preventive elimination of the competing energy potential, seen as a future rival, whose development may present a potential future challenge.

In the globalization era, theaters of war are not only physical-and-geographic spaces of the planet, like land, sea, and air. Outer space around the planet, as well as non-physical spaces, information space and cyberspace, become war theaters. New generation war, post-modern war, para-war, non-conventional war, non-linear war, asymmetric war, diffused war, creeping word, network-centric warfare, rebel war, proxy war, hybrid war: these and other war combinations reflect different aspects of war; however, the key word in them is “war”.

In 2014, Ukraine and the world had faced a kind of war that may be called a hybrid-type aggression. Whatever the definition used, its main characteristic is prevalence of non-military components while solving strategic tasks. Whatever it is called, it does not change its essence. This is war. Still, we think that the term “hybrid war” is the most adequate definition of one of the aspects of a broader notion: a new generation war, a war that destroys people’s minds, as well as society and state governance system while preserving material assets of a victim for the aggressor.

The word combination “hybrid war” previously used by a limited number of experts, became widely used in 2014, almost 100 years after the beginning of WWI and almost 75 years after the beginning of WWII. The world, unnoticed, is sliding towards the next world war, dissimilar to the previous two. The world’s politicians do not notice this even in the fourth year after the beginning of Putin’s hybression: Russia’s war against Ukraine, started as a hybrid-type aggression. The Anschluss of Austria by the Third Reich, the Sudetenland, the hybrid elimination of the Czechoslovak state were the indicators of a global storm in the world politics of the end of 1930s. However, the leading Western European politicians of those times had not noticed this. Dialog with Hitler, negotiations with Nazis, pacification of the Third Reich had resulted in WWII.
The Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union were among the poles of both world wars. As a result of WWI, the Russian Empire collapsed but then came back in a transformed shape, as the USSR. As a result of WWII, the Soviet empire became stronger. It made its sphere of influence in Europe wider. There also was the Cold War, often called the Third World War. By the way, in many dimensions it was of a hybrid nature: “war-no-war”. No one waged a war, like this was during WWI or WWII, but periodically clashes between East and West happened in different parts of the world: Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan. Those clashes were not only ideological. This was hybrid confrontation. On the one hand, it was completely peaceful: ideological struggle and economic competition between the two world systems, capitalism and socialism. On the other hand, it was armed, involving the arms race, and rather bloody, with deaths of people in domestic civil and armed conflicts where every warring side was backed by the USSR or the USA, the Warsaw Treaty or NATO. The USSR had not endured the Cold War. As the Russian Empire after WWI, it collapsed. This turned out to be a hybrid collapse. On the one hand, there is no longer the USSR as a subject but, on the other hand, Russia is there, a smaller replica of the USSR, with all its drawbacks inherited.

It should be pointed out that hybridity is an immanent quality of the Soviet model. In fact, the USSR was a hybrid. On the one hand, officially “union” means an alliance of states retaining their sovereignty although they unite. On the other hand, it is generally known that the USSR was a centralized, unitary state, totalitarian to the maximum. A “single voice” there meant only Moscow’s opinion and had not suggested any other opinions from the capitals of 14 “sister republics”, be it Tallinn, Tbilisi, Aşgabat, or Kyiv. Slogans for “peace all over the world” and the peaceful nature of the Soviet system were on the pages of the press and in radio and TV broadcasts in the USSR. This did not stop Soviet leaders from secretly waging subversive wars in many regions of the world “for the sake of peace and triumph of socialist ideas”. Hybridity was everywhere. The mix of falsehood and truth manifested everywhere, starting with the notion of “the country of socialist democracy” and finishing with enterprises and institutions whose names supposedly testified to the purely peaceful nature of their work.

Such examples can be quoted endlessly:

- “Uralvagonzavod” produced not only and not so many railway carriages. This was one of the biggest USSR enterprises to produce armored vehicles, and it was disguised as producing civil equipment;

- The Ministry of General Machine-Building, contrary to its very generalizing name, engaged in the entirely concrete and narrow-targeted work: it coordinated the work of enterprises and scientific-and-research institutes specialized in the topics of space and missile-and-nuclear weapons;

- The Ministry of Agricultural Machine-Building had the Scientific-and-Research Missile Institute (!), known since 1960s as The Moscow Thermal
Physics Institute, the main developer of strategic and tactical rocket and missile complexes of the USSR;

- The “Leninska Kuznya” Ship-Building Plant, situated far from the seas, in Kyiv, produced not only fishing trawlers of 502 and 503 projects but also corvettes of project 1124M “Albatros”, as well as slow motion screw bolts of regulated pace for Soviet submarines using advanced Western equipment secretly acquired from the enemy avoiding COCOM, the Coordination Committee for Export Control;

- The Mechanics Department of the Kyiv Civil Aviation Engineers Institute trained not only panel engineers and flight engineers for the civil aviation of the USSR. The students were simultaneously acquiring higher military training, studying Tu-16 strategic bombers and KSR-5 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads of 350 kilotons. Every year, almost one-fourth of graduates were made Lieutenants and went to serve in the USSR Air Force and the USSR Navy air force.

The USSR acted in a no less “hybrid” manner abroad. Slogans of solidarity with national-liberation movements of peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America masked subversive actions of the Soviet Union against Western states in their colonial territories. It is interesting that sometimes this was not concealed but, on the contrary, demonstrated. Here is an example: a fragment of a 1971 article by P. Mikhalyov, a special correspondent of “Komsomolskaya Pravda” newspaper, from Angola which fought Portugal for independence. One of the militants shares his memories with the journalist: “Of course, first of all I wanted to fight with arms in my hands but the MPLA leadership decided otherwise and sent me in 1963 to study in the Soviet Union, to the Nova Kakhovka Agricultural Mechanization and Electrification Technical School in Kherson Region (MPLA was an Angolan movement of Marxist orientation, supported by the USSR, opposed to FNLA/UNITA, supported by the West – our note). The future free Angola, an agricultural country, will need my knowledge, I was told. However, after I got a technician’s diploma, I went through military studies in your country for a year. We still have a greater need in military specialities in our country than civil specialities”. This was the kind of “mechanics” and “electricians” that they trained in the USSR where almost every higher educational establishment had a military chair providing for learning not only civilian but military professions as well.

The hybridity topic found its reflection in the folklore of Soviet times. A bright example is a joke about “a hybrid tractor”, in modern terms, of the time of the Soviet-Chinese conflict for Damanski Island in the Amur River: “Chinese aggressors fired at a Soviet tractor which was peacefully plowing the soil in the border area. The tractor returned fire and destroyed the enemy, and successfully returned to the base.”

Perhaps, as a continuation of this Soviet joking tradition, periodically, they in the

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Kremlin invent peaceful “tractor drivers”, “miners”, and “farmers” of the Donbas who fight “the Kyiv junta” after they took their weapons out of the mines.


It is clear that the Kremlin’s current ruler does not file himself or the Russian military he sent to Ukraine with “tractor drivers” or “miners”. It looks like Vladimir Putin believes he is a reincarnation of Grand Prince Volodymyr, the baptizer of Kyivan Rus and one of the princes who «assembled the Rus lands”, according to the Russian version of history.

Of course, all this should be considered solely in the context of the thesis that the Kyivan Rus’ geographical and historical space is identical with the Soviet-Russian space in the Kremlin belief system. This space includes historical territories of the Eastern Slavs: Ukraine and Belarus. Ukrainians and Belarussians are part of the «same nation» in Moscow’s view, of course, of the Russian one, which was repeatedly separated and played off one against another by Russia’s enemies. The last time this happened in 1991, when the Soviet Union was destroyed.

According to Russian imagination, it was precisely the «destruction of the USSR», and not its dissolution, as it is commonly believed outside Russia. Dissolution is a natural process, but destruction is an artificial process, specially designed by the West for destruction of a «great and mighty state that occupied one-sixth of

3 The Russocentric approach to Kyivan Rus history and Russia’s propaganda transformed Kyiv Prince Baptizer Volodymyr the Great into Russia’s prince. Authentic name of Kyiv Grand Prince corresponds to Ukrainian name Volodymyr (originally written in Early Cyrillic: Володимърь: modern Ukrainian version: Володимир). Russian name Vladimir (Владимир) sounds different.
the Earth’s land». Simultaneously, they ignore the facts that the USSR had a raw-materials-based economy, based primarily on oil revenues; it was one of the biggest grain and food importers in the world while it had the largest black-soil territories in the world; it waged a secret war in Afghanistan; it took part in the exhausting arms race with the West. Thus, it was doomed to collapse during the first, albeit short, period of low oil prices, irrespective of this being a ploy or an objective process. Of course, according to the Russian interpretation, it was the West’s encroachments, headed by the USA and supported by Vatican, which created pre-conditions for the collapse of the USSR.

The Soviet Union was destroyed in a non-military way. This view caused the desire of the present lord of the Kremlin to restore it by non-military means as well. This explains numerous projects of the USSR-2.0 in the shapes of ideological constructs in the post-Soviet territories: the Single Economic Space, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Customs Union. There is deception about a kind of Russia’s historic mission for a new assembling of lands. This means that the spiritual baptismal fonts should be assembled under the omophorion of the new Messiah: of course, Vladimir II. This means Chersonesus in Crimea and the Dnieper in Kyiv.

Non-military methods of the restoration of a “great power” through “assembling the lands” had not worked in 1990s, or 2000s. Every former republic of the USSR has chosen its way and was not going to share sovereignty. By the way, Russia was not free from the imperial syndrome during the pre-Putin period, too. It is worth remembering B. Yeltsin’s Decree of 1995, “On the Strategic Course of the Russian Federation with Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States”. It stated in a clear way: “The main aim of Russia’s policy in relation to the CIS is the creation of an economically and politically integrated association of states”. An analytical paper of the Council for National Security and Defense of Ukraine of 1997 pointed out: “The mass awareness of the Russian society does not identify the RF with its territory within the 1991 borders. This defines the expansive mode of behavior of Russia’s political establishment. As shown by the experience of Ukrainian-Russian relations of the latter years, there is a stable political consensus regarding Ukraine, based on the postulate about randomness and temporary nature of Ukrainian statehood”.

Both in Yeltsin’s times and, especially, during the Putin period, the Kremlin has blamed the West for everything. According to the Kremlin’s view, the West has continued expansion to Russia’s living space, which incorporated Central and


South-Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltics, by drawing the region’s countries into NATO and the EU. This meant countries like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which used to be part of the Soviet territory, and Bulgaria, considered “the 16th republic of the USSR”. When later the USA “has targeted Ukraine and Georgia” involving them into NATO, Russia decided to give a rebuff.

First, the USSR’s collapse was characterized in 2005 as the biggest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, then came V. Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference of 2007 with a message of unacceptability and impossibility of the existence of a mono-polar world where the USA is the dominant player. After this, deeds followed words. August 2008. Georgia. Intervention. It worked. The West had swallowed an act of aggression. Brussels had made Georgia, the victim, guilty of the conflict. Russia, in contrast, had been offered partnership for the sake of modernization. The results were above expectations. Russia became stronger due to the hydrocarbon revenue. The West became weaker because of the financial crisis of 2008-2009.

Russia in Putin’s times strives for restoring the Soviet status quo ante in the world arena. However, this does not exhaust the circle of tasks that Putin’s regime wants to solve. One of the main tasks, though not articulated by Russia, is reformatting the world financial system in the way that money flows be controlled where resource flows start. As Russia is the world’s biggest country, and one of the richest in mineral raw materials, the resource flows that start in Russia should come back to it as equivalent financial flows under the state control. The way to such reformatting lies through destabilization of the existing world order, determined by the West and, first of all, by the USA. Destabilization and managed chaos in the world’s regions competing with Russia in raw materials (the Middle East, in the first turn) mean high prices and maximization of imports from “the stable Russia”. High prices for raw materials and, especially, for energy resources, mean weakening of the economies of the countries of the west. The West’s weak link is the European Union, dependent on delivery of energy resources from Russia. To tear EU away from the USA and to achieve its collapse is Russia’s geopolitical revenge of sorts for the destruction of the USSR by the West. This is, in general terms, Russia’s logic during V. Putin’s period of presidency.

Now or never! The time for global revenge has come! The USSR was destroyed from within, this is why the West and its allies will be destroyed from within as well. Propaganda and corruption are universal mechanisms for destroying the modern Western world. The Kremlin realized that the West, starting from the 2000s, is disunited as never before. The USA is bogged down in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Germany dominates Europe and depends on Russian hydrocarbons. European politicians are prone to “the Schroeder effect”. A Europe that V. Putin needs is the
Europe of Berlusconi, Schroeder, Sarkozy, Orban, Zeman, not the Europe of Bildt, Grybauskaite, Tusk, or Merkel. Le Pen, Salvini, Wilders, Farage, et al. are the ones who have to make Europe comfortable for Russia by transforming it into the backyard of “Great Eurasia”. In the Kremlin’s opinion, Trump is the person who has to unwillingly help this with his “America First” policy.

All this taken together testifies to the fact that it is not by chance that the hybrid war became the main, though not the only, tool of the Russian neo-imperialism. V. Putin’s Russia, despite its propaganda power, is afraid of a direct confrontation with the West, especially NATO, because economic and military potentials of the sides are rather different, and not in favor of the Kremlin. This became the reason for choosing the model of hybrid war as the one which, in essence, corresponds to the hybrid nature of the Russian state and, simultaneously, allows to deliver a blow on the West in a way that it does not identify as a war against itself. In this sense, V. Putin achieved success in the hybrid war because even during its fourth year the West has not realized that Russia delivers a blow on Europe with attacking Ukraine, which has chosen and defended European benchmarks in the struggle with the pro-Moscow kleptocracy of Yanukovych. They still have not realized in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, or Rome that the current Moscow authorities are implementing a project of geopolitical re-engineering of Eurasian space, trying to create a hybrid of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, with its territory, according to the plan, running from Vladivostok to Lisbon and from St Petersburg to Colombo.

The hybrid-type aggression against Ukraine, which has lasted for more than three years now, became the Rubicon of the Kremlin’s global geopolitical revanche. Its next stage was the intervention into Syria in 2015, which generated waves of
migration from the Middle East to Europe. Though unsuccessful, the attempted coup d’etat in Montenegro in 2016 marks the opening of “the Balkan Front” against Europe. Demonstrative nuclear sabre-rattling probably symbolizes preparations to non-traditional and non-conventional use of nuclear arms. Cyber interference in American elections, actions of the Russian cyber-forces disguised as international hacker activity point to the fact that Russia has opened the cyber front against the West. These steps, when considered together, allow to make a conclusion that Russia is carrying out multi-front actions against the West, the EU in the first turn, as the weak link in the Transatlantic security and partnership system.

This work by the Center is an attempt to look at the topic of the new generation war not only as the war of a country against another country, Russia against Ukraine, or another confrontation against the East-West divide. It is also about another circle of the evolution of military art, hiding threats no smaller than the threat of the nuclear Apocalypse during the Cold War. Hybression is a stealth technology, of sorts, of waging war, when the source of the blow is initially impossible to see for a victim or the environment. However, the arsenal of Russia’s possible actions is not exhausted by this. Putin’s Syrian campaign demonstrates Russia’s potential with the use of high-precision weapons and with waging contactless war. Supposedly, Russia may act similarly to the way the USA and NATO acted against Yugoslavia in 1999. The third component of Russia’s polyhybression is near: a non-conventional use of mass destruction weapons.

Let us consider the Russian polyhybression as a variety of the new generation war through the energy-centered approach, which we developed. We will first consider problems of non-conventional war of the modern type through its non-military components which are dominant, according to the concept of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, V. Gerasimov. However, we will briefly address history to start with.
1.

CAMOUFLAGED WAR
1. CAMOUFLAGED WAR

1.1. A brief look at the history of the USSR’s subversive activities

Hybrid war is not a know-how of Putin’s regime. The current Russian practices have been drafted on the basis of the templates of the old Soviet practice. Its roots back to the Resolution of the Politburo Commission of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the issue of active intelligence dated February 25, 1925. Soviet Russia tested its first practices of “hybrid war” in 1920s-1930s against its neighboring countries: Poland, Romania, China, as well as Central Asia. “The hybrid war” of the Stalin standard had a different name: military-subversive activity.

However, before these practices were shaped as a system of subversive activity, the Soviet Russia, immediately after its proclamation by Vladimir Lenin, resorted to destroying new nation-states on the territory of the former Russian Empire. Logically, the Bolshevik concept of “Czar’s Russia is a prison for nations” would suggest that the Bolsheviks should support the formation of such states. However, as soon as the Bolsheviks took power, they re-thought the concept of this approach through the prism of “world revolution” and proletariat’s victory. The nation-states of the countries previously incorporated in the Czar’s Russia were identified as enemies because forces of national bourgeoisie took power there, and bourgeoisie was considered the class enemy of the international proletariat.

Ukraine became the first testing ground for implementing the Bolshevik technologies of “organizational weapons” which the Bolsheviks started to practice after they seized power in Russia. The proclamation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in Kyiv, on 7 November 1917, as an autonomy within Soviet Russia, caused an immediate reaction of V. Lenin’s Bolshevik government. He sent detachments of the so-called Red Guards to Kharkiv, where the creation of the alternative “Ukrainian People’s Republic of workers’, peasants’, soldiers’ and Cossacks’ deputies” was proclaimed on the Red Guards’ bayonets. It was in federal relations with Russia and established “the absolute agreement in aims and actions, necessary for the interests of workers and peasants of all the peoples of the Russian Federation”. The similar names of both republics, the deceiving slogans “All power to the Soviets”, “Land to

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6 Based on publications of:
Voronov V. Stalin’s Green Men. Available at: http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/26670277.html; Red Terror for Export. Available at: http://www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/4373/. (in Russian)
Pidlutskyi O. Myths of the Shameful War. 70 Years Ago the Soviet Union Attacked Finland. Available at: http://gazeta.zn.ua/SOCIETY/mify_pozornoy_voyny__70_let_nazad_sovetskiy_soyuz_napal_na_finlyandiyu.html. (in Russian)
As well as a number of the Russian sources, devoted to the War in Spain and the Korean War.
The people”, “Factories to the workers” disoriented the population and increased the degree of chaos.

Later, “the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets” was held in Kharkiv and “the Central Executive Committee” was formed. Then, “the People’s Secretariat” was established, a puppet government managed from Petrograd. Two centers of power emerged in Ukraine, in Kyiv and in Kharkiv, and this provided Russia with the opportunity to present events as a domestic conflict, a civil war. Here is a direct analogy with the current “civil conflict” which, according to the Kremlin, is happening in Ukraine since 2014. The pro-Russian authority in Kharkiv had immediately begun introducing decrees at the command of the Bolshevik Council of People’s Commissars, projected from Petrograd. In January 1918, the Bolshevik troops of Muraviov took Kyiv. “The People’s Secretariat” moved to the capital of Ukraine from Kharkiv. In the subsequent confrontation with the overwhelming forces of Russia and its puppets in Ukraine, the Ukrainian People’s Republic had fallen. The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, formally an independent state, joined the USSR on 30 December 1922, along with the Russian SFSR, Byelorussian SSR, and Transcaucasian SSR (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). This was the first serious success of the Bolshevik Russia in creating and using the technologies of a war where the military component was the main component, but the beginning was characterized with the use of “organizational weapons” disorienting the enemy. Later, these technologies were significantly improved, though their application was not always successful.

In Poland, in 1920s-1930s, special groups acted in the East of the country: putting on the Polish military or police uniform, they robbed and burned down administrative offices in the province thus discrediting the central authorities and trying to provoke uprisings in the regions with non-Polish population. The saboteurs and terrorists, however, had not fulfilled their main task: a “people’s uprising” failed to happen.

This same kind of policy was carried out against Romania. Special units were moved across the Dniester from the Soviet territory and killed Romanian border guards, policemen, military servicemen, and local officials, working along the lines of the “people’s wrath” scenario. The so-called 1924 Tatarbunary Uprising in Bessarabia became the climax of these actions. Weapons were secretly delivered on boats across the Dniester from the Soviet to Romanian territory and stored there. According to the general plan, active reconnaissance groups moved to Bessarabia. They had to lean on the detachments of militants (20-30 people each) formed in advance and were supposed to start a «popular uprising» against “Romanian Boyars» in Cahul, Izmail, and Kiliya. It was planned to proclaim Soviet power there and then address the USSR with a request to provide “internationalist assistance” with regular Red Army Forces. On 15 September 1924, “rebels” cut telephone and telegraph wires, attacked police precincts and began creating revolutionary committees, forming
policing detachments, as well as militia and Red Guards units. However, they failed to capture any of the cities. Soviet power was proclaimed only in the village of Tatarbunary. After they killed the mayor and gendarmes, the gunmen blocked the village and hung red flags on some buildings. Then they herded local residents to the mayor’s office building and announced the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Republic (MSR) within the Ukrainian SSR. They also announced that the Red Army had already crossed the Dniester and had drawn away the Romanian Army. However, while the militiamen were enthusiastically creating revolutionary committees and distributing high state offices in the individually taken village, time had passed. The locals had not accepted the “uprising” while Bucharest had not bided time: within four days, Romanian troops took “the capital of the MSR”, Tatarbunary. The scenario of a “revolution” in Bessarabia, with Kotovsky’s cavalry storming the region on the shoulders of “rebels” in order to provide “the internationalist assistance”, flopped.

By the way, 90 years later a similar failure was in store for a scenario of creating “the Bessarabian People’s Republic” based on 9 districts of Odessa Region in Ukraine’s South-West.

Soviet “volunteers” had not stood aside of the civil conflict in Spain in 1936, successfully inflated by the Comintern. The USSR had joined the agreement on “non-interference in Spanish affairs” and became a member of the international “Non-Interference Committee”. However, as early as 4 October 1936, a Spanish cargo ship with the first consignment of weapons arrived to Cartagena from Feodosiya. On October 13, in the Cartagena port, 18 I-15 fighters were unloaded. After several days, 150 air force servicemen came to an airfield near Alicante. 50 pilots and 100 technicians were among them. On 4 November 1936, an air battle took place between I-15s and Italian Fiat-32s over the Madrid Front. Italy’s representative, Dino Grandi, while speaking to the Non-Interference Committee, said that “the Spanish national forces” had captured 4 tanks produced in the USSR, while a Soviet bomber was shot down on November 3 and two planes were captured on November 4. This same day, the USSR representative to the Non-Interference Committee, the USSR Ambassador to the United Kingdom, I. Mayskiy, rejected accusations from the Italian and German representatives who claimed that the USSR transported military equipment and weapons to Spain and that Red Army servicemen took part in combat actions. This refusal was untrue and resembles the current military actions and subversive activities by Russia in Ukraine. The flow of weapons from the then USSR’s “supermarkets” to Spanish Republicans was significant. From October 1936 to September 1937, 23 sea-going vessels with weapons arrived to Spain from the USSR. In total, the USSR gave the Republicans 1,555 artillery systems, 806 airplanes, and 362 tanks. German and Italian submarines sunk several Soviet ships with “humanitarian help” in the Mediterranean Sea.
Indicative was the attempt of the Stalin regime to regain, by the end of 1930s, control over the former “Chukhon Territory” of the Czarist Russia. Since 1917, this was the independent Finland. The Soviet Russia had officially recognized the independence of the former part of the territory of the Russian Empire. However, the concept of “the world revolution” had, with time, led to re-thinking by the USSR of its approach towards “lost territories”. Under the pretext of “making Leningrad secure” and protecting it from possible bombardment by “White Finns”, Soviet troops launched combat actions against Finland on 30 November 1939. The very next day, December 1, the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic (FDR) was proclaimed, led by the puppet government of Otto Kuusinen, in the town of Terijoki. Kuusinen was an ethnic Finn, a Communist, and held a Soviet passport. The USSR stated that the government in Helsinki had fled and had not governed the country anymore, and the USSR would have relations only with the FDR’s government. On December 2, a treaty on friendship and mutual assistance was concluded between the USSR and the FDR. “The Finnish People’s Army” comprised “volunteers”, Karelians and Finns with USSR passports, who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District. It is telling that its formation started in advance, on 11 November 1939. The FPA’s I Corps was formed, on the basis of the Mountain-Rifle Division 106 of the Leningrad Military District. Before November 26, there were 13,405 servicemen in the Corps, while in February of 1940 the number grew to 25,000. The servicemen had the uniform resembling the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model. The Corps’ staff was headed by Brigade Commander Romanov whose alias was “Comrade Rajkas”, while the political department was headed by some Teryokhin, alias “Comrade Tervonen”. The FPA was headed by Axel Antila, a Finn, a Red Army officer who was repressed in 1937 but urgently returned from GULAG in 1939.

Apart from the USSR, the FDR was recognized by Mongolia and Tuva, where pro-Soviet regimes ruled. The resistance by the Finnish Army and population (in total, 265 thousand militiamen), who confronted the Stalin regime, made Stalin’s plan of subjugation of Suomi impossible. The planned “little victorious war” transformed into an exhausting campaign for the aggressor, with the USSR losses disproportionately high. Although the Soviet Union failed to restore the status quo ante of Finland in the form of the Finnish SSR within the USSR, Suomi was not able to defend its interests in full. Soviet troops had finally broken through the Mannerheim Line; and the hopes of the government in Helsinki for help from France and Britain, as promised before, turned out to be in vain. On 12 March 1940, the government in Helsinki and the USSR concluded a peace treaty. According to the treaty, part of the Finnish territory (Karelia, Vyborg) was handed over to the USSR. “The Finnish people’s government” headed by O. Kuusinen “self-disbanded”. There was no mention of this government in the treaty: the USSR eliminated the puppet as there was no need for its existence any more. Finland is an example of unsuccessful implementation of the hybrid technology of launching a war. The ploy about “coming to help” a hastily created “people’s republic” which dreams of “voluntary accession to the USSR” turned out to be non-convincing to Finns. However, this had not stopped the USSR in the future.
After the end of WWII, Moscow used technologies of discrediting the forces of resistance in the West of Ukraine (UPA), where a powerful movement of resistance to German and, later, Soviet occupiers unfolded since 1942. Clothed in the rebels’ uniforms, the NKVD (later MGB) units perpetrated mass terror against peaceful population. This technology had been in use for almost a decade, until mid-1950s.

Europe faced the Soviet practice of creating people’s republics while WWII was running to its end. In 1944-45, multi-party governments of national fronts, which fought Nazi occupiers and their own collaborators, came to power in countries of Central and South-East Europe. The establishment of regimes of socialist or pro-Soviet orientation was technologically done in three stages. First, a real coalition government was formed, with the participation of Communists. Then, governments were re-formatted with formal preservation of multi-party composition but with entire power resting in the hands of Communists. And, finally, entirely Communist governments were formed with the establishment of totalitarian regime. Such regimes, which got the name of “people’s democracies”, appeared in Bulgaria and Romania in the autumn of 1947, in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, in Hungary in March 1948. The Communist and Workers’ Parties Information Bureau (Cominform), founded in 1947, was the mechanism of coordination of the Communist parties’ activities by Moscow.

During the Cold War, the USSR acted through the mechanism of support of leftist or national-liberation movements in a number of countries. The Soviet Union not only provided them with weapons and money but also sent advisers and special forces’ groups for combat actions disguised as “people’s struggle with a puppet regime supported by the West”.

One of the key aspects that determine the success of a hybrid war is unnoticed and disguised participation of military servicemen of one country on the territory of another country. There is a historically tested mechanism: volunteers (in the case of the aggression against Ukraine they are as if on leave from active service). The biggest case of using armed forces disguised as volunteers was the war in Korea in 1950-1953. “Co-authored” by Stalin and Mao, this tactic led to the appearance of 1 to 3 million Chinese servicemen-volunteers, according to different estimates, and almost 40 thousand Soviet “volunteers”. While Chinese “volunteers” made up the bulk of land forces, the Soviet “volunteers” were mostly meant to conquer superiority in the air. Soviet pilots and air defense specialists were disguised as Chinese volunteers in Korea. They were well disguised: clad in Chinese uniforms, with Chinese aliases and corresponding documents, and their planes had symbols of the Air Force of China’s People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) on them. The 64th Fighter Air Corps, engaged in combat in Korea for almost three years, consisted of three Air Divisions (ten Air Regiments, with 321 planes) and included air defense units and technical maintenance units. The average aggregate number of the corps’ personnel amounted to 26 thousand.
Officially, the USSR maintained that Soviet troops had not participated in the Korean War. In fact, they did participate in the war as part of the CPLA units where there were many Soviet officers and generals. Officially, they were military advisers but in fact they commanded units where Chinese “commanders” were just interpreters. Almost a thousand and a half such “advisers” were sent to the Korean Army as “Chinese volunteers”. The group of Soviet military specialists in Korea played a crucial role in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. They were planning the combat use of tanks, aviation, artillery, engineering troops, and communication troops. Soviet military advisers often took the initiative in their hands.

The USSR concealed and denied participation of its troops in the war. Despite all the measures to maintain the strict secrecy regime, the USA was well aware of this. However, the official Washington kept silent for the entire three years of the war. The US Administration arrived at the conclusion that it would be better to keep the USSR’s participation in the war secret from the American public. This was dictated by the anticipation of the indignant public demanding corresponding actions in response. This was fraught with unforeseen consequences. The USSR used this to its advantage. Here is a fragment from recollections of one of officers - “volunteers”: “Once, an order came to urgently collect our belongings and abandon positions. For almost 24 hours, we were in the hills, several kilometers from our location. Chinese soldiers immediately took our site. Later, it became known that this was the day when a UN inspection was checking whether Soviet servicemen took part in the combat.”
In one of his works, a contemporary Russian expert, Alexander Neklesa, points to features of hibrydity in Korean and Vietnamese campaigns.

Soviet “volunteers” appeared in Syria, too. In 1956 they directly participated in combat actions on the Syrian-Israeli front, as well as in the following events: 5-13 June 1967 (the Six-Day War), March-July 1970 (the war of exhaustion), September-November 1972 (the war in the air), 6-24 October 1973 (the Yom-Kippur War).

The latest modification of the military-subversive actions of the Soviet period were the Interfronts, created by the USSR’s KGB in the late 1980s-early 1990s to counterbalance popular movements which emerged in union republics on the wave of the society’s democratization and its transition to the pluralistic model of development. The last head of the USSR’s KGB, Vadim Bakatin, wrote in his book, “Getting Rid of the KGB”: “The Security Committee was at the sources of the creation of international fronts in the union republics which displayed character in their relations with the Center. The erroneous logic of ‘divide and rule’ stimulated division of society in these republics into two irreconcilable camps and led to the sharpening of social tension [...] The pattern used was: ‘if you don’t want to obey, you’ll get an interfront calling to strikes and raising the issue of the republic’s borders and of the lawfulness of the authorities elected there’, and then the activities of those inter-fronts were showed by the State Security Committee (KGB) as a manifestation of the will of all people”.

Russia’s use of “volunteers” in Ukraine is happening in full accordance with the cases of Soviet military, quoted earlier. A Russian military expert, Pavel Felgengauer, had rather clearly pointed out that there are “military servicemen sent as advisers or commanders. There are volunteers who may be military servicemen but do not represent regular units” within illegal armed formations in the Donbas.
October 2015. A call to volunteers in Alexander Dugin’s group in “Vkontakte” social network: “Our Syrian brothers are awaiting you! ‘Crusader’ international battalion is waiting for the braves. Age: 18-40 years old; good physical form; patriotic convictions; combat skills; military specialization; participation in combat actions a plus. Good pay, combat remuneration, equipment and training guaranteed. To register, call (062) 306-25-13. https://vk.com/agdugin

Similar things are happening in the Syrian campaign. Although the Kremlin has created an image of a classical modern war with the use of high-precision weapons along the lines of the American contactless war against Yugoslavia in 1999, it does possess signs of the parallel conduct of hybrid war with the use of “volunteers” and private military companies.

The retrospective of the topic of hybrid warfare points to the fact that its theorists and developers were not only in the Soviet General Staff. There were people who worked on the topic of wars of the future in the milieu of the anti-Bolshevik White emigres. One of them was Yevgeny Messner, an officer of the Czarist Russia’s Army, who ended his military career as Lt Colonel of the General Staff of Wrangel’s army and emigrated from Russia. He described “rebellion war” as the war of the future in one of his works published in Buenos Aires in 1960: “In the future war, warfare will be happening not on the line but on the entire area of both opponents because behind the armed front line there will appear political, social, economic fronts; they will wage war not in two dimensions as it used to be in ancient times; not in three dimensions as it was from the moment military aviation was born; but in four dimensions; the psyche of warring nations is the fourth dimension. A warring side will be on the territory of another side, creating and supporting guerilla movement, it will support opposition parties, with ideas and in kind, by propaganda and finances; it will be nourishing disobedience, wrecking, sabotage
and terror there by all means, creating rebellion there» 10. “‘Rebellion war’ is a heretic war, psychological, lowly, fierce, Apocalyptic war... They make war openly and secretly, continuously or episodically... They wage war universally, using all the means of ruination... They wage war using regular troops with their military monopoly lost, and using irregular forces, now a powerful war factor... They wage war using guerillas, subversion agents, terrorists, propagandists, and saboteurs... But also using other unconventional weapons: aggressodiplomacy, oil weapons, pornography weapons, narcoweapons, brainwashing weapons...”

A number of references can be quoted to works of military specialists who lived in different times both in the USSR and abroad. These are the works attracting attention, during recent years, not only of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation but also of numerous propagandists of “the Russian glory” and “the Russian arms”. This will not change the main conclusion. And this is the conclusion that the Russian variety of the technology of waging “hybrid war” is an improved version of the synthesis of Soviet military-subversive activity, developed in the USSR during the Stalin period, and of foreign theories and practices, tested in different countries in different periods of modern history.

In his 2013 work, “Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia’s Influence Abroad”, James Sherr, Fellow of the British Royal Institute for Foreign Affairs, Chatham House, put together means and practices traditionally used by Czarist and Soviet Russia and still used by the modern Russian Federation in its relations with neighbors near and distant.

According to him, these are:

– the policy of division and influence;
– the use of moral, financial, and political vulnerability;
– infiltration (to opponents and allies);
– involvement (temporary and conditional alliances);
– creating fictitious companies, “shadow” structures, using proxies;
– using covert operations and agents of influence;
– language manipulations;
– the use methods of propaganda and means of information-and-psychological warfare.

Russia has been using the entire range of methods and tactics mentioned above, not only during the hybrid war against Ukraine but during the entire period of the existence of the independent Ukrainian state. This is why the theory of spontaneity of Putin’s actions against Ukraine, spread from time to time by Russian politicians beyond Russian borders, is either spin-doctoring or lack of deep retrospective

analysis of Russia's policy in relation to Ukraine. The assessment by US President B. Obama was a rebroadcast of this theory. Mr. Obama said that Putin had not had a prepared strategy towards Ukraine, while the annexation of Crimea was the Kremlin’s “improvisation” in response to protests in Maidan, unexpected for Moscow. This deeply erroneous assessment does not match the facts of the modern history of the post-Soviet period.

Russia’s policy towards Ukraine during the first years after the collapse of the USSR confirms James Sherr’s conclusions. Moscow had not perceived the proclamation of independence by Ukraine seriously. Aiming at returning “the fraternal republic” under the Kremlin’s hand, the “young” Russia decided to play the card of the Black Sea Fleet. The strategy of blackmailing Kyiv with territorial claims to Crimea and Sevastopol was urgently developed in Moscow. Russian MPs Yevgeni Ambartsumov and Vladimir Lukin were the authors of the idea. The essence of the strategy was in establishing the Fleet, based in the Ukrainian Black Sea ports, securing the preservation of its infrastructure in Ukraine and, by having done this, in returning “the prodigal sister” to “the Slavic union”. The stake in this strategy was made not so much on the military component (though it had been accounted for) as on the Fleet’s ideological structures. To Russia’s leadership, such a development of events seemed the most accessible and acceptable for the international community. What was left to do was to get Crimea. On 5 December 1992, the 7th Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation resolved to entrust the Supreme Soviet of the RF to consider the issue of the status of Sevastopol, and on 9 July 1993, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution on the Russian status of the city.

11 As an example, a fragment of Sergei Aleksashenko's interview: “Against the background of the Crimean euphoria, a group of people emerged in Putin's environment, including Malofeyev, Surkov, Glazyev, who decided that there were strong pro-Russian sentiments in Eastern Ukraine, and a special operation, similar to the one conducted in Crimea, could be carried out there. It was thought that what was lacking was “to light a match”. They wrote a paper for Putin. And he, in his characteristic manner (Putin never says 'do it this way', he says 'let's see') people interpreted as "possible". And then there appeared detachments of Girkin, the captures of cities began. Then Putin gave an answer which this group of people interpreted as ‘allowed’. unequivocally advocate joining Russia, and that everything could be repeated, it was only necessary to slightly change the scenario, exposing the internal indignation as a popular uprising against the "Fascist regime". But it turned out that the uprising could not be obtained, and in Donbas people did not strongly advocate joining Russia. And then Ukraine gathered its forces and began a military operation against all those comrades. And when the Ukrainian Army was practically ready to crush all these "detachments of Girkin", Putin was told: "Now it turns out that you have lost, let's save the situation". And he gave his agreement to use the real army. And then he slipped away".


Maybe even then, having a powerful military force in Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet, and taking into account the weakness of the Ukrainian state, Moscow could have reached its goals. However, a political crisis in Russia itself became a barrier to this. The crisis resulted in the tanks firing at “the White House” in Moscow and B. Yeltsin disbanding the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. On 15 April 1994, Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin signed the Agreement on the stage-by-stage settlement of the problems of the former Black Sea Fleet of the USSR. At the time, Moscow planted “a hidden bomb» in the Agreement as the Russian Black Sea Fleet was to be based in Crimea, and Sevastopol was defined as its main base. The Russian propaganda did not make a secret: the preservation of a many-thousand-strong contingent in Crimea and Sevastopol was at least a means of political pressure on Ukraine. The maximum intention was to transfer Sevastopol under the Russian jurisdiction, as for Moscow the naval base historically and psychologically was associated with the city, while the city was associated with the base. This became the foundation for new demands to transfer Sevastopol under the jurisdiction of the RF. Moscow’s Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, set up a special fund, “Moscow-Sevastopol”, “to care for and help the fleet”. It was from this fund that anti-Ukrainian activities were financed. At the same time, a political project aimed at making Crimea independent of Ukraine was enacted in Crimea. The institute of “presidency” was created, with further advancement to this position of the puppet figure of Yuri Meshkov, who was preparing “the All-Crimean referendum on Crimea joining Russia”. “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia” campaign unfolded. All this was happening against the general background of sharpening relations between Russia and Ukraine and concentration of Russian troops on Ukraine’s border. The process was stopped by the escalation of the war in Chechnya: Russia just could not be bothered by Crimea anymore.
Summing up the above, we may arrive at the conclusion that the Soviet inheritance of conducting subversive activities is not forgotten by Russia, and its patterns and results turned out to be in demand at the new historical stage of the Russian Expansion.

1.2. Hybrid war: Russian instruments of the Soviet templates

1.2.1. Energy-centrist approach to the nature of the hybrid wars

Major General of the Prussian Army, Carl von Clausewitz, defined war as continuation of policy with different, violent means. Evidently, the policy-centered approach to definition of war prevails even almost two centuries after Clausewitz’s famous treatise “On War” appeared in 1838. This approach was tested by time and numerous wars but it is not the only possible approach. War through the prism of the energy-centered approach which we suggest is the model of the clash of two energy potentials in their broadest understanding includes human, economic, military and other components combined in a certain conditional energy equivalent.

The military energy potential in our understanding is a conditional equivalent of the sum of the state’s potentials, as well as expenditures and preparations, both in materialized forms (arms and equipment, personnel, commodity, mobilization, intellectual and other resources) and in services provided (transportation, communications, training, health services, etc.), as well as in future expenditures provided for by the plan for waging the war

A possible formula of the energy potential of a linear war, for the initiator (aggressor) country may look as a sum of a number of potentials necessary for:
- preparation-invasion-control;
- overcoming external support (if the potential victim has defense agreements with third parties or is a member of a military alliance);
- neutralization of weapons of mass destruction of the victim country (if it possesses them in its arsenal) and protection of own territory from possible use of mass destruction weapons;
- neutralization of unpredictable factors.

This sum of potentials can be decreased by the amount of domestic conflict-generating potential of the victim country which makes it easier for the aggressor to achieve its goal. If third parties support the aggressor’s actions, then this sum of potentials can also be decreased by the amount of support potential of allies.

Everything looks different, non-linear in hybrid war. The key role here is played by the factors of unexpectedness and uncertainty. It is hard for the enemy and

13 The quoted energy-centered model of war for the purposes of this publication is illustrative and of a generalized nature. The model’s detailed presentation is not the aim of this work. More on the model in Annex I.
third parties to determine and classify what is happening. It is worth remembering equivocal euphemisms “green men”, “polite people” used to designate servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in military uniform without insignia who blocked Ukraine’s strategic objects in Crimea and also took part in seizing administrative buildings in the East of Ukraine.

Domestic conflict-generating potential of a victim country is extremely important for further understanding of the profound essence of the hybrid war. If it is significant, it can be catalyzed thus decreasing the spending of the aggregate potential of the aggressor country for waging war. **Instead of increasing its combat potential and preparing for external aggression, the aggressor party can put a stake on creation and development of the domestic conflict-generating potential inside the enemy country. The latter country’s politicians do not perceive this as a manifestation of aggression and preparation for offensive actions.**

This is what Russia has been doing to Ukraine, both in the 20th century and now. The energy potential formula for the war against Ukraine differs from the basic formula. First, in 1994, under the pressure from the RF and the USA, Ukraine got rid of its nuclear missile potential. Thus, the aggressor did not need any additional spending to neutralize weapons of mass destruction of the victim country. Furthermore, in 2010 Ukraine declared its non-block status, and its potential of external support fell to zero. Ukraine has not become a NATO member and had no agreements on mutual assistance, and had no internationally recognized status of a neutral country with corresponding security guarantees (as, for example, Austria has). The only thing Ukraine had was the so-called Budapest Memorandum. It turned out that this Memorandum had no obligatory character, according to the guarantor countries.

The component of third parties’ support for Russia’s actions $\Delta E_{tps}$ (according to the energy-centered model in Annex 1) also equals zero, for the RF had not considered it necessary to involve allies from the ODKB (the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty).

So, Russia’s aggregate energy potential for waging war against Ukraine boils down to creating preparation-intervention-control potentials and neutralizing unpredictable factors. **The main stake is on nourishing and stimulating the domestic conflict-generating potential of the victim country. The bigger it is, the smaller are resources needed to be attracted for external actions.**

With this approach, the main commanding link for waging the war is not so much the General Staff as certain coordinating centers, joined in a network, where the General Staff is responsible for the military component until it is not dominant, i.e. while the hybrid-type war is happening. As soon as the decision is taken to switch to the war of classical type, the role of the General Staff becomes pivotal. The
coordinating center is the link which directly commands the energy potential in this or that direction, as well as indirectly influences the enemy’s energy potential through opportunities created in advance on the enemy’s territory. In the case of Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine it looks like the following sequence. The activization of the military component happens with the aim of gaining various strategic advantages, and the enemy is pushed to a military-operational and political-and-strategic impasse (“the Ilovaysk cauldron” and Minsk-1 as a result; “the Debaltseve cauldron” and Minsk-2). Simultaneously, indirect influence is applied to the enemy, with the use of difficulties connected to the above-mentioned impasse. For instance, stopping deliveries of anthracite for energy needs from non-controlled territories by the end of 2014, coincided in time with a media campaign to discredit importing substituting volumes from non-Russian sources. This put the entire country’s energy system on the brink of blackout. In order not to let the blackout happen, Ukraine had to sign an unprofitable contract for the supply of electricity and coal from Russia. This increases Ukraine’s dependence on Russia while Ukraine needs the opposite: elimination or lowering of this dependence. In parallel, the enemy’s lobbying structures influence the country’s highest-placed leaders, inclining them to diplomatic actions only and narrowing possible instrumental approaches in opposing the aggressor only to truce initiatives, negotiating processes, the involvement of international organizations, etc.

1.2.2. Key features of Russia’s modern hybrid aggression

NATO’s former security adviser, the Dutch Major General, Frank van Kappen, was among the first Western analysts who identified the essence of the phenomenon. “Putin wages a hybrid war in Ukraine”, the General stated as early as 26 April 201414. The term “hybrid war” suggests a broad range of enemy actions on the “soft power — hard power” scale where the military component is assigned a subordinate role. The main means of inflicting damage on the enemy are information-and-psychological, trade-and-economic, financial, and political-and-diplomatic actions. The methods of such war allow to gain tangible results: they disorganize the state governance system, inflict territorial, political, and economic damage on the enemy, and demoralize the society. The hybrid war is not perceived as a war at the initial stage. Denmark’s former foreign minister, Martin Lidegaard, in contrast to his Western colleagues, gave a rather clear-cut characteristic of what was happening yet at the initial stage of the war: “...there is a new kind of threat. I wouldn’t call it military, necessarily; it’s a hybrid war where you have massive propaganda, provocations, stimulation of groups inside other countries, which is not warfare but which is something very hostile and close to warfare”15.

As already noted, the hybrid war, similarly to a classic war, is a clash of two energy potentials. As in a linear war, those win the war who secure a bigger concentration of energy at the direction of the main strike.

The hybrid war’s first peculiarity is consistent masking and blurring of the use of the military component at the initial stage. This does not allow the enemy to establish the fact of aggression against it immediately. The occupation of Crimea is an example. The attacking party has advantages as it concentrated its potentials in order to deliver required blows, while the enemy continues to be in the deconcentrated state, taken aback by the appearance of “green men” and “self-defense detachments”.

The second most important feature is that military success is secured with the minimal use of armed forces. This creates an illusion, with the enemy and third parties which are the enemy’s potential allies, that what is happening is a low-intensity war not posing a threat to the parties not involved in the conflict.

The third special feature is that the aggressor, while using the military component at the initial stage to the minimum, undermines the enemy from within to the maximum, deepening “cracks” and creating “crevices” in its information, political, economic, and social environments and not allowing the enemy an opportunity to concentrate its potentials for defense and a blow in response.

The fourth special characteristic is in aggressor creating special patterns of “smart energy management of influences” according to which the enemy’s potential begins to work for the achievement of the aggressor’s goals and for the enemy’s own weakening. The price of war for the aggressor is falling, while the burden of load is growing for the enemy. There are vivid examples to this: various business schemes on Ukraine’s territory, used by Russian curators to establish partial financing of the occupied territories; financing the Donbas areas occupied by Russia through functioning state-owned enterprises; reinforcing the presence of Russian state-owned banks in Ukraine’s financial sector with the aim of injection of money resources.

The fifth special feature is the creation of the illusion for the third parties on the aggressor’s non-involvement in “the domestic conflict”; initiating of a peace-keeping activity of the aggressor by the aggressor; stimulating third parties to distance themselves from the conflict thus depriving the defending side of an opportunity to increase its potential of offering a rebuff to the aggressor. An example here is the categorical refusal of Western countries to provide defensive arms systems to Ukraine and to consider Ukraine’s proposal on a EU peace-keeping operation.
Despite all said above, the hybrid war in its broad meaning is not an invention of today. It is evident that the expert milieu retains opposing views of this phenomenon. The first view maintains that hybrid war has been in existence since times long past, and Sun Tzi’s treatise is the embodiment of military art namely for the wars of the hybrid type. The other view is that any war is a hybrid war to a varying degree, so hybridity is just one among characteristics of war. Still, we think that the quoted points of view notwithstanding, the modern hybrid war of the Russian variety, as a type of new generation warfare, is a rather unique phenomenon.

One of the hybrid war definitions, accepted within the Russian expert community, points to it as to a mechanism of broadening the potential of conventional policy: “Hybrid war is a sum of forceful, urgent actions along with various means broadening the possibilities of conventional policy, used with the aim of de-constructing unwanted conditions, subjugation, or destruction of the enemy”.

The main driving incentive for the working out of the Russian variety of hybrid war is defense against the West’s expansion and aggression, disguised as non-conventional actions of NATO and the EU in various regions. In this way Russia justifies its expansionist and aggressive preparations and further actions with the imaginary Western aggression. In the case of the hybrid war against Ukraine, Russia, the aggressor presents itself as a victim of the policy of the West, forced to defend itself from its expansion in the post-Soviet space, identified as the sphere of the aggressor’s exclusive interests. Ukraine, meanwhile, is presented as an agent of the West which produces and implements “colored revolutions”. The latter cause a special fear of the Russian regime. In September 2011, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Makarov, said that after the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, as well as disturbances in some other countries of the region “the Russian Army has to be ready for the worst options of the development of political situation in the country”. Director of international programs of the NOMOS Center, Dmytro Shtyblykov, in his work devoted to the analysis of the military policy of the RF, drew attention to N. Makarov’s presentation at the sitting of the Public Chamber on 17 November 2011, where he systematized threats to the military security of the Russian Federation:

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17 Dmytro Shtyblykov, together with another colleague from the NOMOS Center in Sevastopol, Oleksiy Besarabov, as well as Volodymyr Dudka, was arrested in Sevastopol by the RF’s FSB on 9 November 2016 on suspicion of preparing subversive actions on the territory of Crimea. Unlawfully kept in custody, he is a political prisoner of the Kremlin.
1. The West’s desire to establish energy security to the damage of economic and political interests of Russia (the signing of the “EU Energy Charter” and creation of the so-called “Energy NATO”).

2. Violation of the strategic balance of forces (deployment of elements of the global system of anti-missile defense, designing and constructing intercontinental ballistic missiles with conventional equipment).

3. Preserving the USA’s world leadership and expanding military presence and zones of responsibility of the USA and NATO (NATO’s expansion to the East, reconfiguration of the basing of NATO’s Allied Forces, creating the Allied Forces Command of NATO for Africa).

4. Military-technical and technological advantages for leading Western countries (development of prospective high-precision weapons, making robotized combat and reconnaissance systems miniature, unmanned aircraft).

5. Territorial claims to the Russian Federation and its allies:
   - Norway’s territorial claims;
   - Finland’s territorial claims;
   - Estonia’s territorial claims;
   - Germany’s and Lithuania’s territorial claims;
   - Poland’s territorial claims to Byelorussia;
   - Japan’s territorial claims.

6. Conducting military force actions in circumference of principles and norms of international law (military operations in Yugoslavia and Iraq).

7. Possibility of emergence and escalation of military conflicts in the South-Western and Central-Asian strategic directions.

8. The beginning of the “competition” for natural resources and communications in the Arctic (increasing the ice-breaking fleet, basing of armed forces’ units).

9. Increasing the military potential of the European Union (formation of European rapid response force).

10. Putting weapons in outer space and development of anti-satellite weapons (destruction of a Chinese and American satellites with missiles)

11. Increasing the scale of drug traffic through Russia (the RF is part of the so-called “Northern route” of drugs from Asia to Europe with the annual turnover of $15 billion).

12. The USA’s desire to control Russia’s nuclear complex (accusations of vulnerability of dangerous nuclear objects on the territory of the RF)\textsuperscript{18}.

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\textsuperscript{18} The Head of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov reiterated the backlog of the Russian military-industrial complex. 2011-11-21. Available at: http://pro-tank.ru/blog/765-russian-military-industrial-complex-behind
The evident conclusion here is that essentially defensive actions of the USA, NATO and the EU are treated here as expansive and aggressive. The artificial character of the Russian General Staff’s arguments is evident. None of the European countries mentioned in the presentation has official territorial claims to Russia. None of the other Arctic countries has such a powerful ice-breaking fleet and a program of its strengthening as Russia has. The increasing military potential of the EU while its leading member states reduce their defense expenditures looks like a manipulation. No “Energy NATO” was created, and “The EU Energy Charter” never existed. Probably, what is meant here is the Energy Commonwealth Treaty, initiated by the EU for the sake of cooperation with neighboring countries in the electric energy field and gas industry. It poses no threat to the military security of Russia.

Even the EU-initiated Eastern Partnership Program (EPP) and the signing of Association Agreements with the EU by such countries as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia is treated as an act of aggression of Europe against Russia. The Kremlin treats “Colored revolutions” as the West’s hybrid war against Russia within its sphere of interests.
It is clear that the Kremlin characterizes the West’s sanctions against the RF after the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea and intervention in the Donbas as the policy of Russia’s containment. V. Putin used graphic images assessing the West’s attitude towards Russia: it “resembles the desire to put a bear on a chain”\textsuperscript{19}. Another confirmation of this assessment was provided at the sitting of the FSB collegium on 26 March 2015: “A full list of means is used for the so-called containment of Russia: from attempts to organize political isolation and economic pressure to the large-scale information war and instruments of special services\textsuperscript{20}.

The hybrid-type aggression (hybression) is a set of influences of different nature, of regulated scale and combined character, exerted on the enemy. These influences are applied according to a varying algorithm where military means are not dominant. Their application is thoroughly masked and refuted while the act of aggression itself generates undetermined phenomena, complicating its identification.

The profound essence of the hybrid war is a multidimensional directed polydestruction, i.e. ruination by one state of another with a complex combined application of forces and means of military and non-military nature in different dimensions (political, economic, military, humanitarian, etc). These forces and means are, however, aimed at destruction of the enemy not as much on the theaters of combat but with undermining its vital potentials from within with certain actions from outside by initiating the process of its autodestruction. In its essence, this is a technology of sorts, of “cracking” (breaking, dividing) of a country, when “cracks-making” is launched and done both from within and from outside with the aim of gaining the effect of resonant ruination.

The latter is a key feature in addition to the five mentioned above. The hybrid war does not start with an act of open armed invasion but with actions of the aggressor country from within the victim country, aimed at its inner self-destruction. Outside influences are auxiliary. With the help of propaganda, the aggressor disguises this as a civil conflict in the country which is the object of aggression. The strategic aim of the information-and-propaganda support is generation of the undetermined. This allows to deceive the public opinion: to impose useful interpretations of what is happening as a continuation of a profound domestic conflict (civil war). The outside world and many citizens in the victim country, being under the influence of the enemy’s propaganda, accept this interpretation. A bright example here is how international institutions and governments of the world’s leading countries use the terms “Ukrainian crisis” and “conflict in Ukraine” instead of “Russia’s aggression”.

The renewed use of technologies of hybrid war nowadays may be explained with the new level of globalization. New technologies have broadened possibilities of influences in traditional spaces (land, sea, air, outer space), as well as in those which have been developing since the end of the 20th century, information and cyberspace, having no physical dimension of natural boundaries.

1.2.3. Phases of the hybrid war of the Russian model

With account to special features of hybrid war, certain phases of its preparation, conduct and completion should be considered. Taking the example of the Russian hybrid-type aggression against Ukraine, this can be described in a pattern of a sequence of energy transits 00 — 01 — 02.


01. Hybrid aggression:

1.1. Proxy-phase: from 14 August 2013 to 20 February 2014 (blocking the Ukrainian exports to the RF)

1.2. Diffused invasion of the RF’s Armed Forces to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and to the East of Ukraine: from 20 February to 12 April 2014 (from the appearance of “green men” in Crimea to seizure of administrative buildings, Internal Affairs and Security Service departments in Donbas cities by paramilitary groups: the seizure of Slovyansk by Girkin’s group)

1.3. War phase: from 12 April 2014 to 18 February 2015 (Debaltseve)

1.3.1. Latent infiltration: from 12 April to 11 July 2014 (the start of bombardment of the Ukrainian territory from the Russian territory with missiles)

1.3.2. Managed escalation: from 11 July 2014 to 18 February 2015 (Ilovaysk, Minsk-1; Debaltseve, Minsk-2)

1.3.3. Managed de-escalation: from 18 February 2015

1.4. Intra-phase (combination of low-intensity combat at the front line with provoking political and economic destabilization of the enemy state from within, including by proxy methods). Post-Minsk-2.

1.5. Occupation disguised as “peace-keeping operation” or as annexation of territories in order “to prevent humanitarian disaster”.

02. Managed transformation of the occupied territory.

Crypto enforcement (hidden enforcement, covert enforcement: from the Greek κρυπτός and the English enforcement) is a separate phase of unfriendly actions in non-evident form, not perceived as aggression. It is a phase preceding the hybrid aggression but not a phase of the hybrid war itself. Crypto enforcement is a
form of disguised, systematic, and prolonged exhaustion of vitally important potentials of the enemy, lasting until a decision on the aggression of classical or hybrid type is taken. The mechanisms of planning and conducting of crypto enforcement are false-target programming, memetic weapons, and creation of contours of management from the outside.

The proxy phase, in its turn, is a part of the hybrid war. It is a climax of sorts of non-military efforts preceding the hybrid invasion stage. The proxy phase, as a rule, is brief (several months) and is a transition from crypto enforcement to the hybrid-type aggression. This is the phase of intensive use of non-military forces and means of the aggressor country against the victim country with the aim of gaining the cumulative effect of its defeat through the dysfunction of the state apparatus and the collapse of economy.

If the proxy phase is unsuccessful, the phase of diffused invasion follows: the aggression from within through creating seemingly independent pseudo-state actors, nourished from the outside by the aggressor country. This phase and the following military phase are the main stages of the hybrid war. They have to be rather fast-paced (blitzkrieg) if the conflict-generating potential of the victim country was sufficiently “heated” during the proxy phase, while before this the victim country was exhausted during the crypto enforcement stage. Russia’s Crimean campaign is a telling example of the success of such hybrid war at the diffused invasion stage. The “Novorossia” project, in its turn, is an example of a failure, when the design of the Crimean campaign was automatically superimposed on regions where special features were different from Crimea. Diffused invasion is the next phase of the hybrid war, with a limited use of the military component. Diffused invasion simultaneously generates and is accompanied by the emergence of domestic hotbeds of tension and conflicts, prepared in advance by agents’ efforts, as well as by separatist groups entering public domain. They are forming “self-defense” detachments or “people’s militia” under the covert command of specialists who came from abroad: “tourists”, “volunteers”, “holiday-makers”.

If the diffused invasion and the use of the military component do not lead to success, a “switch of phases” may be performed. This happens in the case of a failure of the blitzkrieg scenario. In fact, this was what happened in the East of Ukraine. The intra-phase of the war is switched on, with a parallel renewal of the proxy phase. In parallel, a certain peace settlement process is being launched or consent to it is given, where the aggressor positions itself as a third party not involved in the “civil conflict” between government forces and “people’s militia”. In the case of Ukraine this is the Minsk process where Russia plays the role of an international mediator while consistently trying to incline Ukraine to a dialog with the pseudo-state formations managed from Moscow. At this time, the military component is minimized, while mechanisms of ruining the victim country are activated, both from the outside and from within. The main aim of the intra-phase of the hybrid war is opening of a domestic front of destabilization. It has to confirm the basic
postulate, launched by the aggressor’s propaganda at the stage of diffused intrusion: the presence of a civil conflict in the country.

The climax of the art of the hybrid war is to launch the mechanism of the country’s self-destruction from within, using massive propaganda from the outside, as well as agents of influence and subversive actions from within. The nourishing energy here is both the present conflict-generating potential and such potential created in the course of hybression.

The Minsk arrangements of doubtful legal nature provided Russia with an opportunity to launch the intra-stage oriented at strengthening the domestic conflict capacity of Ukraine as a result of Kyiv’s mistakes and destabilization measures organized by Moscow, and also at creative approach while the events unfold. In Ukraine’s case, this creative approach does not pertain only to “the Minsk agreements”. By using the latter, the aggressor is trying to realize a possible algorithm: Ukraine’s “territorial integrity” (without Crimea) with its federalization. By the end of 2016-early 2017 there were attempts to plant in Ukraine and the USA, through agents of influence, the ideas of a “compromise settlement” of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict for the sake of stopping the war. The essence of such ideas is the recognition of the de facto Russian status of Crimea and returning the toxic ORDLO to Ukraine, with giving them a special status providing for their legalization in Ukraine’s legal space. There is also a plan for early parliamentary elections where pro-Russian forces, according to the plan, gain at least “the golden share”. This should serve the cause of pushing a pro-Russian figure to the position of the head of government with the subsequent limiting of the authority of the head of state and review of foreign policy with its re-orientation to Russia. As a result, Ukraine, with a smaller territory (without Crimea) transforms into an entity of the kind of the Ukrainian SSR 2.0 as of before 1954. Hacking of Vladislav Surkov’s e-mails by the Ukrainian “CyberAlliance” in October 2016 and the documents obtained by the international intelligence community, “InformNapalm”, testified to a high activity of Russian structures in planning and organizing actions for destabilizing the situation in the East of Ukraine, in particular, in Kharkiv.

If this algorithm does not work, a parallel scenario is planned within the intra-phase: introduction of a contingent of regular armed forces disguised as a peacekeeping force (if the conceptual approach to the continuation of the hybrid war is preserved). As domestic conflict continues in the victim country, according to the aggressor country’s propaganda message, requiring settlement, and decision-making procedures at the international level are time-consuming, the initiator of a “peace-keeping operation” can act faster for the sake of the quickest possible “achievement of peace”.

The final phase is the stabilization-transformation phase. This is a transitional stage, when the goals of the hybrid aggression are achieved and the tasks of final stabilization of the situation on the occupied territory is being solved, its transformation into the most optimum form of existence within the occupying country as a satellite territory or several territories with different statuses.

“Transformer war” is the most fitting comparison for the type of the new generation war that Russia has prepared and unleashed against Ukraine and the Helsinki world order status quo. If symbolic Russian images are considered, this war can be called “the nesting-doll war” or, to use a Russian word, “the matrioshka war”. It includes a military component, hidden deep inside, while the other components are outside: non-military casings. This allows to not identify the hybrid war from the very start as a classic war.

Attention should be paid to the inability of the RF to make the central government in Kyiv agree to federalization of the country, using methods of military pressure. The same applies to the reintegration of the ORDLO in their current form of the DPR/LPR. This led to a revision of approaches to the future of these pseudo-state formations on the occupied territories. A perspective of their integration into Russia emerged, along the lines of the Abkhazian or Transnistrian scenarios.

The outer distinction of the hybrid-type war is in the prevalence of non-military influences over military influences, which are minimized. The supreme command may vary the influences applied to the enemy, using the algorithm which can also be changed during the operation. The variable nature of influences which can also be combined in different proportions is a distinct feature of a new generation war. The hybrid war scenario can be created while the war goes on. Proceeding from this, tactics here prevail over strategy. The fact that many experts and politicians, including the former US President Barak Obama, characterized Vladimir Putin as a good tactician but bad strategist testifies to this peculiar feature of waging the hybrid war. In the hybrid war, tactics are moved to the forefront. Strategy is developed and realized with the help of different instruments. This is why one should specifically dwell on the so-called “organizational weapons”.

1.3. False-target programming, memetic weapons, crypto enforcement

The term “organizational weapons” (orgweapons) was used in Soviet times by the developers of organizational management systems Spartak Nikanorov and, later, Sergei Solntsev, although they are not its authors. They conducted applied research of the issues of “organizations’ organization”, “management systems management”, and “genetic management” of management systems, both in the Soviet times and in the post-Soviet Russia. The essence of orgweapons is in applying “the system of organizational (intelligence, propaganda, psychological, information, etc., agreed as to the goals, place, and time) influences on the enemy, making the enemy move
in the direction necessary for the other party.” A paper prepared for the pro-Putin Izborsk Club emphasizes: “With its help, it is possible to direct the enemy’s policy to a strategic impasse, to exhaust its economy with ineffective (non-realistic) programs, to slow down development of weapons, to distort foundations of national culture, to create ‘the fifth column’ among part of the population. As a result, the environment of chaos emerges in domestic policy, economy, and psychology of the enemy country.”

A classical example of one of the technologies of managing an organized mass of people: on 15 March 2014, Moscow saw a “peace march” where the participants called for the formation of “organized civil resistance” in order not to allow for the mistakes of “brothers from Ukraine”. The participants marched to the drumbeat, carrying flags with the USSR state emblem on them. It is noteworthy that the participants were men of athletic stature, aged 25-40, special services personnel or those who took part in the march for money and free red jackets.

http://yablor.ru/blogs/marsh-mira-v-moskve/4267639

The works of S. Nikanorov and S. Solntsev for the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation have long been considered a cornerstone of Russian conceptual approaches to fathoming and developing the hybrid-type war, especially of its crypto enforcement stage. The Izborsk Club paper mentioned above contains a concise characteristic of orgweapons: “In fact, organizational weapons are a means of activation of a pathological system within the functional system of the target country when the pathological system, in order to develop, consumes the carrier’s resources. A characteristic feature of the pathological system (the use of organizational weapons) is the fact that it influences the society’s functional system,


'from the outside', in the first turn, from the hierarchically ‘higher’ (power) level of the systemic organization. Besides, the use of organizational weapons is not always ‘visible’ to traditional forms of scientific observation and not always ‘understandable’ within the traditional logic of everyday gaining of knowledge. Destruction, as the impact of organizational weapons, is aimed at attaining results which are in ‘the system of values’ of the initiator of the use of these weapons. One of the major conditions for the use of organizational weapons is substitution of basic values of the target country with the values of the initiator country as most promising”.

Thus, the pathology, covertly introduced by the aggressor country into the state body of the victim country, switches off its immunity system (the national security system) and reprograms its functioning according to the algorithm when it does not identify a threat to the life of the body and does not fight it. It is telling that the adepts of the Izborsk Club consider Gorbachev’s perestroika an example of a successful use of organizational weapons by the West against the USSR: “Maybe, if a thermonuclear war started in 1975 or even in 1991, the Soviet Union would have not only survived it but would have won it. However, it came to be absolutely powerless against ‘perestroika’ as a kind of ‘organizational weapons’”

24. Although such interpretations significantly exaggerate the West’s omnipotence and pay due to the traditional inclination of Russian politicians to conspiracy theories explaining the USSR’s defeat in the Cold War, nevertheless the organizational weapons are a reality not to be ignored.

Taking into account all the above, orgweapons may be given another name, most adequately reflecting its profound essence: false-target programming (FTP). The aggressor party creates and sets in advance false program attitudes in its relations with the victim party. Their realization results in strengthening the aggressor’s positions and to the weakening of the enemy’s positions. The enemy (the future victim) does not perceive these program attitudes as dangerous because they look neutral or based on universal values. Within this context, it is important to take into account the impact of memetic warfare which is FTP’s necessary component. Meme has information-viral nature and is a specially created message or a concise programmed attitude disseminated in the information space and is meant to form the necessary model of subjects’ minds and of their respective decision-making. Lidiya Smola, a Ukrainian expert, points out that memetic warfare plays an important role as a tool in the information component of Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine.


“farmers”, “Novorossia is a new democratic country” are examples of memes of varying longevity, launched by the Russian propaganda with the aim of distorting the information space in the context useful for the aggressor. However, a meme may also not provoke emotions and be unnoticeable to an extent but still have a serious influence on one or another subject’s decision-making. Such subject get infected by an information virus without even noticing it.

Of special significance are memes meant for a narrow circle of people from the highest state leadership who are decision-makers. The program message “to develop cooperation” may be a vivid example. This message is about expanding economic cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. It sounds standard, neutral, and universal. A similar message is present in relations between different countries as everyone wants to develop economic cooperation. Such programmed attitude apriori is not perceived in a critical way but, on the contrary, is supported by the future victim in every way. Both countries’ mass media promote it in different ways. Here are two media illustrations: “Azarov: There is no alternative to economic cooperation of Ukraine with RF”26, «Yanukovych drew attention to importance of further development of Ukrainian-Russian trade and economic cooperation»27. The Russian side, however, suggests a format of cooperation different from the Ukrainian vision. It suggests Ukraine’s involvement in the processes of re-integration of the post-Soviet space: that new opportunities for the participants of economic life, for the business in our countries would be also opened by Ukraine’s more active involvement in multiparty integration processes, first of all, of course, in the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space,” V. Putin stated prior to the sitting of the committee on economic cooperation issues of the Russian-Ukrainian inter-state commission of 7 June 201128.

During every high-level meeting the parties were making highfalutin statements about high figures of their bilateral trade as the indicator of the success of their economic cooperation. The reality, however, was totally different. First, Ukrainian-Russian relations are asymmetric because of the difference in economic potentials and because of differences in economies. Second, the proportion of the parties in the aggregate amount of their mutual trade is varying manyfold: Ukraine accounted on the average for 5-6 percent of the foreign trade turnover of Russia, while Russia accounted for up to 25-30 percent of the foreign trade turnover of Ukraine. This led to the effect of mutual dependence of varying magnitude. Third, the foreign trade balance was as a rule positive for Russia and negative for Ukraine. Fourth, the structure of the trade has gradually changed in the direction of bigger account

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for the interests of the aggressor country and neglect of the interests of Ukraine. In this case, it changed in the direction of the increase in the amounts of purchases of energy resources. This became ever more burdensome for the target country and also resulted in the increase of its dependence, the emergence of debt problems, etc. Fifth, the demand for the increase of the import of expensive energy resources was formed (natural gas). This resulted in a positive effect for the aggressor and a negative effect for the victim. This increased energy consumption within the GDP and produced bigger dependence on the supplier. In general, the negative payment balance of Ukraine in economic relations with Russia was dynamically growing: $4 bln in 2010, $10.2 bln in 2011, $14.3 bln in 2012, $16.5 bln in 2013.29

The dependent economy, weakened by high prices for the imported energy resources delivered, mostly, from one source, and by debt problems in relations with the aggressor country, turned out not capable of fast re-orienting to different markets. Even the pro-Russian regime of V. Yanukovych sensed danger in 2012 and started using measures to decrease the gas dependence of Ukraine, trying to obtain part of the necessary resources from European suppliers along the reverse scheme. So, a correct (at the first glance) programmed attitude to the development of economic cooperation of Ukraine with Russia resulted in the strategically vulnerable position of the economy of the victim state in the case of the enemy’s decision to launch aggression.

An example of the false-target programming of the international community is providing it with false information about “the absence of Russian armed forces in Ukraine” (“they are not there”), “civil war in Ukraine”, “protection of Russian people in Crimea from the Kyiv junta”. This was done in an extremely unsuccessful and contradictory way. In particular, at a press conference on 4 March 2014, V. Putin refused to admit that Russian troops were taking part in blocking objects of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Crimea: “These were local self-defense forces».30 As soon as the next month, on 17 April, after the so-called “Crimean referendum”, he refuted his own words. During “the direct phone line”, answering the question about “polite people” in Crimea, Putin said: “Our military stood behind the backs of the forces of self-defense in Crimea»31. On 24 October 2014, speaking at the sitting of the “Valdai” International Discussion Club, Putin said something completely different: “Seeing how events unfolded, people in Crimea had almost at once took up arms and addressed us with a request to help them use the measures that they


were planning to use. I won’t keep a secret that we used our armed forces in order to block the Ukrainian military units stationed in Crimea...»32. Finally, the Russian President opened cards on 4 December 2014 in the annual “Address of the President to the Federal Assembly”: “Our people live in Crimea, and the territory itself is strategically important because it is there where the spiritual source of the formation of multifaceted but monolithic Russian nation and of the centralized Russian state is. It was here, in Crimea, in the ancient Chersones, or, as it was called in Russian chronicles, in Korsun, that Prince Vladimir took Christening and then baptized the entire Rus <...> for Russia, Crimea, the ancient Korsun, Chersones, Sevastopol have immense civilizational and sacral meaning...»33

Despite the evident contradictions in Putin’s statements at different times within a sufficiently short period of time (9 months) and the available data of Western intelligence services on the Russian Armed Services’ participation in military operations on Ukraine’s territory, there is a tangible stratum of Western politicians who doubt if the Russian aggression does take place, even in the fourth year of its course. This stratum, under the influence of Russian propaganda and their own ignorance, is inclined to the idea of a civil war in Ukraine, although they understand that Russia is present there in this way or another but this is allegedly natural as they are neighbors and there are many Russians in Ukraine, especially in the East. It is such logic that means success of the false-target programming, in spite of the existing proof of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the waging of war against Ukraine in the Donbas by Russia’s regular and irregular forces (see the infographic of the International Volunteer Community “InformNapalm” in Annex 2).

“The peace process” in Minsk is an example of the FTP in the international dimension. It was initiated by the Kremlin’s program message after “the crisis in the East of Ukraine” began”: “Ukraine and the Donbas need a peaceful dialog”. As peace is a universal value and a dialog is a common tool of Western democracies and, in general, the tool that has no alternative, entirely predictable answers were expected of Kyiv, Brussels, and Washington. The incoming messages were in essence programmed. The message from Brussels and other EU capitals was, “There is no military solution”. From Kyiv, “I am the President of peace, not of war” (Petro Poroshenko). From Washington, “We continue to call for diplomatic solution of the problem”. Here we see the false-target programming of EU leaders who do not have an adequate idea of the Russian aggression and who are interested in restoring economic relations with the RF, limited because of additional sanctions applied to


33 Address of the President to the Federal Assembly. 04 December 2014. Moscow. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173
the RF (cutting it off the SWIFT system, stopping the quoting of the Russian Urals oil, its substitution with other sorts of oil of non-Russian origin, etc.). Third, this programming allowed to block delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine.

The Kremlin has more difficulty with the USA but still the US Administration became its victim: the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Barak Obama, was never able to adopt the corresponding decision on supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine despite Congressional resolutions. However, the biggest success of the FTP is how the pro-Russian lobby in Washington (under the management of the RF Embassy) moved the US Republican party, traditionally the most consistent anti-Soviet and anti-Russian political force, to a pro-Russian platform during the 2016 Presidential elections. The idea of common fight against terrorism, suggested to the West, resonated with Trump’s idea of common fight against the Islamic State. At the same time it was ignored that the fight against terrorism was being suggested by the state which unleashed war against neighboring Ukraine and subjected the Syrian city of Aleppo to barbarous bombing and where official TV channels were threatening to transform the USA to radioactive dust.

In Russia, they usually ascribe the invention of hybrid wars to the Americans, as this fits in the image of the USA as the world imperialist and aggressor, created by the efforts of Soviet and Russian propaganda. However, Russia, in fact, surpassed the United States. However, in fact Russia has surpassed the USA. According to the Kremlin’s logic, Russia implements “conflict detention of the US aggression” in the world. This aggression is allegedly affected through the mechanism of “colored revolutions”. The case of Ukraine demonstrates this approach vividly. According to the Kremlin, it was not Russia which launched war against Ukraine but the USA (and the West in general) who is perpetrating aggression against “the Russian world”, so Russia contains hybrid war with force, using all the available means. The Russian variety of the hybrid war is a counter-weapon against its American variety in the form of “colored revolutions”. However, such an explanation is just a cover for the aggressor. The real state of things and sources of hybrid technologies of waging war look differently.
RUSSIAN HYBRESSION

UKRAINE AGAINST

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2. RUSSIAN HYBRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

2.1. The authorship of the Russian version of hybrid war

The Russian Federation’s hybrid aggression (hybression) against Ukraine will be unbreakably tied to the name of the Russian President in the annals of history. It is absolutely fitting to define it as “Putin’s hybression”. However, he is not the sole creator of this war. Other characters from Putin’s authority vertical are participants in this co-creation. These people are, in particular, Vladislav Surkov (Aslanbek Dudayev) and Valeri Gerasimov. Alexander Dugin and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill (Vladimir Gundyayev), as well as some other persons from Putin’s close circle are part of this in a somewhat different, though not less tangible manner.

Vladimir Putin can be considered the general customer of the hybression. Some peculiarities of his public behavior point to domination of “force elements” in his character as a compensator for inferiority. It is worth paying attention to him being fond of martial arts, in particular Sambo and Judo, testifying to certain psychological inclinations.

Briefly from history. Sambo, “self-defense without weapons”, is a kind of hand-to-hand combat developed in the USSR in the 1930s. Judo, or “way of softness”, is a kind of Japanese combat where the opponent’s actions are used against the opponent. An ancient legend says that Sitobei Okayama, a doctor and one of the most famous adherents to the “jiu-jitsu” combat, which can be seen as the basis for Judo, was watching a powerful snowfall while sitting by the window in his room. Big snowflakes were falling, and a pine-tree branch cracked and broke under their weight. However, a tiny branch of a sakura was bending towards the ground, lower and lower. Then, the snow slipped off the branch, and the branch straightened up. “Yields now in order to win later”, Okayama exclaimed. and this principle has become a basis for many Japanese martial arts, and especially for Judo. Several other principles are basic to Judo: watch carefully all around, think through, act firmly, possess initiative.

Vladimir Putin was not outstanding as to his physical form among his coevals. His childhood fascination with Sambo and Judo in the circumstances of the criminalized Leningrad streets of the Soviet period, and under the management of a trainer of sorts, “Uncle Lyonya” influenced his personality. In fact, you can build the logical can be drawn from his childhood to his mature age when his approaches shaped, influenced

34 Based on "Judoka UA": http://judoka.ho.ua/kodokan.html
35 Leonid Usvyatsov, "Lyonya-athlete“ - the crime boss of the then Leningrad, was killed in 1994 during crime shootouts between criminal groups https://putinism.wordpress.com/2015/12/21/soratniki/
by his own understanding of the Sambo style as “aggression as self-defense”, “war without weapons”, and of judo as “acquiring trust” with the following “throw”. Projecting Putin’s sports principles from the level of intra-personal relations to the level of international relations, a conclusion may be reached that this is their simple transfer and use as a guide to action. The assessment by another former trainer of Vladimir Putin, Anatoli Rakhlin, seems entirely logical in this context: “Putin’s character retained a healthy ‘boorishness’.

“Boorishness” and the distorted understanding of the essence of Judo and Sambo generate a “bent mirror” in Putin’s mind, where the West’s actions towards Russia and the post-Soviet territory (for example, the Eastern Partnership proposal for a number of countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus) are interpreted as manifestations of aggression, and Russian actions are counteractions and self-defense. Accordingly, the best principle of defense is preventive attack. Actually, Vladimir Putin himself admitted to this during the 2015 Valdai Forum in Sochi: “As far back as 50 years ago the Leningrad streets taught me a rule: if fighting is inevitable, you should strike first”. Though this statement referred to the Syrian case, in fact Putin openly (consciously or unconsciously) expressed his strategic approach to international affairs: to land the first punch, act preemptively. This approach may be observed both in the case of Ukraine in 2014 and in the case of Georgia in 2008. This is the approach to the EU and NATO, too. The period of “acquiring trust” of the West, when Putin was called a “flawless democrat” (H. Schroeder) and a person with whom you can deal (G. Bush) ended after August 2008.

36 Ibid.

Geopolitical reconstruction and re-engineering of the Eurasian space with its central block in the form of “the Russian world”, developed by the well-known Russian geopolitician-revanchist, adviser to a number of Russian leaders on geopolitical issues, Alexander Dugin, formed a demand for a new variety of waging non-linear war, different from previous wars.

This is the demand for a “low-cost war” which could be identified as a kind of modern art, where online streaming, media operations, flash mobs, rallies and manifestations are no less significant than armed forces’ operations. Dugin himself said at one of his seminars on March 23, 2011: “We see a merger of military doctrine with modern art, with work of arts, with cinema. I spent more than five years trying to persuade the General Staff and the Security Council to start working on network warfare... It seems to me that we also need to use art for military purposes” 38. In 2008, Dugin stated: “The Soviet Empire will be restored by various means: by force, diplomacy, economic pressure... Everything will depend on the place and time” 39; i.e., with the set of instruments which fits in the technology of waging wars of the hybrid type. Although Dugin, after years of fascination with Putin, has been strongly disappointed with him because Putin had not dared to “cross the Rubicon” and send troops to defend “Novorossia” in June 2014, his entire activity has been within the conceptual approaches to the imperial reconstruction of Russia, developed by himself. It also pertains to the cardinal change of Eurasia’s geopolitical landscape.

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The contradictions in his assessment of the waging of war by Putin (accusation of the betrayal of “Novorossia” when instead of an open and demonstrative invasion of Ukraine Putin used a covert diffused penetration with small forces in the Donbas in the summer of 2014) is a consequence of the lack of technological vision of what ways, what sequence and what instruments can achieve the goal of the hybrid-type war.

However, Dugin’s ideas are “truly terrifying, because they are now in play — not just for the people of Russia, but for all of civilization. The world is in real danger.”

is an accurate assessment of Dugin’s contribution to Russia’s present-day war on the world by an American political commentator Glenn Beck.

Another person had the technological vision of how to realize the concept of hybrid war. In order for the “transformer war” to succeed, the approach “war as a stage performance, the war theater as a play” is needed. This approach is characteristic of the style of the Kremlin’s chief political consultant, Vladislav Surkov, who has vividly manifested creative inclinations and a diversified biography. who studied some time in the field of «theatrical directing», and even worked as the head of an amateur theater. It is no coincidence that in the initial phase of hybrid aggression the leading role was assigned to the fan of theatrical historical reconstructions Igor Girkin (Strelkov), an FSB officer.

The pseudonym of Putin’s consultant is Natan Dubovyttsky (derived from his wife’s name, Nataliya Dubovitskaya). Some fragments of works and public interivews of Dubovitsky-Surkov-Dudayev are rather eloquent, same as numerous, like his surnames, casings of his Matrioshka nesting-doll personality.

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One of the basic postulates of Surkov, as of Dugin, at some time, is that God sent Putin to Russia: “Yes, God. Yes, called him. To save Russia from being swallowed by enemies. The white knight, and very timely”.

Another postulate from “the theory of errors”: “Having passed the point of no return and having suddenly realized that we are on a wrong way, do not swerve. Bravely proceed along the wrong way... The wrong way to India led Columbus to America... Mistakes sell well. They work.”

The story of the Fifth World War as the first non-linear war, when everyone fights everyone, but where the allegoric tale is about a war against the West: “We understood only ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Only ‘black’ and ‘white’. Nothing unfathomable. No half-tones. No saving avoidance. We could not lie...We founded the Society. We prepared the uprising of simple two-dimensional people against complicated and sly people. Against those who answers neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’. Against those who say neither ‘black’ nor ‘white’. Those who know a third word. Many, very many third words. Empty, false, those who confuse ways, who shadow the truth. In these darkesses and spider-webs, in these imaginary difficulties the entire scum of the world hides. They are the house of Satan. There, they make bombs and money. Saying: ‘Here is the money for the well of the honest, here are the bombs for the protection of love’. We move tomorrow. We will win. Or perish. The third is not given.”

The Russian revanche, the [counter]offensive against the West, reconquering the world through Crimea were reflected in images in the column in the “Russki pioner” magazine of 21 March 2014: “The lost paradise will come back, the Golden Age, Crimea... To come back is the highest human dare. This means acting in contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics. In contradiction to death... Cycles and periods are not only the basis for order, they are also revanche, reconquista, the ever-lasting counter-offensive. Reconquering the world seized by death.”

There is a special feature in the definition of aggression of the hybrid type: the generation of uncertainties. “The uncertainty principle” is known in quantum physics as “the Heisenberg principle”. It characterizes the dual behavior of the elementary particle as a wave. The German physicist’s portrait is in Vladislav Surkov’s office. And in a rather interesting company at that. “Decoding” these interests allows to reveal some peculiarities.

Next to it are the portraits of Benoit Mandelbrot, the author of the theory of fractals, researcher of objects and systems with disorderly and chaotic structures, and of Ilya Prigozhin, who developed the concept of synergetics, researcher of entropy and chaos.

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41 Vladislav SURKOV: I was close to a great man. August 02, 2013. http://ruspioner.ru/honest/m/single/3718
42 Ibid.
Amalgamation, in Surkov’s mind, of the ideas he combined in the Heisenberg-Mandelbrot-Prigozhin triad, together with the applied use of their achievements, produces the basic 4-step algorithm of non-linear processes, used for hybrid technologies of waging wars:

1. False-target programming of a partner-opponent through “cooperation model” under cover of which a program of its cryptodestruction is realized.

2. Transformation of certainties and states into a cluster of uncertainties, chaotization of cause-and-effect chains

3. Chaos management through fast decisions, initiated actions and preventive measures towards other actors.

4. Putting chaos to order, re-engineering of space, gaining new reality through synergy.

Effects of non-linear processes often turn out to be unpredictable, random, self-organized. Nevertheless, they can be managed and engineered.

Let us consider this using the example of Russia’s Crimean blitzkrieg. Crimea’s status as an autonomy within Ukraine is swiftly eroded by forces of “local self-defense” which emerged “imromptu” and, with support of “polite people” took key positions on the peninsula and seized administrative buildings. All this happened to the accompaniment of a propaganda campaign about a “Nazi” threat to Crimea and its people as a result of the “coup” in Kyiv, the seizure of power by the “junta” which had deposed the lawfully elected President and sent detachments of “The Right Sector” to the peninsula. A temporary uncertain status is created when formally the
governance of Crimea is still effected from Kyiv but in reality the center can no longer fulfill the governance function because of the obstructionist position of local authorities, backed by “self-defense”, various “Cossacks”, and “polite people” of unknown origin. A room for opportunities emerges, and several transfer options: Crimea as another formally independent state but in fact a Russian satellite; Crimea as a Russian-Ukrainian condominium with Russia’s dominant role; Crimea within Russia.

However, the uncertainty is clear in one thing: for Russia, Crimea is no longer part of Ukraine. Military-and-political management of the uncertainty in the peninsula after its occupation by “little green men” through the mechanism of a questionable referendum is targeting only one of the possible options: Crimea within Russia. Through the referendum, Russia gains the synergy effect, expands its territory by occupying Crimea, and begins re-engineering of the post-Soviet space with the ambition to the geopolitical space of Europe after Yalta-1945. The history of the world after WWII began in Crimea. After 70 years, it receives an opportunity to re-start in Crimea again. And again, it will restart on conditions of the lord of Crimea, i.e. the Kremlin, and specifically Vldimir Putin. According to the Kremlin’s logic, the history made a turn: the Russian status and order have returned to Crimea.

The hybrid-type aggression is a working mechanism for fragmenting and dispersing the existing certainties and statuses, for the generation of uncertainties and chaos with their further transformation to new realities according to the Kremlin’s picture of the world and its vision of a new world order. The Kremlin is alone against the world and all the eyes are on it. It is not by chance that Tupak Shakur made it to Surkov’s office pedestal. Maybe, this happened because of his two albums with rather characteristic titles, “Me Against the World” and “All Eyez on Me”.

The decoding of the Putin-Surkov synergy of co-creativity on the problems of hybrid war would look like the following concise expression: “The savior of Russia and the world is Putin, alone against the world. Act resolutely, strike first, possess initiative, don’t be afraid of mistakes. We will win. We will reconquer the world.”

If Dugin is the constructor general of the geopolitical re-engineering of the Eurasian space, Surkov is the chief technologist, who develops the technological process of the reconstruction of the USSR “as it goes”, and the transfer from Pax Americana to Pax Putiniana, with no fear of mistakes on the way. The more so when erroneous steps open up new opportunities. For example, when Western experts and politicians begin to talk about states and phenomena of post-truth, post-order, post-West, this is nothing else than transformation of certainties and states to a conglomerate of uncertainties, according to the basic algorithm of non-linear processes described above. While there are such constatations and passiveness of the West, while it is incapable of acting in chaos, a unique window of opportunities opens for Russia, for managing chaos through a mechanism of transurfing of changes. It is Russia that finds itself on the crest of the waves of the ocean of chaotization of the geopolitical and the geoeconomic, not the West. It acts through cyberspace and delivers destructive blows at Europe and the USA, while they are incapable of adequately thinking them over and of acting in response.

Deputy to the State Duma of the RF and political exile, Ilya Ponomaryov, who knows the Kremlin’s power Olympus well, characterized Surkov’s role in a way that agrees with the one given above: “He is the most talented technologist. He’s got the reputation of an artist… And you need a masterful player for Ukraine. His role in the annexation of Crimea is the key role. The RF’s Ministry of Defense and the Main Intelligence Directorate were the hands while Surkov was the architect”

As the chief technologist, Surkov takes direct part in and controls the technological process of hybression where it happens, in Ukraine. Starting from the summer of 2013 and until the end of the winter of 2014, six of his trips to Ukraine became known (those which made it to the public space):

1. mid-August 2013: Surkov in Kyiv, **13-14 August he was in Crimea** (the proxy phase of the hybrid war starts: Ukraine’s export is blocked);
2. 20-21 January 2014: Surkov in Kyiv, in Viktor Yanukovych’s Administration, at the height of preparation for the introduction of the state of emergency;
3. 31 January-1 February: Surkov in Kyiv, with his aides (Rappoport, Chesnakov, Pavlov);

45 Putin was offered a different plan for seizing the Crimea, and the leaders of the DPR-LPR will be thrown under a bus - ex-Duma deputy Ponomarev. ONLINE. UA. November 4, 2016. http://m.online.ua/news/758075/
4. 11-12 February: Surkov and Rappoport in Donetsk and Crimea;

5. 14-15 February: Surkov in Kyiv again;

6. 20-21 February: Surkov and the FSB General Beseda in Kyiv, together with a group of law enforcers (involvement of the military component of the hybrid war: diffused invasion of Crimea).

Despite serious theoretical and applied works on topics of non-conventional warfare, Putin’s hybression is a semi-finished product. This was manifested both at the macro-level and the micro-level. The macro-level is several occupied districts of the two Eastern regions instead of 8-10 regions of Ukraine’s South and East. The micro-level if the deficit of human resources for the pseudo-state entities, as well as for commanding personnel for their armed formations. In his October 2015 interview for “Novorossia” media group, Igor Girkin (Strelkov) points out clearly: “…it was the Kremlin (personified by Surkov) who selected, supported and directly pushed to power all the worst (unprincipled, self-centered, untalented and incapable of acting) that was there in the ranks of militia…” 47.

In parallel, the General Staff of the RF’s Armed Forces was engaged in the specifically military creativity. General Valeri Gerasimov was responsible for the sector of hybrid wars there. General Gerasimov was Deputy Chief of the General Staff from December 2010, and became Chief of the General Staff in November 2012.

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It is indicative that in the course of the military reform the Black Sea Fleet of the RF, whose main forces were based in the territory of Ukraine, in Sevastopol and Crimea, was re-subordinated to the Southern Military District. This military district was created on 4 October 2010 with its headquarters in Rostov-on-Don. Half a year before this, literally two months after Viktor Yanukovych had come to power in Ukraine, the Russian-Ukrainian package agreement “Gas-Fleet” was signed in Kharkiv. According to this deal, the term of the Black Sea Fleet’s basing in Ukraine was prolonged to 2042. These actions were a well-thought-over strategy which transformed an uncertainty (possible withdrawal or non-withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet from the territory of Ukraine in 2017) into a new certainty: the fleet will stay in Crimea at least until 2042, while in reality the issue of its withdrawal will no longer be topical. Moreover, with combining of land and naval forces within the Southern Military District, additional operative capacities emerged. This turned out to be important for the success of sending “little green men” to the peninsula. They were not subordinate to the fleet which employed many Ukrainian citizens: otherwise, this would have revealed the operation while it was being prepared. On the contrary, locating the headquarters in Rostov was extremely convenient for securing operational command of combat actions in the eastern regions of Ukraine within the framework of the “Novorossia” project, as well as within possible creation of a land corridor from the Donbas to Crimea. Laying it through the Azov Sea region would have required close interaction of land forces and naval forces.

Thus, the military co-creativity and collective authorship of RF’s hybrid war against Ukraine belongs to Dugin, Putin, Surkov, and Gerasimov. At the same time, one should add to this team of authors the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill, mentioned above; the Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev; former head of the Russian President’s Administration, Sergei Ivanov; and Putin’s compadre, leader of the pro-Putin organization, “The Ukrainian Choice”, Viktor Medvedchuk (Putin’s kum, as Putin is a godfather of Medvedchuk’s child).
These people’s input is not as much creative as organizational and maintaining in the corresponding spheres of their activities, especially during the stage of crypto enforcement. They demonstrated important, though stereotyped, approaches to hybression without which its realization would have been problematic.

The Russian variety of the new generation war is rather unique, this is an exclusive product. Its replication in the pure form is impossible but every new variety will have some basic constructs and patterns as their foundation.

2.2. Organizational flaws of clear-cut concepts

It should be noted that this variety of hybression is not the crown of perfection. A chain of systemic failures happened, testifying to incompleteness of the model and some serious flaws. This concerns not only macro-level, at which the “Novorossia” project failed, but the micro-level, too, with Ukraine’s provincial towns in the border areas. It was presumed that as soon as “the Russian spring” starts, it will be possible to destabilize all Ukrainian territories bordering on Russia, due to media rocking the situation there. This was supposed to happen everywhere, starting with Ukraine’s North-West, and cause chain reaction when local authorities would refuse to recognize the “illegitimate” central government: “the Kyiv junta”. Let us take Putyvl as an example. This is a town famous in the history of Ukraine-Rus. It was founded in the 10th century, and is mentioned in “The Lay of Igor’s Host”. One of the basic publications of destabilizing nature, appearing on 26 April 2014, at the height of “the Russian spring”, had the following story: “The Bolshevik regime was consistently carrying out the policy of disuniting various parts of the Russian people. The Ukrainian SSR was given considerable territories populated by Great Russians and Russian speakers, Putyvl District of Kursk Province among them. It is now incorporated in Sumy Region of Ukraine. Even now ethnic Russians make up a majority there. Among them, near Putyvl, an ancient Rus town on the River Seym, mentioned in ‘The Lay of Igor’s Host’, an amazing autochton ethnic group of the Russian people live, the Goryuny, who retained their ancient Slavic traditions up to this date. The Goryuny Russian sub-ethnos is a fragment of Ancient Rus in Ukraine, and little is known to an average person about them now. They speak Russian and have Russian names and surnames but because they formed very long ago, before the all-Russian identity was adopted, they separate themselves on the everyday level both from ‘the Khokhols’ and from local Russians, ‘the Katsaps’, although Ukrainians usually called them ‘Katsaps’ for their Russian culture and language”.

In order to confirm the authenticity and special nature of Putyvl and Putyvl area, they also used the Soviet version of the area’s history, published on the city council’s site:

“In 1500, the Siver Prince Vasili Shemyaka, to whom Putyvl lands were also subordinate, sided with the Great Prince of Moscow, Ivan III. This was how Putyvl found itself within the Moscow State.

“In 16th-17th centuries the town is the most important advanced defense position on the Southern boundaries of Russia, included in the system of defense fortifications, constructed by the Moscow government in order to protect the state from invasions of Tatars, Turks and other Southern peoples.

In 17th century Putyvl was one of Russia’s biggest cities. As to its territory and population, it surpassed such big cities of those times as Pskov, Smolensk, and Chernihiv.

In 17th century Putyvl played an extremely important role in Ukraine’s relations with Russia. Ukrainian Hetmans entered diplomatic relations with Moscow thanks to mediation of Putyvl voyevodas.

In 19th-early 20th centuries Putyvl was a small district town of Kursk Province. In 1926 Putyvl and the adjacent territory were transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.”

The Russian author asks: “So how had Putyvl District found itself within Ukraine?” The corresponding interpretation is given: “According to the Resolution of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee of 12 May 1924, Putyvl District was abolished, and its territory was incorporated into the enlarged Rylsk District of Kursk Region. On 16 October 1925 the territory of the former Putyvl District was handed over, under unclear circumstances (like Crimea, by the way), to the Ukrainian SSR…. The district’s transfer to the Ukrainian SSR was realized on condition that it will receive the status of a Russian national autonomy within the Republic (including several other such districts). This autonomy existed until the second half of the 1930s, After this, the then party elites of the Ukrainian SSR decided to gradually abolish the Russian national autonomies”.

Thus, an attempt is made to blur Putyvl’s Ukrainian status through a parallel with Crimea. Crimea has already received a different status: “Crimea is ours”; it returned to Russia. Another thing is that in the early Soviet period this area had a status of a Russian autonomy. Thus, a false-target attitude is being formed: Putyvl was given to Ukraine unjustly; it has to return to Russia, like Crimea had. According to the plan, this should have stimulated local population to actions in analogy with the actions in Crimea.

The author continues: “It should be pointed out that it was transferred there not just like this but under certain conditions. Until the end of the 1930s, a Russian national autonomy existed there. After this, it was abolished, and the policy of Ukrainianization of local population began. Nowadays, according to the Ukrainian census of 2001. Russians make up a majority in Putyvl District, more than a half. However, many say that this figure is clearly artificially low. Russian activists maintain that there are more than 80 percent of ethnic Russians in the district. They speak the Putyvl dialect of the Kursk-Oryol group of the Russian language. As to the Goryuny speech, it can be also encountered in Russia, on the territory of the modern Kursk Region. Today, ethnic Russians and Russian Goryuny have difficulties integrating into the Ukrainian society because of the targeted ethnic assimilation.”

Historical and ethnological interpretations like this form “historians”. According to the leading Ukrainian expert on information policy and communication technologies, Dr. Georgii Pocheptsov, they created a new “constructed history”51, while “mass media begin to produce and maintain the interpretation of other side’s history necessary for the attacker”. Such a “special design” of history, relayed through mass media, is capable of launching the generator of chaos in people’s minds. This concerns first of all local governance groups for whom the pages of the past are “opened in a new way”, where their land is in the forefront of international relations; where this land “is not Ukraine”; where the area’s population is a separate special ethnic group: they are not “Khokhols”, they are not “Katsaps”, they speak a separate dialect of the Russian language, but they and their native land have been part of

Russia for long and still are. Simultaneously, people are led to the thought that the
time is coming when justice may be restored and Putyvl, just as Crimea, will again
occupy its “worthy place”, more so that 80 percent of local population are ethnic
Russians or Russian speakers.

All this had not worked. There was no chain reaction. And it could not have happened
without exterior organizational-and-practical stimulation, i.e. “the Slovyansk
scenario” or scenarios of other cities in the Donbas, where groups of Russian
militants were the organizing force for seizure of power and separation of territories.
A leader of separatists during the beginning of “the Russian spring” in 2014, Pavel
Gubarev, said frankly in his interview on the occasion of the second anniversary
of events in the Donbas: “…you can’t count on regional or municipal elites... The
bulwark will again be built according to the principle: support of broad masses of
people and involvement of an organizing force from outside. As this was with us:
Bezler came, then Strelkov... These masses will need to be given an organizing force.
...there is no way other than bringing this structure from the outside” 52. Thus, it is
in fact admitted that the events of 2914 in the East of Ukraine were based namely on
the factor of systemic Russian interference, while local separatists were just abettors,
used in order to create a corresponding showcase in the media. This was a meme of
“the uprising of the Russian-speaking population of the Donbas against the Kyiv
junta, against fascists, and Banderites”.

This conclusion is corroborated by the contents of “the Glazyev dialogs”, audio
records of cell phone communications of Sergei Glazyev, an adviser to the RF
President. His conversations with Russian and pro-Moscow Ukrainian activists
were recorded in late February–early March 2014. This was probably done by means
of radio-technical reconnaissance. As a German scholar Andreas Umland correctly
points out, “the Glazyev tapes” had not become an object of attention of Western
publications and analytical centers. “The contents of these tapes proves that Russia
is in no way an additional third actor or a later factor... The Kremlin was behind (at
least) a certain part of separatist activities several weeks before the start of the war
itself”, Andreas Umland concludes. He also points out that Moscow’s covert pre-war
actions in Ukraine, in late February and early March, were amazingly unsuccessful
on the continental part of Ukraine. A Donetsk journalist, Denys Kazansky, who
thoroughly analyzed “the Glazyev dialogs”, points out the cause of failure, quoted
by Glazyev himself: “fifteen hundred” pro-Russian activists in Zaporizhya in the
final count turned out a miserable handful of losers 53

53 "Glazyev tapes", sources of conflict in the Donbass and Minsk arrangements. Andreas Umland.
"Dzerkalo Tyzhnya (The Mirror of the Week). Ukraine". # 42, November 12, 2016 http://gazeta.dt.ua/
international/plivki-glazyeva-dzherela-konfliktu-na-donbasi-ta-minski-ugodi-_.html
Thus, the quoted fact testifies to the resource limitations of Russia in the hybrid aggression because Moscow failed to provide the necessary contingents of “the organizing force” in all the vulnerable parts of Ukraine’s East and South. Another proof of this is the example of the failure of the project of the “Bessarabian People’s Republic”, mentioned above.

The sectoral external management contours (EMC), created at the stage of crypto enforcement, should be mentioned specifically. Their essence and designation is in creating a mechanism of influence and manipulation of the top state leadership, first of all, the supreme command. In practice, it was created as far back as during the second term of Leonid Kuchma as the President. Later, it was reinforced by the Kremlin’s proteges at various stages of the change of powers in Ukraine. EMC was personified by a number of persons, with most conspicuous among them being Viktor Medvedchuk (political contour), Dmytro Firtash (energy contour), Dmytro Tabachnyk (humanitarian contour), and others.

If such a mechanism is available, a sort of behavior will be imposed on the enemy leading it to surrendering positions without combat. According to the Chinese Sun Tzu treatise, war is the way of slyness and deceit. In the case of Ukraine, such an external management contour was formed along the lines of administrative, energy, and special services resources. It proved to be rather efficient during the lengthy stage of crypto enforcement against Ukraine, which had to result in Anschluss. Under the crisis circumstances of 2013-14, this mechanism proved non-efficient. Its functioning, however, was not stopped. Moreover, the new Ukrainian government preserved this contour after the 2014 Presidential elections, hoping to use it as a mechanism for informal dialog. Events that followed have shown that this dialog
mechanism is just a shield for the Kremlin’s use of FTP methods, directly influencing the President of Ukraine and holding him back from adopting strategic decisions in the interests of the state (for instance, support for the draft law on the status of occupied territories), and at the same time inclining him to questionable decisions (for instance, giving a special status to ORDLO, amendments to the Constitution, etc.), undermining his political positions, trust, and domestic legitimacy.

2.3. Retrospective of cause-and-effect chains

The lack of Ukraine’s resistance to the prolongation of the basing of the Black Sea Fleet, which had to end in 2017, was the result of the false-target programming of Ukraine’s top leadership headed by Viktor Yanukovych. As was already pointed out, the “mutually beneficial economic cooperation” became the key priority of the Russian-Ukrainian partnership. This partnership was called strategic but in reality there were asymmetric relations of “suzerain-vassal” nature. The “mutually beneficial economic cooperation” possessed absolutely opposite features: a positive balance for Russia and growing debts for Ukraine. “Discounted gas” from the Kremlin petrocracy became the number-one priority for Yanukovych’s kleptocracy. This gas was to be had in return for satisfying the Kremlin’s naval ambitions in Sevastopol, Crimea, and the Black Sea.

These ambitions were perceived in Kyiv as a certain “whim” of Vladimir Putin in the image of “Russia’s grandeur” which he has been creating and behind which, supposedly, there was no threat for the regime in Kyiv.

In parallel, during the period of the growing oil prices in the 2000s, a symbiosis of the post-Soviet kleptocracy and European plutocracy formed. In this context, one of the forecasts of the US National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2025”, published in 2010, was resonant. The paper said, in particular, that crime could become the biggest problem, when Eurasian transnational organizations, drawing on extraction of fossil fuel and raw materials, become more influential and expand their sphere of activity. One or several governments in Eastern or Central Europe could become victims of their domination, the paper maintained. This forecast came true in Eastern Europe in the case of Ukraine. The paper’s authors predicted a sad scenario. According to them, Europe could pay for its strong dependence, especially if Russian firms are unable to fulfill contract terms because of insufficient investment into extraction of natural gas or if rising corruption and organized crime levels in the Eurasian energy sector spread, as an epidemic, to the interests of Western business. The events unfolding in the Eurasian energy space in 2006-2010, gas crises, political

55 Ibid.
quarrels, international court proceedings, where questionable companies of non-transparent origin were active players, had shown that the epidemic was already spreading, and this was fraught with unpredictable consequences. The forecast by George Friedman from Stratfor considers not only the post-Soviet space. George Friedman predicts, in particular, that there will be three stages in Russia's actions. During the first stage, Russia will concentrate on restoring its influence and efficient control within the borders of the former Soviet Union and on re-creating the Soviet buffer system. During the second stage, Russia will try to construct a second row of buffer zones outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. Evidently, such countries as Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria find themselves in the special attention zone if Russia achieves its goals in Ukraine and Belarus.

The revenue from the export energy resources flows from Russia to the EU, redistributed through offshore mechanisms, was to a significant measure left in Europe as bank deposits and purchases of property and local businesses. While the intellectually weak and will-less European politicians saw only a profitable business in this, Putin’s regime used it as a bait in order to create a powerful and influential lobby meant to play its role come the H-hour, assisting Russia from within the EU and their individual countries.

Source: http://so-l.ru/tags/show/severniy_potok

This had worked for the first time at the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, when the Franco-German tandem blocked NATO Membership Action Plans from being given to Ukraine and Georgia.

To continue the retrospective, comparing the dates, events, and statements, it is possible to come to the construction of the cause-and-effect chain of relations helping to describe the dynamics of Russia’s gradual, long-term and systemic preparation for outward expansion with its climax in the form of the hybrid aggression against Ukraine.

**Table 1. Retrospective of cause-and-effect events of Russia’s crypto war against Ukraine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decisive event (process)</th>
<th>Deep essence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 28, 2000 - Cassette Scandal (Gongadzegate) - September 2002 - &quot;Kolchuga&quot; Scandal - November 22, 2002 - NATO Summit in Prague.</td>
<td>Reputational blow on the elected for the second term president of Ukraine L. Kuchma due to the case of missing journalist G. Gongadze. Revealed records of the Major of the State Guard M. Melnichenko indicate suspicion of involvement of the president in the disappearance of the journalist. The international reputational blow on Ukraine through allegedly authorized by President Kuchma secret supply of a passive electronic long-range monitoring radar system &quot;Kolchuga&quot; to Iraq under the rule of S. Hussein. The culmination is the seating of heads of states and governments of NATO member states and partners during the Prague summit in French alphabet. L. Kuchma becomes a non-handshakable leader in the West. The consequences are the soft political isolation by the West of L. Kuchma's regime, the drift of Ukraine towards Russia. Invitation of Ukraine to the formats of post-Soviet reintegration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10, 2003</td>
<td>the signing of an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Turkmenistan, according to which all volumes of Turkmen gas were contracted for 25 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19, 2003</td>
<td>signing of the Agreement on the formation of the Common Economic Space on the initiative of the Russian Federation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 29 - October 23, 2003</td>
<td>Russian-Ukrainian crisis around the Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26, 2004</td>
<td>Yalta meeting of the presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Political approval of the 25-year scheme of gas trade and transit to Europe through the created in Swiss RosUkrEnergo (RUE) company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25, 2005</td>
<td>The Message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, where V. Putin called the collapse of the USSR &quot;the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1-4, 2006</td>
<td>suspension of gas supply to Ukraine by Gazprom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>disruption by the Crimean pro-Russian forces of the exercises &quot;Sea-Breeze&quot; of Ukraine and NATO troops on the territory of the peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10, 2007</td>
<td>Putin's Munich speech at the traditional security conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 2007</td>
<td>signing of the Treaty on the formation of the Customs Union by the RF, Kazakhstan and Belarus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>February 17, 2008 - Declaration of Kosovo's independence and Russia's negative reaction.</strong> From media reports: &quot;The proclamation of independence of Kosovo destroys the whole system of international law and will cause a chain reaction,&quot; the First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said.</td>
<td><strong>Western &quot;gift&quot; to the Kremlin. Yet on February 20, G. Friedman clearly predicted the behavior of the Russian Federation: &quot;It also could involve announcing Russia's plans to annex Russian-friendly separatist regions on its borders — most notably the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and perhaps even eastern Ukraine and Crimea. (Annexation would be preferred over recognizing independence, since it would reduce the chances of Russia's own separatist regions agitating for secession). Russia thus would argue that Kosovo's independence opens the door for Russia to shift its borders, too.&quot;</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **April 2-4, 2008 - Germany and France blocked joining the MAPs by Georgia and Ukraine at the NATO Bucharest Summit.** | **The practical success of Russia in its successful blocking of Alliance decisions outside NATO. From the media reports: "... the Russian president hinted that if NATO provides NATO membership action plan (MAP) to Georgia, Russia will recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia based on the Kosovo precedent and thus create a buffer zone between NATO forces and its borders ... if Ukraine joins NATO, this state will simply cease to exist. That is, he actually threatened that Russia could begin tearing off Crimea and Eastern Ukraine."** |

| **August 8-12, 2008 - Russia's aggression against Georgia with separation of South Ossetia. Combat use of the Black Sea Fleet units during the Russo-Georgian war without approval of the Ukrainian side, as it should be under the Treaty of 1997.** | **The Kremlin checked the West's reaction to military actions in the form of a "peace enforcement operation against Saakashvili regime" after diplomatic success at the NATO Bucharest summit. Ostentatiously ignoring Ukraine in the issue of agreed restrictions on the use of naval forces outside the Russian Federation and Ukraine and test of NATO reaction.** |

| **January 1-20, 2009 - suspension of gas supply to Ukraine and the EU.** | **Demonstration to Ukraine and the EU of the level of their dependence on Russian energy resources.** |
November 3, 2009 - program speech by Patriarch Kirill on the Third Assembly of the "Russian World":

"Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are the core of the "Russian World" today... only a united "Russian World" can become a strong subject of global international politics, stronger than any political alliances ... independent states, existing in the historical Rus territories and realizing their common civilizational affiliation, could continue to work together to create "Russian World" and consider it as their common supranational project"59.

Strengthening the geopolitical course of Russia on "gaining lands" through the religious factor.

Media opinions:
"... the head of the largest local Orthodox Church during his 25-minute speech never mentioned Christ, only three times the God, and at the same time he repeated 38 times the phrase "Russian World" - a term, which in the context of the Patriarch's speech sounds like a geopolitical concept, too little connected with church doctrine"60.

April 21, 2010 - Kharkiv agreements prolonging the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia on the territory of Ukraine until 2042.

Long-term securing of the military presence on the territory of the victim country to facilitate realization of future tasks.

August 14, 2013 - total blocking of Ukrainian exports to Russia.

The transition from the stage of crypto enforcement to the proxy phase of the hybrid war.

Thus, we can conclude that systematic preparations and actions, which were aimed at defeating Ukraine and formed clear cause-and-effect chains, were carried out throughout the entire period of Putin’s presidencies in the Russian Federation.

The construction of event and cause-and-effect chains is important in the context of counteracting the «alignment» of alternative chains by Russian propaganda, where the causes and effects are messed up or streamlined according to the Kremlin’s propaganda visions, where the causes and consequences are inverted.

58 http://geopolitica.ru/Articles/95/ - Access Error from 21.03.2015
2.4. Intertemporal preparations

According to the famous Crimean expert Igor Losev, first time Putin decided to «feel Ukraine by a bayonet» provoking conflict around Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait in 2003. Of course, it was not about a kilometer wide strip of sea sand between the Ukrainian Crimea and Russian Taman - Ukraine was tested for the ability to resist. This was one of the first try-out of «Russian Spring-2014». Just during the «Tuzla conflict» special services of the Russian Federation tested methods of psychological pressure and mass manipulation, a massive advocacy company. Then Russian militaries for the first time stood behind the «peaceful builders»; decked out «Cossacks» of the All-Great Don Host of the future adviser to the president of Russia and deputy of the State Duma Ataman Vodolatsky appeared in the arena.

In 2004, during the presidential election campaign, a group of political technologists, which backbone was composed of Russian advisers who worked for the then presidential candidate V. Yanukovych, presented a vision of «three sorts of Ukraine», by which as if the orange forces headed by V. Yushchenko were guided. «The thrown in by them (by the political technologists - our remark) lines of segregation of Ukrainians over time have become the lines of Ukrainian separation by Russian propaganda»62, - this estimation of the journalist Sergei Leshchenko in spring 2014 gained another significant confirmation in the fall of 2016 as a result of the «Surkovleaks» - the disclosure of documents, received by the international volunteer community «InformNapalm» as a result of the hacking of Vladislav Surkov’s office electronic mailbox by the Ukrainian «CyberAlliance»63.

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Three sorts of Ukraine in 2004 according to the version of the political-technological group Granovsky - Kulikov - Sergeytsev

Source: http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/leschenko/53722f577a5cc/

Scheme of Surkov's division of Ukraine in 2014
https://informnapalm.org/29239-surkovleaks-part2/
Both schemes are quite similar and indicate their Russian origin. The appearance time of the first version is 2004 that confirms our version of Russia’s crypto enforcement against Ukraine, which had started in the early 2000s and gained a distinct form with the 2004 presidential campaign by «cracking» Ukraine and its further auto-destruction.

It should be noted that 2008 turned out to be very favorable for Russia for transition to acceleration of geopolitical engineering of the Eurasian space. 2008 showed Russia that its strategy, aimed not only at weakening the West and strengthening its positions, but also at building a non-Atlantic «new Europe», could be quite successful. The US diplomacy, unsupported by force, was perceived by Russia as a weakness and as an additional incentive to create the «Pax Putiniana». Preparation for a war with Ukraine was already noticed in 2008. Oleksandr Sushko, a research director of the Ukrainian Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, wrote in the days of the hottest events in Georgia: «The discourse of the «war with Ukraine» has long become popular in Russia’s polititical intellectual circles. Quite recently, another «masterpiece» of such discourse, Igor Jadan’s (an analyst from Gleb Pavlovsky’s circle) opus «Operation «Mechanical Orange», was briskly (and quite seriously) discussed in both Russian and Ukrainian segments of the Internet. Even the scenarios of the war with Georgia are not so popular. Russians have been purposely prepared for a war with Ukraine»\(^64\).

The Russians carefully analyzed their successes and mistakes made during the Georgian campaign. And not only those that concerned the reactions of the international community and the readiness of their forces to operations. One of the most important aspects of the revision was the approach to formation of the «fifth column», as well as propaganda support and justification of the invasion. This was especially noticeable in Crimea.

First of all, the activity of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), which for 2008 was the main «analytical body» of the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) of the Russian Federation, was increased significantly in the Crimean direction. In the spring of 2009, the Institute was resubordinated to the Presidential Executive Office of Russia. The nature of RISS activities was also changed with its resubordination: ideological-propaganda support was added to information-analytical support of the work of state structures of Russia. Leonid Reshetnikov, retired Lieutenant-General of the FIS, an overt Ukrainophobic person and an «Orthodox Communist», who previously headed the information-analytical department of the FIS, was appointed to the post of Director of the Institute». Tamara Guzenkova, Director of the Center for Baltic and CIS Countries, became the leading specialist in Russian-Ukrainian relations. This tandem, with the support of dependent and subordinated to them

scholars and experts, promoted the theses like «There is no any Ukraine, there is only Little Russia (Malorossiya)», «Ukrainian statehood is a bluff», «Ukraine is a failed state», formed the concept of consolidation of the post-Soviet space «on the basis of territorial and spiritual renaissance». The authorship of the idea of «New NewRussia (NovoRossia)» belongs to these two «Orthodox emissaries».

In 2010, the Black Sea-Caspian Regional Information and Analytical Center of the RISS in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, which is considered to be the leading expert center in the South for studying relevant social, political and economic processes in the Black Sea-Caspian region, including issues of Russian-Ukrainian relations, prepared a large generalized report on the situation in Ukraine and Crimea. According to the report, the Ukrainian people have been invariably inclined to Russia since the days of the Pereiaslav Council; «insignificant Western trends» are marginal in nature, are provoked by a bunch of pro-fascist residents of Western Ukraine; the vast majority of Ukrainians retain the memory of a common history and dream of a revival of the common state existence of the Russian Empire / the Soviet Union; the Crimean population is in favor of joining the Russian Federation, and in the event of resistance by the organizations of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainian security forces, they can be easily blocked by forces of the Black Sea Fleet units deployed in Sevastopol, primarily by units of the Marine Corps.

It is clear that the RISS is not the main source of information for the Kremlin, but only one among many. But an incredible mixture of monarchism, stalinism, Orthodoxy, xenophobia, hatred to the West and Ukraine became the main ideological leitmotif of the RISS. Since the late 2000s, thousands of people have been working on this new ideology, especially in the media, in the Foreign Ministry, in the controlled by the Kremlin «public sector».

«Non-state analytical centers» were not too far behind the RISS. It should be noted the special role of the Institute of the CIS countries (Institute of Diaspora and Integration) of the State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin. Being a formally autonomous non-profit organization, the Institute of the CIS countries (ICISC) competed with the RISS, especially in 2009-2013, both in terms of providing top state RF leaders with filtered information, and in forming a network of influential agents and «useful idiots» in Ukraine. And if in Kyiv the representative office of the Institute of the CIS countries was headed by the apologist of Donetsk-Kryviy Rig Republic Vladimir Kornilov, then the head of the representative office in Sevastopol was former chief of intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet Rear Admiral (Ret.) Vladimir Solovyov - an experienced intelligence officer and apparatchik. «Zatulin’s staffers» not only carried out the collection of intelligence information about the socio-political
situation in Ukraine and the ARC, of materials that characterized the leaders of public opinion, but also actively promoted in the minds of the inhabitants of the peninsula the thesis of Ukraine as a failing state, of the illegality of being Crimea and Sevastopol a part of Ukraine. In 2009, the ICISC’s report «Transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was illegal and unfair» caused significant public reaction; this report became later the basis of the Russian ideologeme, which was to justify the seizure of Crimea by Russia in 2014. In the same year, according to Zatulin’s affirmation, they submitted to the RF Presidential Executive Office an information paper on the need for creation in the east and south of Ukraine (future «New Russia» (Novorossiia)) the separatist «People’s Front of the South and East of Ukraine» composed of pro-Russian movements and the anti-Ukrainian part of the Party of the Regions electorate. On the sidelines of one of the round tables, the head of the Sevastopol branch of the Institute, Admiral V. Solovyov, was genuinely surprised and impressed with the question of whether the Black Sea Fleet of Russia would be withdrawn from Crimea after termination in 2017 of the agreement on its temporary stay in Ukraine. «Sooner Ukraine will leave Sevastopol than the Russian Black Sea Fleet will», was his reaction.

Since 2010, intelligence units of the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, as well as the FSS counter-intelligence unit operating in Sevastopol, received an order to collect information that would characterize and compromise the heads of executive bodies in Crimea, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC, local authorities, security officials, influential businessmen, scientists, journalists, and other leaders of public opinion in order to use them in the interests of Russia. Later, it worked for a campaign to detect «spies, terrorists and saboteurs» among the objectors to the Russian occupation of Crimea. The list of targeted victims was actually formed during the prewar period. Crimean Tatar activists, as well as regional journalists and experts, turned out in the list. For example, there were experts from the Center of Assistance to the Geopolitical Problems and Euroatlantic Cooperation of the Black Sea Region Studies «NOMOS» (Sevastopol), which issued the quarterly «Black Sea Security» and monitored the activity of the Russian Black Sea Fleet not only in Ukraine, but also in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

Considerable burden in preparation of the hybrid war fell on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and led by it the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, more commonly known as «Rossotrudnichestvo». The mechanism of the «Russian world» started its work as the conglomerate of marginal pro-Russian organizations, movements, parties and blocs, under the organizational surveillance of diplomats from the
Russian embassy in Ukraine and the Russian Consulate General in Simferopol, despite the problematic relations in the pro-Russian political environment in Crimea.

At the same time, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces was working out options for military seizure of Crimea. Under various motives and legends, the peninsula was filled with representatives of Russian intelligence agencies, who carried out reconnaissance trips, reconnaissance of the area, were engaged in covert intelligence work. Intelligence units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, deployed in Crimea and Sevastopol, were involved in some special operations against Ukraine. The worked out plans were polished during military trainings of Coast Guard units of the fleet under the guise of planning the conducting of the military operations «in the course of resolving internal conflicts» and «counteracting the actions of illegal military formations».

According to experts, the Russian Federation was preparing for the occupation of the Crimean peninsula in 2015. The reason was to be the «threat of coming to power in Ukraine of the Nazi president» as a result of the next presidential election. In the Kremlin, it was understood that any president of Ukraine, who will replace Yanukovych, will in the first place denounce 2010 Kharkiv gas-fleet agreements between Yanukovych and Medvedev, which continued the term of the Russian Black Sea Fleet deployment in Sevastopol and Crimea until 2042. Denunciation of these agreements was unacceptable for the Russian Federation. However, the unpredicted scenario (EuroMaidan, Revolution of Dignity, escape of V. Yanukovych from Ukraine) forced the military-political leadership of Russia to implement their expansionist plans ahead of schedule.

2.5. False start-2009 and Restart-2013
The crypto enforcement phase, which precedes the unleashing of the hybrid-type war, is characterized in the Ukrainian case by the long-term use of the energy lever of influence. Its basic element was gas. Using the hypertrophied dependence of the Ukrainian economy on gas supplies from the Russian Federation and increasing the price of gas, Russia had been systematically and consistently exhausting the economy of Ukraine. In parallel, opaque schemes of gas business with corrupt background were imposed; corruption was cultivated at higher levels of state governance that increased the dependence of Ukraine on Russia.

In fact, the Russian side by intercepting Turkmen gas (namely, Turkmen, but not Russian, gas constituted the lion’s share of Ukrainian gas imports) through signing the famous Putin-Niyazov agreement of April 10, 2003, prevented direct supplies. Instead, the controlled by Gazprom company Rosukrenergo
WaRS - ХХІ: RUSSIA’S POLYHYBRESSION

was created in July 2004 in the Swiss canton of Zug; this company put under control all gas supplies from Turkmenistan to Ukraine. The signing of a package of agreements between RUE and NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine reformatted the gas relations between Ukraine and Turkmenistan in favor of Russia (see more details in Annex 3).

Gas intensity of the Ukrainian economy, in comparison not only with Central European countries, but also with CIS countries like Russia and Belarus, was abnormally high (see Table 2). To produce $1 million of GDP, in 2010 Ukraine had to spend 183.1 thousand cubic meters of natural gas, while Poland, which had similar industrial structure, spent almost 10 times less gas. After the 2006 gas crisis, Russia started a policy of escalating gas prices for Ukraine (see Table 3), which resulted in steady increase of the cost of gas imports, in the financial exhaustion of the country’s economy, and in increased dependence on the monopoly supplier.

Table 2. Comparison of gas intensity of Ukraine’s GDP with some EU and NIS countries, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP 2010 (PPP) $ bln</th>
<th>Total gas consumption, bln cub. m</th>
<th>Specific gas consumption 1000 cub. m on $1 mln of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>266.278</td>
<td>8.979</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>129.843</td>
<td>5.700</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>203.251</td>
<td>12.438</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>754.097</td>
<td>14.491</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1908.569</td>
<td>82.981</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>305.408</td>
<td>55.923</td>
<td>183.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>134.561</td>
<td>21.803</td>
<td>162.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2812.383</td>
<td>458.100</td>
<td>162.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The calculations of the Centre for Global Studies «Strategy XXI» based on data from international financial institutions (GDP at purchasing power parity) and national statistical offices (total gas consumption).
Russia’s hybrid invasion of Ukraine could have taken place in the last decade. In this context, Russia’s acts of “gas aggression” against Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 deserve special attention. In Europe, they are usually called “Ukrainian-Russian gas crises”, which reflects the traditional political desire of the Old Europe to avoid calling things as they are and finds its continuation even now, when Western politicians avoid using the phrase “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine”, giving preference to the neutral “Russian-Ukrainian conflict”.

The termination of gas supplies to Ukraine and reduction of transit through Ukraine to the EU in 2006 were Russian “actions of retaliation”. To Ukraine - for the Orange Revolution of 2004, to Europe - for support of Ukraine. Even before the Orange Revolution, Russia showed intentions to accelerate the process of destroying Ukrainian statehood, launched by it in the early 2000s. Moscow acted in several directions. The main objective was to undermine the economy, which is easily calculated on the basis of the above dynamics of prices for natural gas exported to Ukraine. It is noteworthy that the deputy head of the State Duma of the Russian Federation V. Zhirinovsky raised the matter of escalation formula of the gas price for Ukraine yet in 2005, on the eve of the 4-day gas crisis of January 2006, which served as a trigger for the following scenario. “They [the leadership of Ukraine - our note] should understand that they will always have to buy Russian gas and it will be more and more expensive. We will insist that in 2007 it will cost $300, in

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Table 3. A retrospective of escalation of gas prices for Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price ($/1000 m^3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>179.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>259.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>260.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>413.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table data - based on information from Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine, chart - East European Gas Analysis (yellow - gas prices for Ukraine, blue - gas prices on the German border, red - spot gas prices in Europe, light blue - gas prices in the US).
2008 - $400. Every year we will raise price for $100, so that in 2012-2013 it would cost $1,000 per thousand cubic meters\textsuperscript{65}, - V. Zhirinovsky stated in his interview in two weeks before the gas crisis of the beginning of 2006; and “what Zhirinovsky speaks, that Putin thinks” - it was truthfully noticed long ago in Moscow concerning Zhirinovsky.

In parallel, Russia began to deploy separatist projects under the slogan of federalization, which meant launching a “reprogramming” of the state system of Ukraine. The first of them was the “Southeast Ukrainian Autonomous Republic” in 2004. This project was unsuccessful, but at the end of 2005 a project of the “Donetsk Republic” appeared as the successor of the Donetsk-Kriviy Rig Soviet Republic of 1918. This also did not lead to success, the organization with such title was banned in Ukraine, but it continued a clandestine work with full support of Russia. Its work was activated in early 2009.

\textbf{A photo from the social network with the symbols of the «Donetsk Republic» (not yet «People»), dated August 12, 2009 https://vk.com/album-3223620_95208996.}

\textsuperscript{65} Cited from a video interview with V. Zhirinovsky from December 15, 2005. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fllNxtYwPLsY Quote on section 6’ 56"-7’ 18".
2009 gas crisis had far-reaching goals. It was supposed to play the role of a detonator to provoke a political conflict in Ukraine along the East-West line. The idea was that in the event of a complete interruption of gas supplies (for domestic consumption + transit to the EU), the Ukrainian authorities could not be able to supply it from main UGSs, located in the west of the country, to the east - to the main industrial centers which would remain without gas and heat. Thus, it was to provoke, according to the plans of Russian strategists, a “social explosion in the east and south of Ukraine”. It is no coincidence that on January 12, 2009 publications appeared on the “border revision” in the CIS and statements of Russian politicians in the Russian media: “RF State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin does not exclude that Russia “at the right moment will give a signal” to the southeastern regions of Ukraine for reunion with Russia”\(^6^6\). This signal could be given in a few days if the Ukrainian side had agreed to Gazprom’s proposal of January 13\(^6^7\) to restore the transit of gas to the Balkans and Turkey according to its scheme. Oleg Dubyna, chairman of the Naftogaz of Ukraine, rejected this proposal: “The proposal, which came from Russia to pump gas by Ukraine’s gas pipeline with the entrance into the GMS “Suja 1200” to Moldova, Bulgaria and Romania, can threaten that we will have to turn off gas supplies to Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk”\(^6^8\). If Kyiv agreed to Gazprom’s proposal, then the citizens of the million-plus cities as well as a number of smaller industrial cities of the East and South of Ukraine left without gas and heat at temperatures below –10° –15° C, would undoubtedly go out with street protests. And these protests would undoubtedly have political demands and would be supported by the regional authorities, the Communists, the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, who traditionally had a pro-Russian orientation and funding from Russian sources.

Probably, the basis of the statements of K. Zatulin was the result of a joint meeting of the Security Council and the State Duma of the Russian Federation on December 25, 2008, where the emphasis was placed on the special role of interregional ties within the CIS, the integration core of which is the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Community. As for Russian-Ukrainian relations, interregional relations are relations


\(^{67}\) Resumption of gas transit through Ukraine. In accordance with the agreements reached, today from 10:00 Moscow time, Gazprom is resuming the forced suspended (because of Ukraine guilt) supply of gas to European consumers through Ukraine. The volume of the first gas supply at the entrance to the GTS of Ukraine through GIS "Suja" will amount to 76.6 million cubic meters per day. Of these, 62.7 million cubic meters in accordance with contract volumes in the direction of the Balkans through GIS "Orlovka" and 13.9 million cubic meters to consumers of Moldova. January 13, 2009. http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2009/january/article56905/

between the south-western regions of the Russian Federation and the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, some of which are bordered with Russia and had at that time a large number of diverse contacts, a wide range of cooperation that could provide “perforation” of state borders by their number and frequency.

In 2009, the gas crisis scenario did not work as a detonator, since Ukraine’s GTS was reversed and central, eastern and southern regions of Ukraine received gas from gas storage facilities located in the west of the country. “Freezing disaster” and the subsequent social explosion of the southeast of Ukraine did not happen. In addition, the Medvedev-Putin duumvirate or “Tandemocracy” turned out to be insufficiently effective management system for solving large-scale external problems, as shown by Georgian events. Therefore, the pause before the restoration of Putin’s status quo in the Kremlin after the 2012 elections was used for more detailed, scrutinous, and in-depth preparations.

However, in 2009 the Russian Fund for Strategic Culture described the so-called “semi-rigid” scenario, which included the urgent redeployment of military contingents to Ukraine with the “interim government”, the dynamic deployment of local governance structures in the occupied territories, based on prepared in advance “support forces” (marginal groups which are critical to the authorities in Kyiv), the creation of “independent” quasi-state entities”.

In this context, it is indicative that the West-2009 strategic military exercises, and especially the West-2013, became the most extensive exercises that could now be identified as preparation of troops for conducting not only traditional combat operations but also unconventional wars. The publications of Russian and Belarusian media outlined the innovation of these exercises. One of the leading American military experts, Philip Karber, drew attention to their importance for further development of events around Ukraine, noting the special importance of these two exercises in his article “Russia’s ‘New Generation Warfare’” in the spring of 2015. In Europe, these exercises were obviously left unaddressed. The Russian Armed Forces launched the practical use of gained in trainings experience in 2014 with an improved scenario of hybrid warfare - hybression.

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Russia launched the hybrid war against Ukraine not in April 2014, with the onset of events in the Donbass, and not in February with the beginning of the occupation of Crimea, as many still keep thinking. The beginning of the Crimean events symbolizes the engagement of a military component, which Moscow had not needed before (although everything was prepared for the military scenario), since everything went according to the «plan of the Anschluss». The basic elements of this plan were de-atlantization and de-europeanization of the governance system through institutional changes. Particularly noteworthy is how institutional changes to the governance system of Ukraine were made under the influence of the agents of the Kremlin. With the election of V. Yanukovych as the president of Ukraine in 2010, the key institutions responsible for cooperation with NATO and the EU fell under «amputation», namely: the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration under the President of Ukraine and the Coordination Bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. A Law «On the principles of internal and foreign policy» was adopted, which established the «non-aligned status of Ukraine», which has no international legal recognition mechanism. Databases on cooperation with NATO were destroyed in the key ministries and departments responsible for defense, security and foreign policy. Moreover, all this was done in a very short period of time - within six months since the election of the
President Yanukovych. A number of persons, appointed by him on positions in the defense departments and security services, had signs of agents of Russian special services. Having received such management, the ministries and departments of the national security system began to work almost in an external management mode. This allowed Russia de facto to reverse the policy of Ukraine from the European and Euro-Atlantic direction into the Eurasian one, leaving only the pro-European rhetoric of Kyiv unchanged.

Implementation of Putin’s blitzkrieg of incorporation of Ukraine into the «Russian world» through the mechanism of Eurasian integration began, in fact, with the speech of the President of the Russian Federation on July 27, 2013 in Kyiv on the occasion of the 1025th anniversary of Christianization of Rus’ at a conference with a very indicative symbolism in the title «Orthodox-Slavic values - the basis of the civilization choice of Ukraine», which was organized by V. Medvedchuk’s Pro-Putin «Ukrainian Choice».

Of course, it should be noted that the basis for blitzkrieg was Russia’s long-lasting efforts of “reprogramming of the basic control module” of Kyiv – of the presidential power – from European to Eurasian one according to the canons of FTP. Initially, this was done in the mode of soft influence on the ruling political-oligarchic groups in Ukraine, starting with L. Kuchma’s presidency. The peak of the efforts, which were
already not only soft, but also semi-rigid ones, fell on the kleptocratic autocracy of Viktor Yanukovych, who monopolized the political and economic power in the country. In accordance with the FTP technology, it is enough to reprogram the main module of the system of state governance of an authoritarian state - the dictator, and this will direct the entire country into a strategic deadlock that was needed for Russia.

“Semi-rigid impacts”, in accordance with the Kremlin plan of hybression, had received new forms within the framework of the proxy phase since August 14, 2013. Russia, abruptly and massively, began to stop Ukrainian exports to Russia, causing economic losses to Ukraine. According to the Federation of Employers of Ukraine (FEU), “Russia has actually blocked all Ukrainian imports”70. The FEU noted that the problems at the Ukrainian-Russian customs had begun in the 20th of July. Pointedly, this synchronizes with the time of visit of Vladimir Putin to Kyiv on July 27th. According to the FEU, from 00:00 on August 14 all Ukrainian exporters without exception were added to the risk profile of the Russian Federal Customs Service’s risk management system in addition to the first four dozen Ukrainian companies that got there in July 2013. The FEU considered the situation as “a complete stop of Ukrainian exports for an indefinite time”71. It is tellingly that the source of information about the trade blockade of Ukraine was the organization (FEU), headed by the gas oligarch D. Firtash, who played one of the key roles in the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, and who was in fact Russia’s proxy tool in Ukraine. The alarmism of the FEU’s announcement was apparently intended to provoke Ukrainian exporters to pressure the government to adopt a decision to join the Customs Union. In those days, Victor Mironenko, the head of the Center for Ukrainian Studies at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, gave a frank appraisal of the Russian actions: “This is of course crazy! This is a full scale trade war! This was spoken during private talks and speeches at different levels in Russia. It was said by academician Glaziev, the president of the Russian Federation, the prime minister. But I have never thought they could go for that. <...> Me, like others, see an attempt at putting pressure on Kyiv, on the Ukrainian administration, to change the integration vector of Ukraine - from the Western to the Eastern”72.

Thus, the purpose of the efforts of the Russian Federation has become clear: to prevent the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU and to draw Ukraine into the Customs Union. The scenario of Anschluss - that is exactly what one could call that was being prepared at that time in the Kremlin. Its essence was to conquer

70 Ukraine-Russia: "trade war" or "certain problems"? Anastasia Zanuda. BBC Ukraine. September 15, 2013 http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/business/2013/08/130815_customs_ukraine_russia_az
Ukraine without a single shot, by “carrot and stick”, forcing Yanukovych’s regime to make an irrevocable geopolitical turn in the direction of Russia. In the summer and autumn of 2013, the mechanism of “stick” and hard pressing was launched, it was intensified through imposed contacts in October-November shortly before the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius.

The Liviy Bereg edition in the editorial investigation of Ukrainian traces of Surkov’s activity noted: «In parallel with the economic levers, Moscow engaged also a specific «shuttle diplomacy» - high-ranking guests from White-Stoned City (Moscow) met privately with leading Ukrainian businessmen, trying to «reprogram them» in every possible way. The highest-ranking official was the adviser to the Russian President, Vladislav Surkov. For the first time, his «unofficial» visit to Kyiv was recorded in mid-August 2013. It was just unofficial because this visit (as it should be with official ones) was not recorded by the Foreign Ministry. «For you to know: all business issues our guys discuss now with Surkov», - commented one of the sources from Yanukovych’s closest circle». This is a specific feature, as the chief technologist of hybrid war personally participated in «reprogramming» the «base module» of the state governance system - of the president of the country and business modules - the leading oligarchic conglomerates - by methods of false-targeted programming. And quite successful, as further events showed.

On October 24 V. Yanukovych arrives in Minsk for the meeting of the High Eurasian Economic Council at the level of heads of states, where he meets with V. Putin; on October 27 he arrives to V. Putin in Sochi; in less than two weeks, on November 9 - again a meeting, and again in Russia, and at one of the military bases under the most strict secrecy.

Reprogramming of the “presidential governance module” of the public administration system provided Putin with Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. The Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 905-r dated November 21, 2013, became the implementation of the expected in the Kremlin result of FTP use. Its essence is in two paragraphs: “In order to take measures to ensure the national security of Ukraine, more detailed studying and elaboration of a set of measures to be taken to restore lost production volumes and directions of trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation and other member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States <...> to suspend the process of preparation for the conclusion of the Association Agreement between Ukraine on the one hand and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states, on the other hand”. In November-December “carrots” were used - the promise of orders worth billions for enterprises of the Ukrainian Defense-Industrial Complex.

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At the beginning of December 2013, it was noted in the analysis of the NOMOS Center: “... Russia is preparing, with the help of agents of influence in the Ukrainian government, to establish control over the most valuable industrial assets. This is evidenced by the urgently organized by Vice-Prime Minister Y. Boiko for the Russian Vice-Prime Minister D. Rogozin on December 2 “promotional tour” to the main enterprises of the Defense-Industrial Complex - to two leading shipyards in Mykolayiv (Chernomorsky Shipbuilding Yard and Shipbuilding Yard “named after 61 communards”), the Yuzhmash Rocket and Space Enterprise in Dnipropetrovsk and the Aviation Science and Technology Complex named after Antonov in Kyiv ... Russia needs industrial capacities to place military orders on them. It needs the capacities of the Ukrainian Defense-Industrial Complex, but wants to fully get them under own control, as well as to prevent Ukraine joining unfriendly to Russia (as it thinks) alliances - NATO and the EU ... The negotiation process with the EU, which continuation next week was announced by Azarov, will not have a particular perspective under such tendencies. Russia acts proactively, forcing Ukraine to surrender strategic assets”74.

It is important to understand that Russia sought to get under control the leading industrial assets of Ukraine not only for using it as an intermediate link in the technological chain of establishing control over the Ukrainian state, but also taking into account that the ownership of these assets would give the Russian Military-Industrial Complex new qualities that would raise the technical level of the Russian Armed Forces for a future war against the West. Such approach can be seen as a preparation component for the future polyhybression of Russia when it would act multi-frontally against the West - by hybrid methods, for example, in the Balkans, the Baltic, or Moldova, and conducting an open intervention or “peacekeeping operation”, for example, in the Middle East or Southern Caucasus.

The culmination of the use of “carrots” was the Kremlin’s promise of providing $15 billion credit resources, of which three billion were provided immediately, as well as gas with a “discount for Yanukovych” for $268.5 per 1,000 cubic meters, which was reflected in the Moscow agreements between Putin and Yanukovych on December 17, 2013. In practice, this was the final surrender of Yanukovych’s kleptocracy and the success in applying the FTP by the Kremlin, which led to the turning of the foreign policy vector from the European to the Eurasian direction, and the replacement of the declarative eurointegration model with the basic constructions of the aggressor country: “Orthodox Slavic unity,” “Russian World”, “Customs Union”.

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Thus, the “restart-2013”, unlike 2009 one, turned out to be generally successful. However, EuroMaidan, which, for its part, was stirred up by Russian special services with their own methods (the murder of activists S. Nigoyan, M. Zhiznevsky and inducement of Yanukovych’s security forces to the bloodshed in Kyiv), caused an uncounted scenario and splashed out uncontrolled energy of Ukrainian society. This forced the Kremlin to move to the use of a military component.

2.6. Specifics of the Crimean stage of hybression

The operation of the RF Armed Forces on the occupation of the Crimean peninsula is a camouflaged heavy-handed part of the RF hybrid aggression against Ukraine. In accordance with the above mentioned stages, it was a previously planned stage of engagement of the military component of the hybrid war in the event if after the intensive proxy phase, which lasted from August 14, 2013 until February 20, 2014, it would not be possible to reach the strategic goal - to conquer Ukraine completely, having curbed the Maidan.

The operation was started on February 20, 2014, when President Viktor Yanukovych was still in Kyiv and was negotiating with the opposition with the participation of international mediators - foreign ministers from Poland, Germany and France, as well as a special envoy of the president of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, «empty» landing ships of the Black Sea Fleet with «green men» on boards were entering the Sevastopol bay, using the right of entering without a customs inspection, provided to the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in accordance with the Russian-Ukrainian agreements of 1997; military cargo aircraft were landing at the Kacha airfield with special force unit «Vympel» on boards. The occupation of Crimea began from Sevastopol. This was done quite simply, given the legal presence of the personnel and hardware of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia.
The chronology of the launch of the military component of hybrid aggression is important for understanding how Russia misinformed the international community, which tactics and strategy were used and where and when the Ukrainian side had opportunities to stop Russian aggressive actions.

- On February 20, the aide to the president of the Russian Federation, Vladislav Surkov, arrived in Kyiv. In Crimea, information came out that the group of armored personnel carriers had departed from the deployment site of the 810th Marine Corps Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet in the Cossack Bay of Sevastopol in the direction of the city exit. Explanation: «The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Crimea has brought its troops to the enhanced security regime due to the difficult political situation in Ukraine».

- On February 23, at a rally in Sevastopol, «people’s mayor» was «elected» - the citizen of the Russian Federation Alexei Chaly, whom FSS agents brought urgently by plane from Turkey;

- On February 24, Russian armored vehicles completely blocked entries and exits of Sevastopol;

- On February 25, a group of ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which returned from Novorossiysk after the completion of the Olympic Games in Sochi, delivered more than a thousand of armed paratroopers to Sevastopol;

- On the night of February 26-27, special forces of unit «Vympel» (of the Russian Federal Security Service’s Special Forces Center) and of the 45th Separate Special
Operations Regiment (of Airborne Forces of Russia) arrived secretly in military uniform without identification badges/insignias from Sevastopol to Simferopol and seized the buildings of the Verkhovna Rada and the Council of Ministers of the AR Crimea. Barricades were built in front of the buildings;

- In the morning of February 27, the Russian military forces set up checkpoints on the Perekop Isthmus and the Chongar Peninsula, through which rail and road connections between Crimea and mainland Ukraine run. «Don Cossacks» were deployed there together with Russian military;

- On February 28, the Russian special forces without insignia seized the Simferopol airport and the Belbek airfield (Sevastopol airport). 11 Russian Mi-24 attack helicopters invaded Crimea from Russia. Four Russian military cargo aircraft IL-76MD with paratroopers, violating the airspace of Ukraine, landed at the Airfield Gvardiyske. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine was given a notice in an ultimatum form that the planes would be landing every 15 minutes. No one was allowed to inspect the aircraft. Several dozen armored vehicles, including the «Tiger» armored vehicles and other types of equipment and weapons, which had not previously been in the military units of the Russian Federation in Crimea, started moving from Sevastopol and Gvardiyske in the direction of Simferopol. The Maritime Guard unit of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in Balaklava was surrounded by unknown armed people;

- On 1 March 2014, the Federation Council of the RF gave its consent to the introduction of the Armed Forces of Russia into the territory of Ukraine in accordance with the address of the President of the Russian Federation. Additional legalization of Putin’s appeal had been carried out by post-factum letter from Viktor Yanukovych on March 1 requesting the introduction of the Russian Armed Forces into Ukraine;


- On March 3, the blocking of all Ukrainian military units in Crimea was started; it lasted until March 25. Exits into the sea from the bays of Sevastopol and the lake Donuzlav were blocked by the ships of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. 9 planes IL-76MD violated the airspace of Ukraine, having moved paratroopers to Crimea. The Russian Black Sea fleet commander Admiral Alexander Vitko issued an ultimatum to Ukrainian militaries: if they do not surrender to 5:00 on March 26, it will start a real attack on units and troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces throughout Crimea.

Kyiv had enough forces in Crimea to stop aggressor’s actions, even despite the administrative chaos that prevailed in the governance system when President Viktor Yanukovych, Prime Minister M. Azarov and his government members run away from the capital, and O. Turchynov, the Speaker of the Parliament elected
by the Verkhovna Rada, who was also appointed by the Parliament as acting president, could not yet control the situation.

General Oleksandr Kichtenko, a former commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, in a resonant interview on June 23, 2016, noted that Kyiv had a significant number of trained forces in Crimea: «There was a very strong garrison of Internal Troops: up to 3000. Internal Troops are the forces that fight also in peacetime. They carry the service of enforcement of public order, they are active troops. And the ‘Tiger’ Special Force Regiment was a very well trained regiment, supplied with the most modern equipment and weapons. It was stationed near Feodosia in Crimea, and if the correct decision were made to use the garrison of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in cooperation with the SSU (I just know that the ‘Alfa’ Group was ready for serious actions), then such sad for us developments would not happen in Crimea»75.

Air Defense Forces of the country also failed to fulfill their mission. Air space was not closed. The shutting down by Air Defense or interceptions by fighters of several aircraft with paratroopers or attack helicopters that flew through Ukraine’s airspace to Crimea could radically change the course of the Crimean campaign and history as a whole. By the way, the GS of the Armed Forces of the RF did not exclude the scenario of counteraction from the Air Defense forces of Ukraine, therefore, a fraudulent move was applied - when approaching to landing planes with paratroopers aboard served the SOS signal. Similar tricks are known for some special operations76. If Ukrainian fighters forced to landing to another airfield in Crimea at least one of the Russian cargo aircraft with paratroopers on board, this would leave the RF President the possibility on March 4, 2014 at a press conference to reject the participation of the RF Armed Forces in events in Crimea and to claim that they were local «forces of self-defense».

One more fatal mistake of the transitional authorities in Kyiv was the follow-up of the Western politicians’ recommendations on the behavior model in

75 The security forces were ready to protect Crimea, but the leadership failed to adopt the decision - a General. June 23, 2016, http://ukr.obozrevatel.com/politics/30716-siloviki-buli-gotovi-zahistiti-krim-ale-kerivnitsstvo-ne-prijnyalo-rishennya-general.htm
76 "On August 21, 1968, at 2.12 am, the Soviet An-10 passenger airplane, due to engine breakdowns, requested an emergency landing at the Ruzine airport in Prague. It received the landing permit, but passed by. Instead of it, almost the same type of An-12 military transport, which followed it, with the group of Special Forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate on board, landed. An-12 ran along the runway, slowed down, saboteurs jumped to concrete without waiting for the aircraft to stop. Having made a landing, the plane, without stopping, ran off and took off, releasing the runway for other planes that flew one after the other. The fighters of the Special Forces of the GRU seized the dispatching tower and ensured landing at the airfield by the landing method of the 7th Guards Airborne Division. From that the liberation campaign of the Soviet Army in Czechoslovakia began in August 1968". Viktor Suvorov. "Soviet Military Intelligence". LLC "Publishing House" Good Book". 2016
Crimea. Refat Chubarov, the head of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatar people, gave an exhaustive assessment of the behavior of Western partners of Ukraine: «I was all the days in contact with the ambassadors of European countries, the United States. And there was always a request: do not provoke Russian militaries to more resolute actions. It will take some time, we will definitely find a solution. Do not let you to be provoked - it was the main and only message of our Western partners ... »77.

Moscow had a clear understanding that during the first weeks of the Crimean campaign the West would have no clear position regarding the events taking place on the peninsula, especially since they were masked by the hybrid nature of the invasion - armed men appeared, but no firing, victims, and destructions as well. There was confidence that without Western support Ukraine would not dare to oppose invaders. In order to prevent such resistance, a complex of measures was carried out starting from the outright psychological pressure on the top leaders of the country and up to actions from inside through various channels of influence. This deprived the opportunity to take adequate decisions and led to actual paralysis of governance. The published transcript of the meeting of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on February 28, 2014 has eloquent proof that the leadership of Ukraine and the leaders of the political parties that took power after Yanukovych’s runaway adhered to the position of avoiding resistance to the aggressor. Most clearly this turned up in the speech of the leader of the parliamentary faction of the Batkivshchyna Party, Yulia Tymoshenko, who attended the meeting of the National Security and Defense Council: «I also talked with our foreign partners, and they also confirm that Russian troops are at the borders, and ask not to make any moves. We have to listen to them, because without them we are completely powerless. Therefore, we must now beg the entire international community to stand up for Ukraine. This is our only hope. No tank should leave a box, no soldier should raise his weapon, because that would mean a loss. No state of martial law and activation of our forces! We must become the most peaceful nation on the planet, just behave like a pigeon of peace ... »78.


Thus, we can conclude that the false-targeted programming of the Ukrainian leadership on abandoning armed resistance to interventionists proved effective in this case.

A Crimean expert, Andriy Klymenko, points out that the technology of the special operation on the occupation and annexation of Crimea had a number of patterns, which were then applied in other regions of Ukraine within the framework of the «Novorossiia» project:

1) information and propaganda preparation of the territory, based on the direct intimidation of the population by the mythical repressions of the «Ukrainian fascists»;

2) infiltration of militants («Cossacks») from the Krasnodar Territory of the Russian Federation in support of «Cossack» organizations of Crimea: initially to create massiveness at rallies, and then to create illegal armed formations of «Crimean self-defense» on their basis;

3) the covert bringing of troops, mainly units of special forces, the Marine Corps, and the Airborne Forces of the RF with weaponry through the infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Crimea;

4) capture by «green men» of strategic objects (administrative buildings, airports,
seaports), blocking the sites of military units of the Army, Navy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Road-Patrol Service, the SSU, and Internal Troops;

5) the formation of «self-defense bands» out of infiltrated «Cossacks», the retired Black Sea Fleet militaries, the officers of the disbanded Ukrainian militia special forces «Berkut» who participated in the shooting of the Maidan in Kyiv;

6) providing weapon to «self-defense bands» and gradual transfer of control over blocked military units and infrastructure to them from Russian troops;

7) replacement of executive authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol city state administration with the help of legitimate bodies - the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC and Sevastopol city council;

8) legitimization of occupation and annexation by means of «referendums» on joining the Russian Federation, which were held under the control of Russian troops and «self-defense bands».

The occupation and annexation of Crimea has become quite exemplary in terms of meeting the objectives of the pre-designed plan and the sequence of its implementation. It has become to a certain extent a standard for performing hybression. Worked out pattern was immediately applied during the next stage of «Russian Spring», the «Novorossiia» project.

2.7. Unexpected scenario

As already pointed out at the beginning, when planning any war, whether classical or non-conventional, there is always a probability of unexpected scenarios that will require additional capacity to neutralize unexpected factors (ΔE unexp).

EuroMaidan destroyed Putin’s scenario for Anschluss of Ukraine as a result of a long period of crypto enforcement. According to the plan, Ukraine had to not only abandon the Association Agreement with the EU, but also agree to join the Customs Union and EurAsEC with the prospect of being further involved in the CSTO. That did not happen.

In 2014, the Kremlin launched a tough scenario. After intensive proxy phase (August 14, 2013 - February 20, 2014), the military component of hybrid aggression was used to increase the multidimensional and diversified pressure on Ukraine. The military operation in the form of a diffuse invasion began on February 20, 2014 - the beginning of occupation by the Russian Federation of the Crimean peninsula, which is part of Ukraine. The date - February 20 - is not accidental. 60 years ago, on February 19, 1954, the Decree of the Bureau of the Supreme Council of the USSR «On the transfer of the Crimean Region from the RSFSR to the UkrSSR» was adopted. The logic of the authors of the
Crimean annexation is quite easily tracked: February 19 is a «black day» in the history of Russia and Crimea, so the next day, February 20, should symbolize the return to the status quo ante. This once again suggests that the operation of «green men» was planned in advance and tied to a specific symbolic date, and regardless of what government in Kyiv was. If Viktor Yanukovych remained in the presidency during 2015, as agreed in the talks between him and the opposition through the mediation of foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Poland on February 21, it cannot be ruled out that the transfer of Crimea to Russia, in exchange for a «portion of carrots» to the kleptocratic regime in Kyiv, could have happened, properly arranged in the framework of the Anschluss scenario, with a propaganda performance like the «Pereyaslav Council 2.0» under a pageantry guidance of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. If the «junta» comes to power in Ukraine, then a forced option would be applied, the scenario of which was also prepared. The forced scenario was thoroughly disguised so that at the initial stage it did not look like that. «I gave instructions and orders to the Ministry of Defense, let’s face it, under the guise of strengthening the protection of our military facilities in Crimea, to redeploy there special force units of the Main Intelligence Directorate and the forces of the Marines, paratroopers», - Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, admitted in an interview to the creators of the propaganda film «Crimea: the way home». «No error was made. This was a difficult task, keeping in mind its scale, the use of diverse forces and means. And there were at the first stage special forces of the GRU, the Airborne Forces, the Marine Corps, and then other units».
Valeriy Gerasimov’s, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF, assessment is very revealing; it was presented by him one year before the start of the Crimean campaign in his report «The main tendencies in the development of the forms and methods of the Armed Forces use, the urgent tasks of the military science for their improvement» in February 2013: «In XXI Century, there is a tendency of erasing differences between the state of war and peace. Wars are no longer proclaimed, but having begun, they do not follow the usual pattern for us. And the «rules of war» have changed significantly. The role of non-military means in achieving political and strategic goals has increased, which, by their effectiveness, have significantly surpassed the strength of weapons in some cases. The ratio of non-military and military measures is 4:1». The emphasis of the used methods of confrontation shifts towards widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures. The new forms and methods of warfare include «reducing the military and economic potential of a state by defeating critical assets of its military and civilian infrastructure in a short time»79.

Obviously, the «West-2013» exercises have become a kind of try-out of the use of military component of hybression. Here is a fragment of one of the analyzes of the post-Crimean period, which reflects the concrete practice of the hybrid war against Ukraine and disguises its military component: «It is necessary to act indirectly ... First of all, it is necessary to send military and civilian specialists, security services for the construction of full-fledged institutions of governance in the territory of newly created republics. It is necessary to create all the conditions for organizing the volunteer movement, providing comprehensive assistance for its training, weapons and military equipment supply, creation of volunteer training camps for volunteers from the Donbas, and not only from it, on the territory of Russia, the DPR, and the LPR. To provide intelligence information to the South Eastern Resistance Forces, including data of satellite, radio and electronic reconnaissance; to provide unmanned vehicles for tactical reconnaissance, equipment for electronic jamming, means of secure communication ... We can supply weapons that are used in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as foreign weapons so that no one could formally accuse Russia of providing armed assistance to the «separatists-terrorists». To engage our reconnaissance and sabotage groups for sabotage on strategic enemy sites (airports, military bases, armored vehicle columns, sabotage against the significant gatherings of enemy forces, etc.), provide information from intelligence sources, and more. This option is the best and only possible»80.


The American experience of conducting wars against Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan was analyzed in Russia. Western conclusions were taken into account. It was stated in the Stratfor report of December 2014 to the Valdai Club: «... at first glance, the US lost these wars. But such a judgment shows a lack of understanding of the fundamental intentions. From the military point of view, the goal was not to establish control over these countries, but breaking their internal order, creating chaos and destruction...»81. In the post-Soviet space, Russia aims to create controlled chaos, destruction of internal order in neighboring countries against the background of what it will look like a hearth of progress and prosperity, and joining its geopolitical projects will have no alternative. The

hybrid war, which arsenal includes all expedient means throughout the range of application - from soft power to hard power - is ideally suited as a mechanism for creation of controlled chaos that is consistent with the theoretical developments of S. Nikanorov and S. Solntsev on «organizational weapons» and applied developments within the Surkov’s technologies.

In the case of Ukraine, it was launched in advance, as already mentioned. It is worth mentioning the described above: the main object, at which the use of organizational weapon is aimed, is a system of state governance. In countries with an authoritarian, dictatorial regime, this essentially simplifies the task: it is sufficient to influence the leader and his closest surroundings by mean of their personal «reprogramming» and automatically - «reprogramming» of the state governance systems. After all, the dictator and his closest surroundings are the main managers of the centralized system of the state governance. (It is more difficult to do in democratic countries, but is also possible. Some other mechanisms are applied there that give «Schröder effect», «Berlusconi effect» or «Orban effect»).

In the case of Viktor Yanukovych, his personal «reprogramming» during frequent meetings and conversations with Putin led to the necessary managerial effect for Russia - changes of personnel in the national security system. For key positions (Ministry of Defense, Security Service, Department of State Security, and several others), individuals were appointed who had signs of the planted agents of Russian special services. The algorithm of the functioning of the national security system was actually reprogrammed through such personnel assignments. It no longer worked as a protective mechanism of the state of Ukraine, but was transferred to the Kremlin’s external management through a chain of Russian special services and relevant units of the administration of the Russian president. This created the basic achievement in the form of destruction of defense and state security systems, which led to the success of the hybrid aggression scenario in the Crimean direction.

However, yet within the framework of the Novorossiia project, the failure occurred due to emergence of an unexpected scenario, caused by several factors that were not predicted, were underestimated or own strengths and capabilities were overestimated:

- overestimation of the pro-Russian potential of east and south of Ukraine;
- underestimation of the social potential of self-organization and resistance to the aggressor by Ukrainian society;
- underestimation of the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and volunteer battalions;
- an incident with shutting down of the civil airplane of the Malaysian Airlines (flight MH17) by the regular air defense missile system «Buk-1M» of the RF Air Defense;
- defeat of the main forces of the illegal armed groups during the unprecedented raid of airborne forces from the 95th SAMB (Separate Air Mobile Brigade) through the occupied territories of the Donbas in July-August 2014.

As a result, instead of the emergence of «Novorossiya» in the territories of at least 8 regions of the south and east of Ukraine, only the so-called LPR and DPR appeared in the form of occupied territories of two regions - Donetsk and Luhansk.

All this led to the transition of hybression from the algorithm of the «Crimean Blitzkrieg» to the algorithm of a protracted conflict with the sharp increase in the cost and price of the war for the aggressor, and also put it before the need for transition to the pseudo-peaceful process (Minsk) and transition of the war to a further mode of the intra-phase, which is intensified by low-intensity combat actions in the east. Besides, the aggressor had to intensify the actions in the framework of the previous stages of the hybrid war, with the aim of achieving the effect of the dysfunction of the state apparatus and self-destruction of Ukraine.
3. RESONANT ASPECTS OF THE HYBRID WAR
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3.1 Evidences of preparation and beginning

The determination of the degree of vulnerability of one or another country to a hybrid type aggression is essential for timely diagnosis, prevention and preventive actions. The basic determinants of the probability of conducting a hybrid war are the key ones. They can be formulated as follows.

**Internal Determinant:** *If a country has a subcritical internal conflict potential, it is the question of the time when it will be used by an external actor (actors). The higher is an internal conflict potential in a country, the higher is probability of a hybrid war against it.*

**External determinant:** *If neighboring countries in a geopolitical environment of a country have similar ethnonational, religious, linguistic and other features, then interregional communications can induce centrifugal processes both externally and internally. The combination of similarities increases the likelihood and effectiveness of applying hybrid-type war techniques.*

**Communication and Energy determinant:** *If within a country an aggregate communication potential of a certain territory (ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other component of society) with a foreign country (association of countries) exceeds an aggregate communication potential within a country, then the centrifugal potential that arises can be used by an external actor to conduct a hybrid type war with minimal use or by avoiding the use of military force.*

**Information and Communicative determinant:** *If a neighboring country develops a powerful propaganda apparatus for foreign audience, including actions from inside another country, it is an indicator of crypto enforcement and preparation by this country for potentially unfriendly actions against a country (group of countries) whose population is exposed to information psychological processing.*

**Cultural and Humanitarian determinant:** *If a neighboring country initiates a variety of cultural, linguistic, religious, educational and other humanitarian projects that rise its role in the civilization dimension not only in its own territory but also in neighboring countries, it is an indicator of crypto enforcement and preparing for unfriendly actions in the future.*

According to first three determinants, Ukraine can be defined as a country against which hybrid war technology can be applied, while the fourth and the fifth determinants point at the Russian Federation as an aggressor. The presence of an internal conflict potential that did not have a critical mass but which was artificially stimulated by an external actor - Russia - through asymmetric economic relations, energy dependence, corrupt business schemes involving political figures and high-
ranking officials, interregional ties with the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, inhabited by Ukrainian, but mostly Russian-speaking, citizens, employed in the industrial sphere, which, from the Soviet era, focused on sectoral cooperation with the Russian partners - all together created internal Ukraine’s vulnerability to Russia, which is dominated by syndrome of geopolitical revenge. Two other determinants can be illustrated by the concepts of the «Russian World», «Orthodox Unity,» «Triunity of Slavic peoples of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus», by the activities of Russian media in the territories of other countries, etc.

Signs of the beginning of a hybrid war should be structured in three levels: yellow, orange, red. At that, the orange level means the practical beginning of a hybrid war with the subsequent transition to a red level, which, in its turn, implies the further involvement of military component in a disguised form.

Yellow level:

- systematic massaging in media of a neighboring state (of a potential aggressor) of the problems of a neighboring country (of an object of future aggression) with an emphasis on national security threats;
- activation in a neighboring country of associations of compatriots, which advocate for protection by «all means» of the rights of national minorities in the territory of a neighboring state;
- initiation and holding of various public events of a scientific and applied nature on resonant topics, that brings rift into the public conscience of the country-object of future hybression;
- putting biased materials, which have manipulative, discredited nature for state power and political forces, into the information space;
- active works with social networks, including creation of thematic groups, trolling actions of victim’s country leadership, active work of the bots;
- imposition of «interregional cooperation» between border regions in order to create and strengthen centrifugal tendencies in a victim country;
- emergence of branches of various associations of a neighboring state of educational and cultural orientation in both a capital and regions under the roof of which corresponding ideology and propaganda are spreading;
- illegal support of irredentist and separatist forces in the territory of a neighboring state in the form of grant support of local NGOs created for addressing tasks of the next level;
- creation and support of paramilitary groups that meet regularly for taking ideological, political and special trainings in the territory of a neighboring state;
- establishment of contacts and cooperation between actors from an aggressor country and marginalized groups in the territory of a potential victim country: businessmen, owners and top managers of major city enterprises, money-based «oppositionists» which are dissatisfied with the current authorities.
Orange level:
- promotion of country’s aggressor creatures to responsible positions in state hierarchy of a victim country;
- institutional changes in the public administration structure that do not coincide with national interests, but do coincide with interests of an aggressor country; changes are achieved through its creatures;
- sharp increase in external activity of the propaganda apparatus of an aggressor country with intense release of large volumes of misinformation and false interpretations of events in a neighboring country in order to disorient the world community;
- emergence of counterintelligence information on tampering by neighboring state organizations of local authorities and law enforcement bodies, owners of large enterprises (upon receiving the relevant order, corrupt entities will be actively involved in cooperation with representatives of an aggressor country or will follow the instructions of the «curators»);
- establishment of discriminatory trade regimes for main export goods and services of a neighboring state, creation of difficulties in importing critical goods (energy resources) on which neighbor’s economy depends;
- sharp activation of NGOs that oppose state authorities with calls «not with words, but with cases» to solve problems;
- increase in the number of tourist trips in the border zone;
- widening activity of special services and, in particular, military intelligence of a neighboring state on the territory of a neighbor;
- concentration of armed forces and means in the near zone, conducting military exercises in immediate vicinity of the border.

Red level:
- afflux of radio intelligence data on the sharp increase in intensity of radio Communications in a certain zone (zones) along a border between two countries;
- a massive informational and psychological campaign in media of a neighboring country, aimed at protecting compatriots, warning a government of a neighboring country about consequences, while simultaneously appealing to own country authorities to «take measures»;
- holding by some NGOs mass events under anti-government slogans;
- appeal from NGOs, rallies, assemblies from a victim country to leadership of an aggressor country with calls for «assistance», «protection» with one or another argumentation and motivation;
- appearance of self-defense bands, Cossack units, private military formations;
- local disruptions of the broadcast of state television channels, their replacement by
television channels of an aggressor country;
- emergence of unidentified militant groups («green men»).

Active mainstreaming and promotion by Russia of the concept of the «Russian World», activity of the ethnical ROC with the propaganda of «Orthodox Unity» in Ukraine, activity of the «Rossotrudnichestvo», opening branches of Russian educational and humanitarian institutions in industrial centers of the east and south of Ukraine, widening activity of Russian and pro-Russian Cossack Formations, etc. were evidences of the yellow level of threat which were ignored by central authorities in Kyiv, which were under the influence of false targeted programming and corruption actions of Moscow.

The orange level was marked, since 2010, by elimination of the structures responsible for Euro-Atlantic cooperation, by appointment to major posts of people with an explicit pro-Russian orientation, by decisions to consolidate Russia’s military presence in Ukraine, and by increase of energy dependence on Russia. The peak of the orange level became the trade blockade of Ukrainian exports in 2013 and RF security forces’ «humanitarian aid» by special-purpose equipment for attempts of Yanukovych’s regime to suppress «Ukrainian fascists» on the Maidan in Kyiv.

It is important to look at the red level and its features on the Crimean example. According to Andriy Klymenko, the technology of special operations on the occupation of Crimea had standard elements, which were then applied in other regions of Ukraine:

1. Massive information preparation of the territory, based on direct intimidation of the population by mythical repressions of the «Ukrainian fascists»;
2. Infiltration of militants («Cossacks») from the Krasnodar region of the Russian Federation in support of the «Cossack» organizations of Crimea - first, for mass creation at rallies, and then for creation on their basis of illegal armed formations of «Crimean self-defense»;
3. Hidden entering of troops, mainly of special force units, marines and airborne forces («green men») with weapon and equipment, using infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet of the RF in the AR of Crimea;
4. Seizure of strategic objects by «green men» - of administrative buildings, airports and ports; blocking of places of deployment of military units of the Ukrainian Army, Navy, Border Guards, SSU, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Internal Troops;

The threshold of transition of a hybrid war into a conventional one is an open massive use of regular armed forces by an aggressor country. For such a transition, an appropriate casus belli is created. According to our assumptions, the incident with shutting down by the «Kyivan junta» of a civilian plane of a Russian airline over Ukraine should have to become the reason for classic war launch. Downing of the MH17 flight of the Malaysian Airline on July 17, 2014, probably due to a mistake by the executors from the 53rd Air Defense Brigade of the RF Armed Forces, put an end on the scenario of an open war against Ukraine using high-precision weapons - similar to the NATO campaign against the former Yugoslavia. This is the scenario that Russia began to use in Syria, after about a year, in September 2015.

Russia had to continue the hybrid war, but according to the «scenario C», that is, when the «scenario A» of repetition of the Crimean blitzkrieg in the east and south of Ukraine failed to succeed, and the «scenario B» - the «Novorossiya project» -
started to evidently demonstrate stagnation: «the uprising of the Russian-speaking population of the Southeast of Ukraine against the fascist junta» did not take place; separatist uprisings in Kharkiv, Odessa, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk were neutralized by central authorities; expansion of proclaimed in the occupied territories of Donbass of the DPR and LPR to the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions failed; operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and volunteer battalions localized the activity of illegal armed groups and Russian interventionists within the separate districts of the two regions of the Donbass. Following the technology of hybrid type war, Russia continued to argue that the RF Armed Forces were not involved in the «conflict in Ukraine» (a well-known propaganda formula «they are not there»). Although all this is refuted by obvious things and evidences not only by the Ukrainian side but also by independent estimates, however, at the 4th year of aggression against Ukraine, Moscow continues to deny its participation (see Annex 2 for more details).

The United Kingdom Embassy to Ukraine provided infographics on November 19, 2014 with pictures of three T-72 BM spotted by journalists of western mass media in the Donbass - near Lugansk and Donetsk on August 28, September 4, October 23. These tanks are not used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

3.2 Some mechanisms for prevention and counteraction

In the classic war, the main mean to achieve goals is the use of regular armed forces; other types of impact on the enemy are subordinate. Russia’s actions against Ukraine - as aggression of a hybrid type - are going on in a masked form: initially, in the form of formations of militias, Cossacks, volunteers, and later, in the form of armed formations of «puppet» state formations, in which, according to the legend of Russian propaganda, local tractor drivers, miners, farmers got arms and weapons hidden in mines and taken away from the Kyivan junta.

In accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974, «Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations». Article 3 of the Document contains a list of acts falling under the definition of «aggression», regardless of a declaration of war:

(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;

(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;

(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;

(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;

(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;

(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

Paragraph (g) in this case leaves no room other than aggression for the qualifications of Russia’s actions, since it determines not only the action of the armed forces of one state against the other, but also clearly states that this applies to: «the sending by or
This is exactly what Russia is doing against Ukraine, acting both externally and internally. Belarus was almost the first country which reacted to the threat of the war of hybrid type. The case of Putin’s hybression against Ukraine, as well as Minsk’s suspicions in the presence of plans in Moscow to remove A. Lukashenko’s regime, led to an extremely rapid rethinking of the realities of the modern world and introduction of amendments to the national law «On a martial law regime». The essence of innovation lie in including preventive measures to bar unfolding a hybrid war. A martial law regime can be introduced in Belarus even without official declaration of a war by any country. The law entered into force on February 1, 2015. A number of indicators were installed.

Military threat is recognized not only as concentration of armed forces of another state (other states) along a state border, as emergence of armed conflicts zones, as conducting mobilization in another state, but also as «other activities of a particular state (states), extremist, including terrorist, organizations, located in the territory of another State (States), including statements and demonstrations of force made in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, indicate the preparation for an attack».

Any of the following is recognized as an attack, regardless of the declaration of a war by another state:

- sending by another state (other states) or on behalf of another state (other states) to the territory of the Republic of Belarus of armed gangs (groups), irregular forces, mercenaries, or units of regular troops which use the armed force against the Republic of Belarus;
- other actions related to the use by another state (s) of the armed force against the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and constitutional order of the Republic of Belarus in any other way incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations»

Thus, we can conclude that Minsk quite successfully used the existing criteria for determining aggression as an indicator of the beginning of the hidden use of the military component. But this is applied to conceptual approaches at the doctrinal

level. What can be imagined in practical terms, taking into account Russian strategy and tactics of hybrid warfare? Particular consideration should be given to the fact that hybrid aggression is carried out by an external force that activates and nourishes internal conflict potential of a victim country, and also should be taken into account the fact that such international institutions as the UN, OSCE, PACE are slow, ineffective and incapable of acting in the algorithm of «conflict preventing». In case where an aggressor is an influential Member State with veto right, the activities of these international organizations are actually paralyzed. The following list is not exhaustive but reflects the main positions of counteraction to hybrid aggression.

1. Quick transfer to a special mode of operation in accordance with the internal procedure of a National Security Authority (Security Council or other body provided for by Constitution of a country) without introduction of martial law in a country at a stage of appearance of threats of the Orange level, which should be automatically provided at the doctrinal level (National Security Strategy, Military Doctrine).

2. Rapid and tight response within a country:
   2.1. Strengthening of cyber defense of state administration, strategic enterprises, and armed forces.
   2.2. Strengthening the control of electronic communications (e-mail, mobile and landline telephones), monitoring social networks;
   2.3. Strengthening the control of financial flows in order to identify and eliminate channels of financing of forces acting as agents of influence of an aggressor country;
   2.4. Introduction of restrictions on the activities of media, and above all, funded by an aggressor country, in order to prevent launching of information and psychological operations in media space of a country-object of aggression;
   2.5. Cessation of activities of some non-governmental organizations that serve as a platform for internal destabilization;
   2.6. Internment of leaders of separatist groups;
   2.7. Strengthening counter-intelligence activities and implementation of a set of counter sabotage measures;
   2.8. Carrying out special measures to neutralize leaders of illegal armed groups in case of their appearance.

3. Border closure with an aggressor state, fire reinforcement of a border, redeployment of units of regular armed forces to areas vulnerable to attack.

4. Strengthening protection of critical transport and energy infrastructure.

5. Appealing to international institutions - the United Nations, the OSCE (although this will not bring the expected effect, but nevertheless must be executed with the aim
of providing to the world community undistorted by enemy propaganda assessments of what is happening).

6. Asymmetric actions towards an aggressor on its territory or territory of third states where its interests are presented.

7. Media resistance in global information space.

8. Request of external assistance from potential allies.

Yet at the initial stage, it is important to achieve maximization of damages and losses of an enemy in order to dramatically increase the «price of victory» from the level expected by an enemy to the unacceptable level. The Ukrainian lesson on the loss of Crimea shows the need to hardly resist the aggressor without any delay and regardless of recommendations and advices of the partners to «keep calm» and «not to be subjected to provocation». The ease and speed, with which almost all of Russia’s goals in the Crimean operation were achieved, played a fatal role in the development of the situation in the Donbass in less than two months. The Crimean case created an illusion of ease, with which goals can be achieved during the next stage of aggression within frameworks of the project «Novorossiia». For Ukraine, the war in the east, which began after occupation of Crimea, became a payoff for the surrender of the peninsula without a single shot. The Crimean surrender of Kiyv became an encouragement for the aggressor, and the domino effect began. An exhaustive estimate is given by the Russian historian Yuriy Felshtinsky: «Events in Eastern Ukraine are the immediate result of ceding Crimea without a fight ... If Ukraine defended Crimea with arms, it would still go to Russia ... But the ‘uprising’ in Eastern Ukraine would not have begun» 85.

If we consider the international aspects, then hypothetical options for terminating Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine could take place in asymmetric execution by the United States, if Washington had the political will to fulfill its obligations in accordance with the security guarantees provided to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum. However, in February 2014, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF were confident that the US reaction to the annexation of Crimea and the separation of the southeast of Ukraine would be exclusively non-military. The United States, NATO, and EU will follow patterns. The key indicators for the Kremlin were the events on June 11-12, 1999, when the Russian battalion of airborne troops seized the Slatina airport in Pristina (Yugoslavia), not admitting the British there, and the events of 2008 in Georgia. NATO and the United States did not dare to provide armed resistance. The General Staff of Russia was convinced that, in the case of Ukraine, everything would be the same as it was in both Pristina and Georgia, therefore, they acted on the principle of «beat first!», «victory will be for us».

85 The world is not crazy. Yuri Felshtinsky: Crimea turned out to be only a first step. 05-05-2014. Http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5364A28A98AFA
At the same time, Russia also followed patterns, using Soviet-style ones. The nature of decision-making on the invasion of Ukraine, and later on interventions in Syria, resembles the «Afghan patterns» of the USSR in 1979. The main ones were:

- guide - the views of leaders;
- finding out external threat;
- capturing the mood of leaders;
- «keep your nose in the wind»;
- bet on strength;
- mutual guarantee;
- personal ambitions;
- excessive propaganda and lack of analysis;
- inertia of thinking;
- the price of human life is not important.

The comparative characteristic of stereotyping actions of Russia and the USSR is in Annex 4.

The United States was the only country that, hypothetically, having warned Russia about the consequences of unleashed by it hybression, could resort to asymmetric non-stereotyping actions, taking into account the Soviet stereotyping conduct of the Russian Federation. Russia could be restrained with the help of both non-military and military, but contactless and bloodless, means.

The United States and the West as a whole will not be able to stop Russia without the use of fierce force, because Moscow is confident that the West will never be ready for this, as confirmed the Syria case, in particular, the lack of an adequate response from the West to Aleppo’s barbaric bombing in 2016 by Russian aviation. The sooner the United States will launch tough actions against Russia, the sooner, and with less losses, it will be possible to overcome the crisis and prevent its transformation into a massive war in the Middle East and in Europe.

The US Navy missile strike at Syrian airbase Shiyrat on April 7, 2017, in response to the use by the Assad regime - with Russia’s consent - of chemical weapons on April 4, is an indicator of the US transition to a strategy of tough response to Putin and Assad regime’s actions in Syria. This means another unpredictable scenario for the Kremlin. If the United States goes to preventive actions, it will put Russia at a deadlock and force it to act reactively.
4. POLYHYBRESSION OF RUSSIA VECTORS OF EXPANSION
4. POLYHYBRESSION OF RUSSIA. VECTORS OF EXPANSION

It is hard to determine the limits of RF aggression; however, in the fourth year after the beginning of the proxy phase of hybression in August 2013, it is clear that its appetites are not limited to Ukraine alone. «The limits of Putin’s military interventions depend heavily on his goals. depend to a great extent on his goals. If the goal is the enlargement of ‘the Russian World’, potential victims could be Belarus and Kazakhstan… If Putin’s goal is not letting the Eastern neighborhood countries escape from the Russian sphere of influence, the level of danger rises for Georgia and Moldova… Finally, if Putin’s goal is to humiliate the West, to undermine the credibility of NATO or to recreate the Soviet Union, then the Baltic States might come under attack as well» is a fairly accurate, though incomplete, assessment by Margarita Šešelgytė from the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the Vilnius University. The most accurate assessment of the actions of the RF against Ukraine, given by European leaders, was provided only by the President of Lithuania D. Grybauskaitė who stated that «Putin’s Russia today is ready and willing to go to war. Europe and the West are not ready and not willing to go to war» «If he (Putin - our note) will not be stopped in Ukraine, he will go further» «Ukraine, being in conflict with Russia… is not only defending its territory, but also Europe and its values» However, these assessments are eroded by the chorus of those in the West who want to «continue the dialogue» and restore «business as usual» with Russia. It works for further expansion of Russia in Europe.

The basic determinant of geopolitics, geo-economics and futuropolitics, according to Kremlin’s vision, must be aimed at controlling the global financial flows, since he who controls money he has power. Control over the world finances signifies global dominance. This can be achieved by undermining the United States dominance in the world, as the global financial flows and settlements are based on the US dollar and ensure global domination of the United States. In Russia, it is believed that the global order should be different, based on the Eurasian Heartland. The resource base (availability of energy, mineral, water and food resources), informational, psychological, and special impacts (propaganda, false targeted programming, special services) and force projection (nuclear missiles, air and space forces, cyber troops),
and if necessary, the use of force in the hidden (technologies of crypto enforcement, hybrid warfare) or explicit form, should serve as a decomposition of the existing world order and reengineering through chaotization of the European space and, in parallel, of the global world order with reorientation of financial flows in the new global power center, the «Great Eurasia», the core of which is Russia.

The current Russian expansionist policy is based on the so-called Eurasian mission of Russia, formulated by Dugin back in the 90s of the 20th century. According to Dugin, it is formulated quite simply: «The imperative of Russia’s geopolitical and strategic sovereignty is not only to restore the lost regions of the ‘near abroad’, not only to renew the allied relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, but also to include in the new Eurasian strategic bloc the states of the Continental West (in the first place, the Franco-German bloc, which gravitates towards liberation from the Atlanticist patronage of the pro-American NATO) and the Continental East (Iran, India, and Japan)... Access to the cold seas of the North and the East should be complemented by an access to the warm seas of the South and the West, and only in this case Russia will become geopolitically ‘completed’». In this regard, Dugin is consonant with the Belgian geopolitician Jean Thiriart and his concept of Europe from Dublin to Vladivostok.

The mechanism of implementation of this concept is war. But through the classical war, Russia will not be able to achieve its goals. Its military might is not so powerful, even given the existing nuclear potential. In a direct conflict with the West, it will lose. However, Russia has enormous resource potential, above all, the energy one. Therefore, the main intention of Russian strategists is to unleash a latent war that would not be perceived as a war and would not allow NATO to engage Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. One must admit that such approach works. A perfect example of it is the Russian-Turkish confrontation over Syria following the incident of the air incursion of the Russian Su-24M bomber into the air space of Turkey and its subsequent destruction by a Turkish fighter in November 2015. The NATO allies of Turkey denied the latter even to launch the consultation mechanism provided for under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, despite the fact that the Russian armed forces openly conduct hostilities in Syria. Such behavior of the NATO allies has benefited Russia, which, despite a sharp crisis in its relations with Turkey, was able to outplay the West at the next stage of the Ankara dispute with Brussels and Washington after the attempted military coup against the regime of R. Erdogan.

It is clear that the overall potential of Russia’s expansion, given the size of its GDP, does not meet its ambitions. Russian experts define the maximum extent of expanding Russia’s influence: «The task of Russia, as one of the main land poles in Eurasia, is to maximize its influence on those zones that lie between its land territory and the water area surrounding the Eurasian continent, integrating them to the greatest
possible extent in the strategic and economic dimension”90. It is beyond the power of Russia. However, one can assume that the main stake is placed not so much on the mechanisms of conquest and subordination, but on the «self-subordination» of the countries of the Eurasian continent to a new «pole of the world» under the influence of the «green men» effect for some of them (the post-Soviet space countries) and Russia’s resource attractiveness for others (the European Union member-states).

It should be taken into account that, along with the «Ukrainian scenario» to prevent signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, Russia also implemented the «Armenian scenario», which can be classified as «self-subordination». This scenario was much easier for Moscow to handle due to total dependence of Armenia on Russia. It was not implemented using the hybrid war methods, there was no need for that - the mechanism of energy and security dependence and the crypto enforcement tools snapped into action. The Armenian scenario is a mechanism for reengineering the Eurasian space, which fits into the canon of the Russian multi-frontal war against the West. According to Kremlin’s vision, the EU, by offering the Association Agreement (AA) to Armenia, sought to deprive the RF of its «Transcaucasian foothold». That is why Moscow embraced the proactive approach. The sudden refusal of Armenia from conclusion of AA with the EU and the subsequent accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was the result of direct pressure exerted by Vladimir Putin on President S. Sargsyan, just as it was done in the case of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych. The mission of «correction of S. Sargsyan’s policy» was entrusted to Ari Abramyan, the head of the Union of Armenians of Russia, the Russian oligarch of Armenian origin. In this case, Moscow resorted to the proxy methods. The President of Armenia was taken by a private plane to the oligarch’s estate in Croatia on August 28, 2013. The message that Sargsyan received was unequivocal - no agreements with the EU and immediate accession to the Eurasian Economic Union. Upon returning from Croatia, Sargsyan refused to sign the association agreement with the EU. Putin received Sargsyan in the Kremlin in less than a week’s time - on September 3. Thus, the total dependence of Armenia on the Russian Federation, both in the energy and security dimensions, was successfully converted by Putin’s regime into consolidation of the Armenian bridgehead of Russia on the platform of the Eurasian Union.

Russia places its stake on the policy that can be called a geo-resonant decomposition of the world order, established not only after the Cold War, but also since the times of World War II. The effect of geo-resonance, according to the plan, should be caused by copying, to varying degrees, of Russia’s behavior by other players. The Kremlin thought fit to violate the norms of international law, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, the Paris Charter and other international instruments. The expectation is based on the principle «do as I do», that is, the behavior of Russia must trigger a chain reaction of similar steps to be taken by other players. The

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«Zhirinovsky’s Letters», dated March 2014, to the leadership of certain Central European countries (Poland, Hungary and Romania) testify to that. In particular, the letter reads: «On the eve of the war, the USSR leadership, trying to protect itself and its allies, was practically forced to include part of Bessarabia, which belonged to Romania, in the Soviet Union. Today it is Chernivtsi Region on the territory of Ukraine. Besides, geopolitical considerations dictated the expansion of the USSR through the inclusion of a number of originally Polish territories. Those are now the Volyn, Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Rivne regions. The listed lands have always been part of the Polish state... Another, no less eloquent example is Transcarpathia, the region that is ethnically and historically related to Hungary... Why in Poland, Romania, Hungary they do not think about holding a referendum in the territories of the above-mentioned regions of Ukraine, as well as in the adjacent regions of Poland, Romania and Hungary? The only issue is the possibility of returning Chernivtsi Region to Romania, Transcarpathian Region to Hungary, and five regions of Ukraine - Volyn, Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and Rivne - to Poland.”91.

Russia’s actions on annexation of the Crimea, according to the Kremlin’s plan, must lead to similar actions by the countries of Central Europe, for example, Romania and Hungary, to protect their compatriots in Ukraine because of occupation of the territories with high concentration of national minorities, and in Poland it must provoke the imperial syndrome due to nostalgia for «Kresy Wschodnie» (Eastern Borderlands).

It must stimulate Armenia, Azerbaijan and Serbia to restore historical justice as they understand it in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo. Thus, those who advocate for compliance with the Helsinki principles will become, either deliberately or not, their destroyers, playing on the side of Russia. The effect of such policy is like a virus - it can manifest itself not immediately, but infection is already there. Then the virus will start to replicate, and this will result in the situation of «war of all against all», against which background Russia will look like an island of stability and an arbiter in resolving conflict situations. Frequent statements by Western leaders about impossibility of resolving a particular issue (Iranian, Syrian, Ukrainian one, etc.) without Russia’s participation can serve as a vivid illustration of that. Russia’s involvement, according to the vision of the West, has to contribute to a constructive resolution of a problem, but this can only be possible provided Moscow also thinks the same way. Experience, however, shows that Russia, as a rule, joins international formats for solving certain problems with a destructive program disguised as a constructive solution owing to the efforts of Russian propaganda. The main obstacle to the success of launching this «virus program» is the broken and increasingly fragile transatlantic solidarity of Europe and America, which is being tested by the isolationist sentiments in the US and the anti-American sentiments in the EU.

European analysts tend to believe that the hybrid war in the form it is waged by Russia against Ukraine is almost impossible with respect to the EU and NATO countries: «For countries like Ukraine, hybrid warfare is a tangible threat, but for most European states it poses less of a danger. Such tactics worked so well in parts of eastern Ukraine because it is hard to imagine a more favorable ground: a contested, passive or near-absent sense of Ukrainian identity, estrangement from the new authorities in Kiev, a large-scale Russian military and intelligence presence in Sevastopol, and the domination of Russia-based media outlets. Due to this climate, it was not just easy for Russia; it was almost effortless. Such conditions, however, are unlikely to be replicated on a comparable scale elsewhere»92. On the one hand, this is really so. The EU and NATO countries tend to have more monolithic societies, even if they are multi-ethnic and multi-confessional, not to mention such single-ethnic and mono-confessional countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. However, such analysis does not take into account the possibility of creative approaches to artificial provocations, creation and hidden external fuelling of internal conflicts. It is precisely the application of the above-described FTP that serves as a basis for further unfolding of an internal conflict, the energy of which is then used by the external aggressor, disguised as an uninvolved neutral party or even as a peacekeeper, while taking the position of all-round support for its «own» side of the conflict. On the other hand, indeed, Putin’s hybression may be difficult to apply to an individual EU country, but it can be easily applied for the collapse of the EU as a whole, as a quite heterogeneous alliance, torn apart by contradictions from within.

European countries are full of different conflict-prone zones. Provided that an appropriate painstaking and lengthy work with creative approaches is carried out combined with availability of appropriate financial, intelligence and intellectual potential, it will be just a matter of time to create the preconditions for an internal conflict in a given country, followed by a hybrid invasion into it. Furthermore, one can assume that the efforts to create such preconditions are underway now. The stake may be placed on «cracking» the local communities by using critical sentiments in the areas of high concentration of migrants.

The areas that historically are conflict-prone as for bilateral relations, may be amenable to «hybrid cracking» of intra-European relations. Here are some examples: the dispute over Transylvania between Romania and Hungary; the Polish historical

92 Nicu Popescu. Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian / For countries like Ukraine, hybrid warfare is a tangible threat, but for most European states it poses less of a danger. Such tactics worked well in parts of eastern Ukraine because it is hard to imagine a more favourable ground: a contested, passive or near-absent sense of Ukrainian identity, estrangement from the new authorities in Kiev, a large-scale Russian military and intelligence presence in Sevastopol, and the domination of Russia-based media outlets. Due to this climate, it was not just easy for Russia; it was almost effortless. Such conditions, however, are unlikely to be replicated on a comparable scale elsewhere. // EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015.
encroachments on Lithuanian Vilnius; the Albanian-Macedonian dispute, Kosovo and a number of other sensitive issues in the Balkans. It just seems that conflicts now belong to history. In fact, they are dormant volcanoes of sorts. The powerful tectonic blow, which Russia inflicted on international law and which ruined the world based on the Helsinki Accords of 1975, could stimulate the conflict potential and cause a chain reaction. We do not aim to describe possible scenarios of potential hybrid wars, because this is not the subject of this study. For us, this is important in the context of identifying possible options for further Kremlin actions. What Russia is successfully using is generation of new cracks and fractures both in the transatlantic community and in the United States and Europe, in parallel. Actually, Putin’s Russia has ridden the wave of geopolitical transformations caused by weakening of the United States and Europe and rising of Asia. This is a peculiar effect of geopolitical transurfing, which can bring Russia to the crest of the wave, but then shove the «geo-surfer» into a whirlpool of a global storm with fatal consequences for it.

One of the basic options for Russia’s actions against Europe is connected with the Middle East «generator of migration», which was brought to full capacity in 2015 as a result of the Russian intervention in Syria. The influx of «migration waves» into Europe, whose power directly correlates with destabilization of the Middle East, has demonstrated that such approach can bring good results for the Kremlin. Here, Russia acts against the EU using the methods that are typical for the crypto enforcement phase. «Migration waves» are very attractive to be used for sending to Europe specially trained «migrants» for the future «H-hour». The same applies to the «tourists» with special training. The technological level and technical equipment of modern terrorism is getting drastically enhanced and improved. Although some high-profile terrorist attacks are classified as mass-scale ones (September 11, 2001 in the United States, November 13, 2015 in France), they so far have had local consequences. Scenarios involving the use of weapons of mass destruction with simultaneous media multiplication may be on the way. For example, contamination of the urban water supply systems in large agglomerations by chemical, bacteriological or radioactive materials, which will cause not only panic but also migration of millions from the potentially contaminated territories with the corresponding level of chaos throughout a country. Given the compact size of most European countries, this can lead to a collapse of the public administration system. Such technologies are fully in line with the conceptual approaches to conducting hybrid wars as related to the unauthorized use of weapons of mass destruction. However, Russia’s priority now is the cyber front against Europe and the West as a whole. That was borne out by the 2016 US elections.
5. AS A WEAPON IN HYBRID WARFARE
5. GENERATOR OF MIGRATION FLOWS AS A WEAPON IN HYBRID WARFARE

5.1. Strategic engineered migration

In the spring of 1999, after the mass expulsion of Kosovar Albanians, Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow stated: “the nature of warfare has changed; now the refugees are the war.” Kelly Greenhill in her article “Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War” wrote that M. Minow was not alone in declaring this a new and different armament – namely the refugee as a weapon.

Despite conventional perception, the fact of instrumental exploitation of population outflows is neither new nor extraordinary phenomenon. Rather, such exploitation of population by the state and non-state actors has a long and successful history in both war- and peacetime. Moreover, despite a widespread belief that most of migration outflows are deliberate consequence of unpredictable man-made or natural disasters, indeed the most are a direct result of specific political decisions, approved due to particular policy or military considerations.

Russia’s bombing of Syria, which caused a massive outflow of migrants to Turkey and Europe, forced the expert community to talk again about the use of refugees as a living weapon, which should be considered in the broader context of hybrid warfare. In this sense, General Philip M. Breedlove, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was one of the first to openly point out that massive bombardment of civilian targets by Russia is aimed at weakening Europe: «Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve.» American Senator John McCain, known for criticizing Obama’s policy of non-interference, also said in February 2016 that Russia’s strategy was to deepen the migration crisis and use it as a weapon, with the aim of splitting the transatlantic alliance and undermining the European project. The European Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Khan in an interview with the German newspaper Die Zeit, said: «More and more refugees come from Russia. Their number is small, but it’s an alarming political signal. Significantly, this is happening at a time when the European Union is already under pressure.”

93 The war in Yugoslavia provoked a migration outflow of 400 thousand people per year from 1999. That is several times less than a migration crisis of 2015.
96 http://inosmi.ru/politic/20160324/235837051.html
Just in the last two decades, we have witnessed the use of refugees as weapons in wartime. They were used as soldiers in the African Great Lakes region, as a living shield in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for creation of logistical barriers in Kosovo and the Sudan. Nevertheless, still against the backdrop of large-scale relocations to Europe, the manipulations of migrants’ flows as weapons to achieve strategic objectives remain a poorly-studied phenomenon. Moreover, the existence of such a type of weapons is often questioned.

The term «strategic engineered migration» was detailed in the publication «Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War» by Kelly Greenhill in 2008. The author gives the following definition: strategic engineered migration — in- or out-migrations that are deliberately induced or manipulated by state or non-state actors, in ways designed to augment, reduce, or change the composition of the population residing within a particular territory, for political or military ends. Based on the previous works of Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum, the author determined four different, but not incompatible forms of strategic engineered migration that can be used separately or in combination with the others in the wartime:

— **Dispossessive** – a form of immigration and/or emigration, the main task of which is to take possession of the territory or property of another group and/or to abolish this group by ethnical or political domination of the migration subjects. Ethnic cleansing belongs to this form. Dispossessive migration is the most widespread form of strategic engineered migration. The bright example is Darfur in the Sudan.

— **Exportive** – displacement aimed at strengthening the internal position of the ruling elite through the expulsion of political dissidents and other internal enemies, or in order to create discomfort and destabilize foreign governments. Sometimes it is individual, but most often it affects the social classes of population or individual social groups. Examples: deportation of Tamils by the Sinhalese government of Sri Lanka, as well as Cambodia in the mid-1970s. Typically, this type of migration occurs after revolutions or changes in the ruling regime.

— **Militarized** – displacement that is always carried out during an active military conflict to gain an advantage over the enemy, in particular by causing damage or destruction to the enemy’s control units, its logistic schemes or traffic conditions, or by strengthening its own structures through the acquisition of additional human resources. The USSR during the Afghan campaign triggered an outflow of migrants to Iran and Pakistan to create a buffer zone and deprive Afghan fighters of the transshipment support bases along the Pakistani border through carpet bombing.97 Another more opportunistic type of militarized migration

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is the attempts to use flows of migrants, already provoked by others, for own purposes. For example, in the eighties Thailand took the opportunity to shelter quarter of a million Cambodian refugees in parallel using them as a live buffer zone for protection from prolonged conflict in Cambodia.98

— Forced – a form in which real or exaggerated migration flows are used as an instrument of foreign policy to provoke or prevent changes in political behavior, or to achieve side preferences from an opponent. It includes using by propaganda the topic of artificially generated migrant flows.

The dynamics of the migration crisis in Europe at an early stage has shown that fear can also be a powerful disorganizing and disintegrating tool. Concerns about the destabilization of domestic national policies in the member states undermined solidarity, which in turn prevented a single collective response from the EU. The fears of the EU governments concerning the consequences of increasing number of migrants, forced the authorities to resort to questionable national policies that jeopardized the future of the entire Schengen system. The return of the border control has also proved to be a high-value task.99 According to the European Commission’s vision, the EU countries must provide refugee quotas or pay a fine of € 250,000 for each unacceptable refugee. According to some estimates, the idea of restructuring the European Refugee Fund may cost approximately €35 billion per year, while the EU’s total budget is about €143 billion.

Given the intersection of the motives and tasks in the strategic manipulation of migration flows, any analysis of one form of migration should consider the possible effects of other forms. All four forms of engineered migration can be applied simultaneously. During the Bosnian War of 1992-1995, all four forms of engineered migration, disposessive, exportive, militarized and forced, were applied at the same time by all three sides of the conflict: the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs100. Another example of cross application of four forms of strategic engineered migration by all parties involved in the conflict is the Vietnam War. Strategic engineered migration, being an asymmetric lever, is most often used by weak actors in their opposition to a stronger opponent. After the crisis is created, the weak actors can act as guarantors of its settlement in exchange for financial or political concessions. As Scott Snyder noted: “This kind of crisis diplomacy is an effective tool for weak states to give priority to their problematic issues in the agenda during the talks.” 101

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100 See. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1995); Nik Gowing, “Real-time TV Coverage from War: Does it Make or Break Government Policy?” in Bosnia iby Television (London: British Film Institute 1996); and James Gow and James Tilsley, ‘The Strategic Imperative for Media Management,’ in Bosnia by Television, c.103
101 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge (note 32) p.69.
Strategic engineered migration is a relatively cheap tool of foreign policy compared with the use of regular troops. In reality, there is no need to use a regular army in order to force the population to migrate. To do this, you can undertake powerful demonstration strikes on large crowds. Consequently, strategic engineered migration does not necessarily have to be the result of direct combat operations.

The invasion of illegal migrants and refugees in Europe and Turkey has led to a change in the classification of national security threats. In the mid-February 2016, the excerpts from a report by Turkey’s security services published in the Hurriyet newspaper, highlighted Turkish suspicions that Russia was purposefully attempting to “weaponize” the refugee crisis. The report warned: “The regime forces [pro-Assad] and allies are trying to create a new refugee wave by moving towards Azaz [in Northern Syria]... There are 10 refugee camps between this town and Turkey’s town of Kilis, approximately along an eight-kilometer line. The residents of these camps will likely flee and seek shelter in Turkey while these camps would be taken by the PYD or Assad forces.” 102 As was stated in the report, Russia was employing the tactics previously used in the first Chechen war in the north Caucasus in the 1990s, known as the “Grozny model”. This involved forcibly emptying urban residential areas through a campaign of attrition against the local population. Once this was achieved, heavy weapons were deployed to eradicate the opposing forces, entailing widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure.

The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union party (PYD), whom Turkey regards as terrorists and mercenary in league with Moscow, effectuated its advances, including seizure of the important Menagh air base with the support of the Russian airstrikes. Another aim of PYD was to increase its controlled areas around Azaz as it did in 2015 in Tell Abyad, when nearby 25,000 refugees flowed from the town seized by the PYD’s forces. Of those 25,000 only 4,000 came back, but another 20,000 stayed in Turkey, that impacted the changes in the demographic structure of Azaz for Kurds good. Obviously, Russia and Assad’s forces used the “Grozny model” to create the de facto supported by Russia Kurdish state in the Syrian north along the Turkish border.

It can also be argued that there were attempts to use the tactics of strategic engineered migration on the territory of Donbas, when pro-Russian militants shelled the residential areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Horlivka, in which cities there were no units of the Ukrainian armed forces. The attacks on the peaceful population served not only as a detonator for the creation of a wave of refugees, but they also were successfully used by the Russian propaganda for drawing the image of «outrage of Kyiv punishers against their own people.» Thus, strategic engineered migration from Donbas had a double advantage for Russia. Pro-Ukrainian population migrated

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to other areas of Ukraine that required additional subsidies from the war-weakened Ukrainian budget to support refugees. Pro-Russian population of Donbas migrated mainly to the Crimea and Russian border regions, including Rostov, where, after a short time spent in refugee camps, they were proposed to move to the sparsely populated Russian hinterland of Siberia, if they wanted to further take advantage of the social state support and gain citizenship. This was a well planned step to improve the demographic situation in remote areas with minimal infrastructure and harsh climate. According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the number of internally displaced people as a result of Russian aggression is 1.75 mln. In international comparison, Ukraine ranks forth, surpassed only by Syria, Iraq and Yemen. For comparison, in the EU, the migration crisis was caused by the arrival of 884,000 refugees from Syria.103

Strategic engineered migration can be used by the interested party as a perfect tool to transfer terrorist groups to the territory of the victim state for further terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks in Ankara, Brussels, and Paris demonstrated a new level of improvement of terrorism, its hybrid form, generated by strategic engineered mass migration and individualization, when terrorist acts are carried out not by large groups, but by individual radical terrorists. Such actions are difficult to prevent. If terrorism is viewed as a military strategy,104 it automatically turns into an instrument for achieving political goals not only by the radical groups, but also by the state actors.105 The terrorists can be used as authorized agents for waging hybrid warfare, while the instigator remains in the shadows. This technology of using a third party, whether it is a state or a group of militants, fully fits into the mechanism of proxy warfare.106 In this context, Syria is the most striking example, since in its territory several parties with their own interests in the region all at once support and carry out training of terrorists who are then sent as lone wolves to undertake terrorist acts in one or another country of destination.

On December 7, 1941, while preparing an attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan’s concept was to inform the United States about the severance of diplomatic relations 30 minutes before the attack, but due to an error in data processing, the message in Washington was received only an hour after the launch of airstrikes on Hawaii. Those were the times when wars between the states were started with the observance of the protocol of The Hague Convention of 1907, which required the declaration of war before the beginning of hostilities. Today, the methods of warfare have changed, and the victim state may for years remain unaware of the fact that its territory is used as a testing ground for innovative technologies designed for conducting unconventional warfare.

105 http://katehon.com/ru/article/gibridnyy-terrorizm-v-evrope#sdfootnote3sym
106 Ibid
Given Russia’s revanchist attempts to assert its dominant position on the geopolitical map of the world and to change the unipolar model of the world order, it seems logical to assume that Russia is conducting a crypto war on the territory of EU and Turkey, including using the «generator of migration waves».

5.2. Projections of probable migration flows to Europe

A significant factor of uncertainty as to a further course of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa is the reason for the lack of clear official forecasts in Europe regarding future migration flows. Instead, only retrospective statistical information is available.

According to Eurostat, the number of first time asylum seekers’ applications in the EU-28 was more than 1.2 million, twice as many compared to the previous year 2014. Four countries - Germany, Hungary, Sweden and Austria, accepted about two-thirds of the first-time asylum applications in the EU in 2015, and are considered to be the largest recipients of refugees. The dynamics of migration to Europe since the beginning of the Arab Spring can be seen below:

**Immigration of non-residents (green), asylum seekers (orange) and illegal border crossings (blue) in the EU in 2010-2014.**

![Immigration graph](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/20/Immigration_in_the_EU.png)

Source: [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/20/Immigration_in_the_EU.png](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/20/Immigration_in_the_EU.png)

According to IMF forecasts, published in *The Telegraph*, up to four million migrants will come to Europe by the end of 2017 (the forecast covers the period 2015-2017), i.e. on the average 1.3 million per year. The IMF’s forecast exceeds those of the EU, according to which 3 million migrants can arrive in Europe by the end of 2017 (1 mln in 2015, 1.5 mln in 2016 and 0.5 mln in 2017)\(^{108}\).

The displaced persons in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East are potential migrants to the EU. Migration flows from different parts of Africa intensify. With about 2 million displaced people, Turkey plays the key role as a transit country. Given geopolitical factors, there is no clear vision of how many asylum seekers will arrive in Europe in the coming years. According to Eurostat estimates, in 2015-2017 population growth in the EU should be expected at 0.15% of the total population and 0.1% in subsequent years. The influx of first-time asylum applicants in 2015-2017 is expected at 1.3 million people.\(^{109}\)

According to the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, the largest number of displaced persons who arrived in the EU via the Mediterranean Sea from January 2015 till March 2016 were citizens of Syria (46.7%), Afghanistan (20.9%), and Iraq (9.4%). The map below shows the countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU-28 for 2014. The countries of origin have been divided into five categories. There are seven countries in the “high” category. These account for a total of 313,000 requests, representing 50% of all applications. The bar chart shows the top 15 countries in terms of the number of refugees. The figure in parenthesis shows the difference as compared to 2013; a positive value shows an increase, a negative one means a decrease (e.g. there was an increase of 72,000 applicants from Syria in 2014).


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According to the estimates of the Federal Ministry of Economics of Germany, published in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* newspaper\(^{110}\), 3.6 million refugees are expected to arrive in Germany by 2020, on the average 0.5 million per year. In 2015, Germany accepted 1.1 mln refugees. In order to project economic development, the Economy Ministry created «an internal, purely technical estimate on migration in coordination with other government departments.» However, there is no official government estimate on how many refugees Europe’s biggest economy plans to accept in the years to come, as the numbers are quite volatile. Also, there are no clear official estimates in the EU as a whole.

Military conflicts in the coming years will directly affect the generation of new migration waves. To predict the future vectors of migration to Europe, it is enough to pay attention to the modern points of instability. The strategy of Islamist movements in the Middle East in the years to come will provide for the expansion of influence in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, as well as in Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Preparation of terrorist campaigns aimed at weakening the regional centers of influence – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Egypt, is projected to take place in order to deprive those countries of their leadership positions in the Muslim world. The conflict in Iraq in the near future will continue to provoke new migration waves.

The precarious situation with the ruling regime in Algeria due to the lengthy period of stay of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in power; rivalry for power within the Algerian political system; lack of military command cohesion; lack of reforms; social tensions against the background of low oil prices: all these factors add to the risks for this country, where the external actors are also interested in further upsetting the available situation. The pressure of the “Arab revolutions” at the borders of Algeria in Libya and Tunisia, the pressure in the west by Morocco due to the Sahara conflict; the Malian conflict in the south make Algeria increasingly militarized. The destabilization of Algeria could play into the hands of Russia in terms of depriving Europe of one of the most reliable sources of gas supplies.

In 2015, the Chad Lake basin region in Africa experienced a powerful conflict escalation leading to massive displacement of the local population. The Boko Haram Islamist terrorist group stepped up its actions in north-eastern Nigeria, where today 2.2 million people are internally displaced to neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The deterioration of the security situation in the region remains almost unnoticed by the international community and bears the potential for further generating refugee outflows.

The migration crisis in Europe has short- and long-term consequences:

1) further dynamic shift of the balance between indigenous Europeans and migrants;

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2) increase in the numerous socio-cultural centers of Islamic population;

3) expansion of the social base of Islamism, given the penetration of representatives of the radical Islamist organizations in Europe in the midst of an uncontrolled flow of refugees;

4) political split in Europe in terms of the migration policy;

5) emergence of new xenophobic organizations, anti-European in essence, but pro-European according to their rhetoric;

6) changes in the domestic political landscape of the EU countries as a result of coming to power of anti-liberal and xenophobic forces.

Brexit has already become a stimulus for the active action of euroskeptics in many EU countries. In Germany, finally, they started to pay attention to the waves of refugees from Chechnya, who are increasingly entering the country as asylum seekers who underwent persecution by the Kadyrov regime. More and more often, the federal agencies in Germany come to the conclusion that the Russian special services use migration as a weapon for destabilization, and also, under the guise of Chechen refugees, send their spies to Europe.  

The lack of an adequate assessment of strategic engineered migration driven by external forces has led to the most powerful political earthquake in the EU over the past few decades and bears a powerful destructive potential for a further chaotization of the European geopolitical space, reengineering of which is moderated from the outside.

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6.

THE FOUNDATION
OF RUSSIAN
ENERGY MILITARISM
6. THE FOUNDATION OF RUSSIAN ENERGY MILITARISM

6.1. Turning energy resources into a weapon

Russia is traditionally rich in mineral resources, in particular hydrocarbons, hence it is the country for which energy power is tantamount to a conceptual vision of Eurasian and global power. Given this approach, hydrocarbons and their supply infrastructure are more than mere commodity or just pipelines. The vision of itself as a world energy superpower became a dominant one in Russian self-awareness yet in the late Soviet times and then became especially pronounced in the 2000s at the stage of the rise of oil prices and the advent of Putin’s era. Since Russia is the largest country in the world and also the richest in terms of energy resources, in Kremlin’s view the world will face energy deficit as the global population grows. In accordance with these ideas, as well as the historical retrospective of Russia as an object of territorial encroachments due to its resource wealth, Russia will have to defend its sovereignty over the territory and the right to manage the resource base without any foreign influence. Such perception is an integral part of both Russian militarism, based on the concept of «fortress under siege», as well as energy hegemony, which stems from the lead of the RF in terms of the energy reserves. Russia seeks to sell its energy resources at the maximum price that is quite understandable, however, in the view of the Kremlin, this can be achieved not only by improving its competitive positions in the world markets, but mainly by creating a dominant, ideally monopolistic position for its companies. To ensure such a situation, they allow actions to be taken to neutralize competitors by non-competitive methods. This logic leads to energy and force expansionism, which mutually justify each other. Russia needs energy expansion to gain more markets and more income, which are required to strengthen its military power and protect the territory rich in mineral resources.

Force expansion can be carried out not so much through direct military intervention as through subversive activities, which is typical, as we have already shown above, specifically for Putin’s Russia in its intent, at a certain stage, to seize control of the prospective production areas of global importance and to neutralize the alternative competitive energy streams and routes. Finally, it should expand the business of both state and private companies and bring additional revenues to the Russian budget and ruling kleptocracy.

The rising oil prices since the 2000s stimulated not only the economic development of the Russian Federation, but also dangerous processes in the minds of its political establishment, which was afflicted with a complex of loser in the Cold War. The revanchist sentiments in Russia became noticeable already in the early 2000s. In 2000, in the analytical report for the “Strategy-1” Foundation, entitled “Post-Yeltsin Russia: Challenge to the U.S. interests and Ukraine’s security”, it was stated: “Russia’s growing power will create more problems for the West, which did not dare to sanction Moscow in the wake of the Caucasian war. While the West tried to prevent Russia from feeling that it was isolated in the international arena, Russia
itself regards this behavior quite differently – as the success of Russia’s harsh and uncompromising policy, which now must be the basis for its relations with the West.”112 In fact, exactly this was done by Putin’s regime, however its dangerous evolution towards authoritarianism, kleptocracy, revanchism, and interventionism, had been ignored for a long time by Western, in particular European leaders.

The hunger for the global revenge, reproduction of the world’s multipolarity, in which Russia will be the main of its poles, combined with the idea of «collecting the lands» in the post-Soviet space, became the stimulus to find ways and means for achieving the desired goals. Whereas in the Soviet period global revenge was seen as the build-up of military potential, under the conditions of globalized world economy hydrocarbons and pipelines are able to complement the military arsenal. The main point of the Russian foreign policy during the period of Putin’s leadership is to return the superpower status, which the USSR once had, to today’s Russia. Putin’s earlier assessment of the collapse of the Soviet Union as «the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century», in fact, sets the vector of Russia’s movement towards restoring the Soviet status quo ante. In this sense, the RF energy strategy is aimed at achieving this ambitious geopolitical goal.113

However, such a vector was not noticed or even ignored in the EU and its leading member states. Assessment of Russia’s energy activity was carried out only in the system of business coordinates. “I do not think that Russian President Putin will make energy supplies an instrument of his policy”114, said the then European Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger on August 26, 2014, when Gazprom had already been carrying out its gas blockade of Ukraine for more than two months. This assumption of the European Commissioner reflected the level of ignorance in respect to Russia, which at that time the EU continued to identify as a strategic partner.

In February 2006, Emma Simpson wrote an article for the BBC, «Russia uses energy weapons.”115 She noted that energy supplies endue Russia with a significant political power and the world wants to see how this power will be used. Now we can state that the Russian Federation is quite successful in using energy resources and their delivery infrastructure to solve geopolitical and geo-economic problems. Energy motives are also present in Russia’s actions, including geopolitical, geo-economic and military dimension. Weaponization of energy policy of Russia began not today and not in 2006, when Emma Simpson drew attention to this.

114 Oettinger does not believe that the RF will use gas as leverage [Electronic resource] / RIA News. – Available at: http://ria.ru/economy/20140826/1021449457.html - Published: 26.08.2014
Analysis of Russia’s behavior in the late 1990s-2000s shows that it consistently has been resorting to the use of energy as a weapon, carefully masking it under commercial disputes with the buyers of Russian hydrocarbons in the post-Soviet space. The analytical paper of the “Strategy-1” Foundation, “The deficit of American involvement in Europe”, published in 2000, thus describes the energy and geopolitical tendencies of that time:

“The rise in oil prices provoked the European Union to address Russia with the idea of increasing energy supplies. Russia, which had long been nurturing the plan to split the Euro-Atlantic community, was on the watch for an opportunity to attract more attention from Brussels. Yet in the mid-1990s Moscow started to implement the grand project of exporting Yamal gas through the territory of its satellite Belarus to Poland and Germany. In 1999, the construction of the Trans-Black Sea gas pipeline ‘Blue Stream’ began in order to increase supplies of Russian gas to Turkey.

“It is no coincidence that it is precisely with respect to Poland and Turkey that Moscow implements the policy of creating and strengthening the energy dependence of these countries on Russian energy carriers, primarily natural gas and electric power. Considering that these NATO member states will eventually become members of the European Union, Russia is taking strategic steps to increase the energy dependence of the enlarged EU in the future.

“Already today, Russia tries to create the preconditions for this. Moscow has put forward the requirements that must be fulfilled to obtain its consent to increase the export of energy to the countries of the European Union. Those requirements include:

- Investments of the European Investment Bank in the extraction and transportation of oil and gas in Russia;
- Elimination by the European Commission of the existing restrictions on import of electricity;
- Political support of the new projects of oil and gas transit bypassing Ukraine;
- Bringing pressure on Poland to obtain its agreement to lay a gas pipeline across its territory bypassing Ukraine.

“According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union must ensure political cleansing of all transit routes for Russian energy resources. ‘That is, there must be no whims on the part of Ukraine, no whims on the part of Poland and other countries,’ said Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov on the eve of the EU-Russia summit.

Ultimately, behind all this is the strategic calculation of Moscow to make Europe more obedient to Russia, and eventually form a Russian-European anti-American coalition. Undoubtedly, such Russia’s hidden striving for dominance poses a threat to Euro-Atlantic solidarity and represents a challenge to US interests in Europe”116.

The above-mentioned refers to the Yeltsin era in Russia. In the post-Yeltsin period, the approach of «energy resources - more than just commodities» has tacitly become one of the leading Kremlin’s policies. Very few Western experts take notice of the fact that the official document «Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2020» begins with the statement: “Russia possesses significant energy resources and a powerful fuel and energy complex, which is the basis for economic development, an instrument for conducting domestic and foreign policy.” This document was approved by the Russian government as early as in 2003. Two major gas crises in the Russian-Ukrainian relations took place thereafter in 2006 and 2009. The European countries also experienced their impact, as Russia cut off gas transit via Ukraine to Europe.

Intentions to use energy resources as a political instrument are confirmed both by the statements of the Russian high-ranking officials and by the number of recommendations for the Kremlin from the developers of concept documents for the Russian government.

Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia, and at the same time the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on Cooperation with African Countries, in November 2011 expressed himself quite frankly about the instruments of Russian foreign policy: «...the oil and gas policy should become not only an important component, but also one of the main instruments of Russia’s foreign policy.»

Significantly, the conceptual proposals for the updated version of the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030 included the following provisions: «...the main priorities of the energy policy for this period are <...> effective use of the Russian energy potential with regard to its international economic and political relations <...>, ensuring of geopolitical and geo-economic interests of Russia in Europe and neighboring countries as well as in the Asia-Pacific region.”

In the basic provisions of the Energy Strategy formulated for the period up to 2035, the additional dimension of external energy policy is not concealed: «Russia as a responsible state considers external energy policy not from the exporter’s narrow perspective of the exporter which maximizes short-term income, but as a means of solving not only national but also global problems.»

In 2010, the Centre for Global Studies Strategy XXI in the framework of cooperation with NATO realized a project “Energy resources and their delivery infrastructure: the potential for inappropriate operation in Europe”. Within the project, the analysis of basic documents of the Russian Federation was carried out, in particular National Security Strategy, Military Doctrine, Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation and others. Also, Russia’s actions during gas crisis 2009 were analyzed. Some of the key findings that we made in 2010 require special attention at a time when “terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory,” 120 as rightly stated in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy approved in 2016.

1. A number of official documents of the Russian Federation (e.g. National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020, Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Energy Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030, the Program of effective systemic use of foreign policy factors aimed at long-term development of the Russian Federation) contain ambiguous provisions and do not contribute to strengthening confidence in Russia as a prospective partner. In particular, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation do not properly consider NATO enlargement process and its global functions. In this regard, a task of containment is formulated through “neutralization of possible military threats by political, diplomatic and other non-military ways”. This increases the likelihood of the use of non-military deterrence, energy resources and infrastructure by the RF in the event of aggravation of relations with individual countries, and with NATO and the EU as a whole.

2. None of the gas crises, either in 2006 nor in 2009, were prevented or regulated by legal means. Crises were regulated politically. The achieved settlement was not of a comprehensive nature and could be seen as a kind of an ad hoc settlement.

3. The European Commission officially left in abeyance the question «What happened in January 2009: Russia stopped gas supplies to the EU, or Ukraine stopped transit?» The EC satisfied itself with the statement: “On the night of January 6 to 7, all supplies from Russia through Ukraine to the EU were stopped. Gas supplies from Russia to Europe were cut off from January 7 to 20.” 121 None of the European companies, apart from the Slovak Slovensky Plynarensky Priemysel

4. Large-scale projects of gas transit pipelines exported by Russia can create a surplus of pipeline capacities. In the case of insufficient integration of gas infrastructure within the EU, it threatens to manipulate the volumes, directions and prices of gas exports in order to maximize the monopolist’s revenues. In a situation of critical aggravation of relations between the Russian Federation and NATO, or between the Russian Federation and one of the countries (a group of countries), the Alliance can serve as a mechanism for implementing synchronized heterogeneous pressure through the projection of a threat of restriction/disruption of supply in conjunction with an information-psychological campaign and cyber attacks.

5. The gas crisis of 2009 was accompanied by a large-scale information and psychological campaign and PR-support of Gazprom’s actions by reputable international PR agencies (Gavin Anderson, GPlus Europe, Ketchum). It has brought results. In the European mass consciousness, the cliches «Ukraine interrupted transit to Europe», «Ukraine is an unreliable transit link», «North and South Streams are the solution for transit problems» emanated from the Russian propaganda. The propaganda message about «Ukraine stealing gas» is especially widespread. Even European Commissioner G. Oettinger used the above-mentioned expression in August 2014, predicting the situation for the winter of 2015 that had not come true.123

It should be noted that surplus of Russian pipeline infrastructure due to the intention to build new trans-border gas pipelines, poses a potential threat to markets, above all those without diversified energy sources. Russia’s energy strategy provides precisely surplus due to the policy of diversifying energy exports routes: the share of the European direction in the total volume of exports of Russian fuel and energy resources will be steadily shrinking due to the diversification of export energy


123 However, in the Russian Federation they ignore the fact that in the history of the Ukrainian-Russian gas relations there is not a single case of a legal confirmation from international courts concerning gas stealing. Moreover, there is only one unsuccessful precedent when Gazprom officially went to court in order to prove the fact of "stealing". It is case №185/2000 in the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Federation (Moscow) on the claim of Gazprom to Naftogaz of Ukraine for allegedly unsanctioned gas take off on the territory of Ukraine. On May 30, 2001, the Court dismissed this claim. During the gas crisis 2009, Gazprom exploiting the thesis of the gas stealing on the territory of Ukraine, tried to present the situation with the take off of fuel gas to fuel gas transportation system, as a fact of confirmed theft. The monitoring group had not confirmed it. Moreover, the Russian side, after the signing of the contracts, stated that had no complaints against the Ukrainian side.
If we take into account that in 1973 a success of the Arab oil embargo was achieved with a 9 percent reduction in oil supplies, then the existence of a substantial supply of capacities means the possibility of a proportional supply limitation. This means that transit flows can be volatile. It can be concluded that the creation of a diversified gas export system by Russia aims to vary the volumes, directions and prices of export supplies to the EU’s non-integrated market in order to maximize revenues as well as to exert pressure on one or another EU member state and NATO by threatening the restriction / disruption of deliveries, especially in conjunction with the information-psychological campaign. To similar conclusions came the American expert of Russian origin Mikhail Korchemkin from the East European Gas Analyses (USA): «The Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipelines are designed not to increase Russian gas supplies and not to increase the reliability of Europe’s energy supply. New Gazprom projects will allow Russia to disable gas supplies selectively to Belarus, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. Thus, the energy security of these countries will be weaker.”

6.2. Infrastructure component of the Russian energy policy

Infrastructure ambitions of Russia are reflected in the «Energy Strategy for the period up to 2030»: “Russia will augment efforts for main regional gas producing centers consolidation (countries of the Central Asia, Iran) on the basis of its gas transport infrastructure. Russia will seek to establish the Eurasian integrated gas transportation system for provision of export and transit cross-flows between Europe and Asia… Russian pipeline infrastructure will become an integral part of the “power bridge” between Europe and Asia, and Russia will become the key center of its management.”

A conceptualization of Russia’s self-esteem, scale and direction of its further actions can be understood from the program statement by Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft - the largest and most influential oil company, at the V Eurasian Forum in Verona in October 2016: “There are objective conditions in Eurasia to reconstruct the continent’s economic integrity through the integration of traffic flows, flows of energy, energy resources, technologies and financial directions… Russia, thanks to its unique geographical location and resource potential, ‘is naturally intended’ to be a link, a kind of a «bridge» between Europe and Asia…President of Russia Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin set a task to build up Eurasian partnership on the basis of the large integrational contour…”

In practice, according to the model of power bridge which appears to be an element of the false target programming, the model of energy penetrator – a mechanism of system penetration and making leading countries of Europe dependent on Russian energy supplies, their geopolitical reorientation to the Eurasian model in which the dominant position will occupy the Russian Federation, - is concealed. In this context, Putin’s statement that Russia’s borders never end, does not look like a joke.128 The EU does not perceive Russian energy bridge as a threat. Consequently, non-military means dominate Russian expansion of hybrid type. But the military toolkit for promoting the model of «Great Eurasia» Russia has also prepared for those, who will prove to be resistant to Russian propaganda, false target programming and energy crypto enforcement. Russia’s military preparations in the Arctic are confirmation of this. Russia’s intervention in Syria, which Western analysts associated first of all with Putin’s desire to preserve Assad in power and demonstrate to the West that «Russia does not leave its people,» actually highlighted energy motives, goals and interests of Moscow in its global expansionism. The statements of the Russian media in the autumn 2015 was rather frank: “The overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria is threatening to change the balance on the European gas market, as in this case, Qatar can build a direct gas pipeline through the Syrian territory to Turkey ... Syria is one of the few stress points that holds back the formation of geographically correct and cheaper way of delivering Qatar fuel to Europe.” 129 A year later, one of the leading Russian military commanders, a former head of the Main Directorate of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, was even more frank: “If Russia did not invade there (Syria – our note) and retain the power of Bashar al-Assad, today the question of survival for the Russian budget would be raised. Because there are three gas pipelines there ... The first route in Europe. Through the territory of Syria to Turkey, where Turkey would become an operator of gas supply...”130 Obviously, under the three gas pipelines the general meant a promising gas flow from Iran, Qatar and Iraqi Kurdistan that could enter the EU market across Syria at different times and in different circumstances. The growth of gas supply in the energy markets of the EU, reached the peak of its consumption and increasingly saturated with renewable energy, means a reduction in the share of Russian supplies and drop in Russia’s gas exports revenues respectively. The latter, though not as determinative as the export of oil and petroleum products, has a significant share in the total amount of revenues from the sale of energy resources to Russia abroad.

130 Russkiy mir. General Ivashov accepted that Russia does not wage a war against ISIL and explained for what purpose they did invade. October 6, 2016 http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2016/10/06/113352/russkij-mir-general-ivashov-priznal-chno-rossiya-v-sirii-ne-voyet-s-ig-i-obyasnil-dlya-chege-vtorglis-.shtml
Russia continues to implement a strategy to counteract competitive projects of alternative gas routes to the European market. The Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus are in the epicenter of the Kremlin’s attention. «The fully operational TAP / TANAP pipelines would push Gazprom out of key markets in the Southern Europe - Turkey and Italy ... The implementation of these plans will in the future lead to a serious reduction of the Russian share in the EU’s gas supply needs, which means a serious fall in the revenues of the Russian Federation and reducing political influence on the EU. In Russia, they understand the risks and along with economic countermeasures, would try to take others. One of the options for counteraction to the Russian Federation could be an attempt to destabilize the South Caucasus, through which transit pipelines should pump gas from Azerbaijan and possibly Turkmenistan and Iran to Turkey and then to the EU. The most probable scenario is provoking a full-scale war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia is actively preparing the ground for intensification of full-scale military operations, with this purpose active arms supplies to both sides of the conflict are being carried out. A major protracted military conflict in the South Caucasus, Armenian rocket attacks on Azerbaijan’s oil and gas infrastructure may call into question the stability of energy supplies through the Southern Gas Corridor to the EU ... In order to realize a dream of the Eurasian empire, Putin needs a weak South Caucasus, where Moscow will be the main external force that exercises military influence and controls the flow of Caspian oil and gas in the region.» 131 - this is the analysis of regional military experts in the South Caucasus. This is entirely consistent with the long-term monitoring of Russia’s activity in the Caspian-Black Sea area, carried out by experts from non-governmental think tanks “Strategy”, “Strategy-1”, “Nomos” and then Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”, since the mid-1990s. It is noteworthy, that before the destruction of the Russian Su-24M bomber by Turkish fighter destroyer in November 2015 that led to exacerbation of Russian-Turkish relations, in the eastern part of the country in July-August 2015, militants of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) had blown up four main pipelines through which oil and gas come to Turkey from Azerbaijan, Iran and Iraq. Taking into account that the PKK is the product of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (foreign intelligence of the Soviet era), it is possible that the RF special services have renewed their curatorial relationship with the fighting wing of the diverse Kurdish national liberation movement to increase the risks to alternative projects of hydrocarbons supply in Europe.

State-owned companies are particularly important for the success of Russian energy expansion. Having a monopoly status or dominating the market, they manage the energy infrastructure and simultaneously supply energy to global markets. As, for example, Gazprom. “Development of Gazprom is a big

achievement of Putin, turning it into a state-forming, empire-forming structure. With its help he had scattered the pipes across Eurasia, connecting them with Europe, Belarus, Ukraine and the Central Asian republics. And this space strapped with steel pipes was the first prototype of the future great state. Gazprom is civilizational achievements of Putin’s Russia... Gazprom ... saved the country, laid the foundation for a future Eurasian statehood. Gazprom is a steel bud, from which eventually a flower of fifth Russian empire bloomed,” 132 - this is a vision of Gazprom in the circle of pro-Putin intellectuals from Izborsky club.

It should be noted, that energy resources usage as an instrument for “ensuring geopolitical and economic interests of Russia” is not only political rhetoric, but also a practice. Following cases may be considered to show how Russia used energy resources as a leverage in relations with other countries:

- unilateral disruption of Russian oil transit via Latvia in 2003;
- reduction of Gazprom’s gas supply to Belarus during winter time in 2004 and 2006;
- blockade of supply of electricity and gas to Georgia in winter 2006;
- blockade by Transneft of Kazakh oil transit to Lithuania via Russia in 2006;
- oil supply cut off by Transneft to Lithuania in 2006.

It is evident that all mentioned cases belong to post-Soviet space. However, given Russian approaches to use energy resources for solving both “national and global problems,” it cannot be excluded that similar instruments will not be deployed against other EU and NATO member states. In this regard, a sudden reduction of oil supply to Czech Republic in summer 2008 is a very clear example; at time, Prague signed agreement to station on its own territory US antiballistic missile system radar. Since 2015, in Moscow in relation to Latvia the idea has been discussed to stop the transit of petroleum products through the main Ventspils terminal which is traditionally the main for transshipment of Russian petroleum products in the Baltic. Latvia has already been identified by Russia as a potential target of the next hybrid invasion, as it is the weakest link between NATO and the EU in the Baltic.

This corresponds to one of the conclusions made during the monitoring of “Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030”, included in the renewed “Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2035 (main provisions)”: “main foreign challenge for Russia’s energy industry is sharply increasing competition in the external energy markets. In the long run, a fierce competition is expected to sustain and increase share in key traditional

and emerging energy markets” (highlighted by authors)\(^{133}\). Obviously, Russia is acting and ready to act in the future not so much by methods of economic competition, but by neutralizing its competitors with all available means. Here military, economic and energy vectors of Russian politics converge, because this is exactly what was written in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation of 2009 edition: «the presence in the conflict regions of the contingents of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.»

### 6.3. Hydrocarbon “carrots”

Energy resources into the Kremlin’s hands have an ambiguous application as a leverage. Abovementioned practice of the hydrocarbon “sticks” is not the only tool, as hydrocarbon “carrots” also exist. Russia budget depends directly on production and export of the mineral resources, in particular crude oil, oil products, natural gas, coal, electricity. Exports structure in Russia, as the main source of currency speaks for itself:

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<tr>
<td>Crude oil and oil products</td>
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<td>Natural gas</td>
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<td>Total exports</td>
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#### Table 3. Dynamics of energy exports of the RF in 2012-2016 (based on data of the Federal Customs Service of Russia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Export items</th>
<th>2012 $bln</th>
<th>2013 $bln</th>
<th>2014 $bln</th>
<th>2015 $bln</th>
<th>2016 $bln</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude oil and oil products</td>
<td>280.0</td>
<td>282.9</td>
<td>269.7</td>
<td>157.0</td>
<td>119.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total energy exports</td>
<td>366.0</td>
<td>362.9</td>
<td>346.1</td>
<td>213.6</td>
<td>160.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total exports of the RF</td>
<td>524.7</td>
<td>526.4</td>
<td>496.9</td>
<td>345.9</td>
<td>287.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: in parentheses () authors indicated a share of all energy resources in the total exports of the RF, in brackets [ ] – a share in the total volume of all exports of the RF.

\(^{133}\) http://ac.gov.ru/files/content/1578/11-02-14-energostrategy-2035-pdf.pdf
Energy exports not only brings revenues to Russia’s budget and state corporations, but also provides an opportunity to finance the «solution of the global problems» by sponsoring some political forces, lobbying organizations, extremist groups whose services it needs to achieve its goals. To imagine the possible scale of shadow financing of Russian influences abroad, it is enough to consider the volumes of energy exports in monetary terms and deduct 1% of this amount. An indicator of 1% is taken conditionally by analogy with a specific share of Gazprom’s charity spending in 2010, when it first unveiled its sponsorship costs. It’s easy to calculate that according to such a model, in recent years at least $3 billion annually could be channeled into secret financing of various projects abroad, in accordance with the plans and directives of the Kremlin.

Therefore, there could be a lot of Russian loans to various radical parties and movements in Europe to facilitate their coming to power, like that in the amount of EUR 9 million provided to French far-right National Front of Marine Le Pen in the First Czech-Russian Bank. Obviously, according to the Kremlin, it is a way to change the political landscape in Europe to own advantage. Therefore, Russia is quite successful in waging crypto war against the EU as a weak link in the transatlantic community:

- massive Russian anti-Western propaganda in Europe and strategic communications with radical far-left and far-right factions;
- torpedoing the signing of Association Agreements between the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the EU (successfully in the cases of Armenia and Ukraine in 2013);
- promoting gas pipeline megaproject (South Stream, Turkish Stream, Bulgarian Stream, Nord Stream 2) to increase EU dependence on gas supplies from Russia and bypass Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States;
- blocking transit of gas streams from Central Asia to Europe through Russia, as well as projects for the supply of gas to the EU from non-Russian sources through independent routes;
- intervention in Syria as a catalyst for the migration outflows to Europe in 2015 and the elimination of promising competitive projects.

134 «Gazprom’s cheritable expenditures» at the applicable rate of Central Bank of Russia in 2011 exceeded $400 mln that is less than 1% of pre-tax profit of the concern», «Gazprom» at the first time to disclose expenditures http://runews.org/gazprom-vpervye-raskryl-rasxody-na-blagotvoritelnost/
135 National Front of Marine Le Pen received a loan in Russian bank [Electronic resource]/RIA News. – Available at: http://ria.ru/economy/20141123/1034667007.html#ixzz3Pm7gL7Td – Title translated. – Published: 23.11.2014
The Russian research fellow and author of the book «Hybrid war a lá Russe», points out one of the mechanisms for cooperation with radical groups in Europe: «The beginning of the open search and establishment of contacts between the Russian leadership and the far-right radicals in Europe can be traced from the end of 2007- beginning of 2008. At this time, by the decision of President, state-funded Institute for Democracy and Cooperation (IDC) with two branches - in New York and Paris, was created; headed by Adranik Migranyan and Natalia Narochnitskaya respectively. The main task of the Paris branch of IDC, known also as the European Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, was networking with the far-right segment of the European, particularly French establishment, including the National Front headed by Marine Le Pen.” 136

It is extremely revealing that the creation of IDS was announced personally by V. Putin at the EU-Russia Summit in October 2007 in Lisbon. Putin’s Assistant on relations with the EU, Sergei Yastrzhembsky frankly said: “It is time when Russia, considering its financial capabilities, can afford what was previously a luxury, but now is a necessity ...” 137 It is worth mentioning that in 2007 - the first half of 2008, as peak of oil prices came before a collapse in the second half of 2008 year. This meant that Russia had received unprecedented amount of revenues from energy exports and began to allow itself what was previously considered «luxury», in particular a war against other countries. On August 8, 2008, Russia invaded Georgia.

It is easy to conclude that such a line of behavior of modern Russia is inherited from the Soviet Union, the backbone of which was Soviet Russia. The USSR intervention in Afghanistan took place at the peak of oil prices in the seventies of the 20th century. Therefore, energy resources and revenues from the high oil prices have played, play and will play a key role for Russian expansion as its base engine.

However, the dynamics of oil prices since the mid-2000s has been showing that Putin’s Russian regime falls into the same trap as the Soviet regime of Brezhnev: a sense of omnipotence and permissiveness against the backdrop of rising oil prices and energy exports revenues, turning fiasco when the price dynamics changes from ascending to descending.

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137 Ibid.
6.4. Energy grounds, interests and aims of Russia in the Ukrainian frontline of hybression

6.4.1. Neutralization of competitors

The prewar period is characterized by the fact that the Government of Ukraine has signed production sharing agreements (PSA) with TOP-10 transnational energy companies. Two PSAs concerned projects of unconventional gas extraction on land, while the third was exploration of the Black Sea’s deep-water shelf. The Ukrainian sector of the Black Sea shelf could fully meet the country’s needs in hydrocarbons, according to the State Service for Geology and Subsoil of Ukraine [Державна служба геології та надр України] potential reserves of energy resources (oil, natural gas) on the Ukrainian Black Sea shelf were estimated at 2.3 billion tons of oil equivalent (2.3 trillion cubic meters in gas equivalent), which accounted for 40% of all energy resources of Ukraine. Moreover, unlike the land unconventional gas deposits, where large-scale exploration works were needed, offshore deposits were more promising, as exploration in the adjacent Romanian sector of the Black Sea confirmed the availability of commercially extractive natural gas reserves. The consortium of international companies headed by the world leader an American company «ExxonMobil» won the tender for the exploration and production of the offshore SkIFS’ka block in the Black Sea.
Given this, and taking into account Russia’s traditional inclination to create uncompetitive and monopolistic schemes, one of the motives for the Crimean occupation, was energy. The forecasts by the American IHS CERA regarding the prospects of Ukraine’s expansion of national gas production both conventional and unconventional, caught the eye of Russia. According to IHS CERA projections, up to 2030 Ukraine could reach the level of gas production of the mid-1970s. Under these circumstances, domestic gas would not only satisfy all needs of the country, but also would be exported to Central and Eastern European countries, displacing Russian gas. The main prospect linked to exploration of offshore fields in the north-western sector of the Black Sea between Crimea and Odesa region. Moreover, in the neighboring Romanian block, geological exploration works by ExxonMobil and OMV have yielded positive results.
Annexation of the Crimean peninsula solves several strategic issues for Russia:

- drop-out of prospective projects of gas exploration and extraction in the Black Sea, initiated by Ukraine with the involvement of the European and American companies which were a challenge for Russian state-owned companies;
- squeeze out leading American and European oil and gas companies, which are concurrent to Russian state-owned ones, from the northern sector of the Black Sea;
- denying Ukraine access to the main offshore gas deposits and prospective hydrocarbons deposits in the Black Sea;
- creation of preconditions for correction (if necessary) of the route of the Trans-Black Sea gas pipeline with its partial laying near or through the Crimean peninsula and the Black Sea shelf.

In addition to large-scale and completely realistic plans for the future, Ukraine independently explored the Black Sea shelf. On the balance sheet of the PJSC Chornomornaftogaz (a subsidiary of NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine) there were 17 fields, of which 11 gas, 4 gas condensate and 2 oil deposits. Annual production in 2013 amounted to almost 1.7 billion cubic meters of offshore natural gas, which fully satisfied the needs of the Crimean peninsula, where it was completely consumed.

Takeover of the energy infrastructure in Crimea was a priority task for occupational authorities carried out with the help of formations of the so-called «self-defense», the arrived Cossacks, infiltrated «vacationers» and special forces of the Russian army. Particular attention should be paid to the capture of the fixed and jack-up drilling rigs, as well as vessels of the technical fleet that were producing natural gas outside the peninsula on the Black Sea shallow shelf outside the 12-mile zone; that is, in the exclusive economic zone of Ukraine.
A seizure of the Chornomornaftogaz’s office was held on March 4, 2014 when a group of unknown men led by Andrey Ilyin, who announced his appointment as the new head of the company by Sergey Aksenov, the self-proclaimed head of the Republic of Crimea, had arrived there. The group consisted of Russian professional soldiers without identification marks; similar groups were also noticed in other structural subdivisions of the company and on technological facilities (dockage facilities, vessels of the technical fleet, drilling platforms). By March 14, 2014 all management and technological processes in the company, were taken under full control; on March 13, 2014, the so-called Vice Prime Minister Rustam Temirhaliev had arrived in person with the guards to confirm the credentials of the newly appointed chairman of the board Kharitonov and his deputy Ilyin.138

6.4.2. Operations on the Black Sea shelf

The most striking example of the operations to establish control over the objects of energy infrastructure during hybression is the operation of capturing modern ‘Petro Godovanets’ and ‘Independence’ jack-up drilling rigs as well as ‘Mys Tarkhankut’ and ‘Fedor Uriupin’ offshore ships, acquired in 2013 at the cost of NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine. According to InformNapalm international volunteer initiative, drilling rigs were captured by the 104th Paratrooper Regiment of the 76th Paratrooper Division of Russia’s airborne forces. In particular, a profile of the Russian soldier Ivan Kozlov

was found in VK social network with the pics on both drilling rigs.\textsuperscript{139}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{images/145.jpg}
\caption{The photos of the Russian soldier Ivan Kozlov found at his account in the social network VKontakte}
\end{figure}

A fact of his involvement in the Crimean campaign and capturing of the drilling rigs is confirmed by a set of pictures uploaded in December, 2014 as well as by the decoration ‘for return of Crimea’, probably conferred after his coming back from the combat duty on the drilling rigs (as usually 1 month).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{images/146.jpg}
\caption{Decoration ‘for return of Crimea’ conferred to the Russian soldier Ivan Kozlov}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{139} https://informnapalm.org/12642-104dshp/
On March 15, 2014, an airborne operation was undertaken in the Arabat Spit in the Sea of Azov. A group of Russian paratroopers landed there for capturing gas measuring station and the Strilkove field and stayed there up to December 11, 2014. Then, operation was scaled down as it turned out that the field had no strategic significance for the gas supply to Crimea. The then-current Minister of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine Yuriy Prodan informed about capturing of drilling rigs on the Black Sea shelf on March 19, 2014 in an interview with UNIAN agency.\(^{140}\)

According to eyewitnesses, even after reporting on the first visits of representatives of the self-proclaimed government of Crimea, neither central office of NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine, nor Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, nor the Ministry of Defense or the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine did not send clear instructions for further actions; a special body, envisaged for accident or emergency situations, was not formed; the individual initiatives of Chornomornaftogaz’s employees turned under control of the Russian FSB and were blocked by the armed groups. Thus, the most unfortunate failure occurred with the protection of drilling rigs. They were captured by the Russian paratroopers landed on drilling rigs not immediately, but almost three weeks after the start of the diffuse invasion of Crimea. The main problem was that under the condition of administrative chaos the Ukrainian Maritime Guard did not comply with Art. 31 of the Law of Ukraine «On the Exclusive (Maritime) Economic Zone of Ukraine», which clearly states: «Protection of the sovereign rights of Ukraine in the exclusive (maritime) economic zone and control over the exercise of rights and fulfillment of obligations of other states, Ukrainian and foreign legal entities and individuals, international organizations in it, are carried out by the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine». Similarly, the Navy of Ukraine was not capable of decisive action, since it was blocked in the bays of Sevastopol and Donuzlav. However, the Brigade of Surface Ships and the Protection and Support Division of the Western Naval Base, which are located in Odessa, could carry out the necessary actions. Also, the forces could have been deployed to the drilling rigs with the help of the military helicopters, given that the main rigs were equipped with landing pads. However, nothing happened.

On the fact of illegal capture of Ukrainian state property by court decision of December 23, 2015 jack-up drilling rigs ‘Petro Godovatets’ and ‘Independence’ were arrested.\(^{141}\) However, on 8-9 December 2015 both drilling rigs were towed close to the shore of the occupied Crimea (near Golitsynske field), where they were covered by the Russian border guard service units deployed on the peninsula. The operation on towing off the drilling rigs away from Odesa field were conducted under the FSB control, the border service of which earlier had sent ‘Ametist’ patrol craft in the area

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141 "Pirates of the BSF RF ": Who does keep Ukrainian drilling rigs stolen by Russia - "Boiko’s rigs". 11.01.2016. http://censor.net.ua/p368466
of rigs stationing. The operation of towing the rigs itself, probably was covered by the 25th Separate Special Forces Regiment of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Serviceman of the Armed Forces of the RF Alexander Alimov on the drilling rig. From a profile on Facebook. OSINT. InformNapalm.

6.5. Power transmission to Crimea

Russia, having occupied Crimea, faced serious problems with the energy supply of the peninsula. The energy deficit of Crimea traditionally amounted to ~ 83% for electricity, 100% for coal, 100% for petroleum products. In practice, Ukraine made Crimea energy self-sufficient in terms of gas supply due to the investment of NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine in expanding operational drilling on the Black Sea shallow shelf in 2011-2013.

The energy blockade of the peninsula by Ukraine in 2015 turned out to be so unexpected for Russia as the disruption of water supply through the North-Crimean channel in 2014. It should be noted that the actions of the Ukrainian side fitted into the logic of maximizing the price of occupation for aggressor. Energy blockade has exacerbated the financial burden on the occupier’s budget, as it was necessary to solve the strategic problem of reorientation of the energy consumption of Crimea from the Ukrainian direction to the Russian. The Russian Federation has again faced an underestimated scenario. It was believed that the Novorossiya

142 Based on researches of the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” in 2015-2016 http://geostrategy.org.ua/ua/component/k2/item/1017-militarizatsiya-okupovano-go-krimu-yak-zagroza-mizhnarodniy-bezpetsi
project, in its original form - separation of 8-10 regions of eastern and southern Ukraine, had to solve automatically all issues of energy and resource supply of Crimea, in particular electricity and water supplies. Moreover, Ukraine, more precisely what would be left of it, would be deficient in energy, since the main sources of primary energy would fall on the territory of the so-called Novorossiya - almost all coal mining and almost half of natural gas production, as well as the lion’s share of thermal energy, more than 2/3 of the nuclear generation (9 out of 15 power units of the nuclear power plant). The Novorossiya project collapsed, so Crimea automatically turned out to be in a difficult energy and resource situation.

The Crimean power system was designed in the Soviet period for the supply of electricity from the mainland to the peninsula through 4 air lines from the IPS of Ukraine [Integrated Power System of Ukraine]. Maximally, it is capable of conducting 1250 MW of power, which corresponds to the maximum amount of energy consumption on the peninsula. Crimea has a capacity of its own thermal generation of about 205.5 MW, including Sevastopol. (Base local generation: 100 MW at Simferopol Thermal Power Plant (with a design capacity of 100 MW), 6 MW at Kamysh-Burun TPP (with a design capacity of 30 MW) and 14.5 MW at Saky TPP (design capacity of 14.5 MW), as well as Sevastopol TPP with a capacity of 60 MW.)

All projects of transmission of power in Crimea via the power bridge and creation of additional generation on the peninsula, foreseen by Russia, will amount to a total capacity of 2225 MW, which is 1.8 times more than the traditional supplies of Crimea from mainland of Ukraine until 2016. **It is obvious that the greater than before occupation power is connected with the growing needs of the Russian armed forces on the territory of the peninsula, as well as perspective plans for their build-up. In addition, it is a confirmation of large-scale plans for the deployment of additional military infrastructure that will require significant energy consumption.**

The general scheme of energy supply of Crimea by Russia is as follows: the transmission of electricity from the territory of the Russian Federation via energy bridge over Kerch Strait and construction of additional generating capacities on the territory of the peninsula, which will use Russian gas to be transferred to Crimea through a new gas pipeline.
In practice, Russian approach is two-fold: supplying electricity and gas to the peninsula, as well as construction of a new generation in line with expansion of the existing. This causes criticism in the expert circles of the Russian Federation, since the Crimean energy surplus will cost much to Russian budget. In the event that all projects will be implemented, the total generation capacity in Crimea, along with the power bridge’s capacity, will be 2225 MW. On the one hand, this is the result of satisfying the needs of all lobbying structures that use Russian budget for Crimea for self-enrichment. On the other hand, Moscow is trying to create a stock of capacities if the Kerch energy bridge is short-lived. The latter is quite probable, considering both the geology of the bottom of the Kerch Strait, the «storming» and the Chinese contractor during the cable transmissions. According to available information, there were serious violations of engineering norms during the execution of works.

Capacity of four high-voltage transmission lines from the mainland of Ukraine to the peninsula is 1250 MW, that fully covered consumption needs of Crimea. Total maximum capacity of energy generation and energy bridge after realization of all planned by Russia projects - 2225 MW that exceeds all conceivable needs of Crimea.

Source: Centre for Global Studies ‘Strategy XXI’
Russia proved technically unable to provide the construction of the Kerch power bridge. This is an important point that shows the backwardness of Russian industry and technologies. It turned out that high-voltage submarine cables in Russia were not manufactured, as there are no companies that can conduct submarine cable laying. To lay energy bridge they had to involve Chinese suppliers and contractors, in particular Jiangsu Hengtong HV Power System and Shanghai Foundation Engineering Group Co, Ltd. Effective power generation in Crimea is impossible without gas turbine installations of German «Siemens», which the Russians tried to push for action bypassing the sanctions. The Ukrainian side showed inactivity against the Chinese vessel and laying a cable through the Kerch Strait in autumn and winter of 2015.

6.6. Cyber and energy dimension of hybression

6.6.1. Grids in wartime

Under hybrid-type aggression against Ukraine, Russia pledges to use the energy component of war, especially in the winter. Conduction of the large-scale combat operations in winter is complicated, so the advantage is given to non-military components. In 2014, the rate was made to create an anthracite coal and electricity deficit in order to force Ukraine first to energy, and then to military-political surrender. All previous years Russia also made a bet on the fact that it would be possible to employ a tool of artificial third gas crisis, in which massive Russian propaganda would have blamed Ukraine to be the culprit. The cyber attacks on the IPS of Ukraine on December 23, 2015 and December 17, 2016 were made. They proved to be unsuccessful, although they caused some damage to a number of regional power distribution companies. Two main energy networks of Ukraine, the Gas Transmission System (GTS) and the Integrated Power System (IPS), which are among the largest in Europe, are periodically exposed to cyber attacks from the territory of the aggressor.

**Briefing note**: GTS of Ukraine consists of 38.550 km of the high- and mid-pressure pipelines, 72 gas compressor stations, 1455 gas distribution stations, 13 underground gas storages (UGS), 6 regional departments of trunk pipelines management, including 41 production administrations of trunk gas pipelines and 9 production administrations of underground gas storages. UGS are an integral part of the gas transportation system of Ukraine. Their active volume is 30.95 bcm, a maximum daily capacity in withdrawal season can reach under particular condition 290 million cubic meters.

143 Aggregated data based on the papers of PJSC Ukrtransgaz, NEC Ukrenergo and National Institute for Strategic Studies.
per day. The main underground storage facilities – 4/5 of total volume – are located in the west of Ukraine close to trunk pipelines Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod, Soyuz, Progress. The underground gas storage facilities can be used not only to cover seasonal gas consumption fluctuations, but also to create strategic reserves of up to 15 billion cubic meters of gas to ensure security of supply to Central Europe, the Balkans and Turkey.

In the period, when Russian military formations and separatist groups carried out intense hostilities, gas distribution systems located in the battle areas suffered in general 31 breakdowns. In ten cases, the Ukrainian side failed to repair the wrecked objects. In 21 cases, their functionality had been renewed after repair works.

IPS consists of 8 regional power systems, 265 electricity producers, of which 7 electricity generating companies produce more than 90% of electricity and 45 electricity distribution companies. Five thermal power generating companies operate 14 thermal power plants with 102 units. JSC Ukrhydroenergo operates 102 hydroelectric generating units as part of the hydro plants cascades on Dnipro and Dniester rivers. In Energoatom, at four nuclear power plants 15 energy units are on-stream. The IPS of Ukraine composes of bulk electricity grids with voltage of 220-750 kW, operated by Ukrenergo, as well as power distribution electricity grids operated by 45 regional electricity distribution companies. In the immediate vicinity of the fighting zone are located Luganska TPP (1.4 GW), Vuglegirska TPP (3.6 GW), Myronivska TPP (0.2 GW); in 2014-2015, these plants fell under fire resulting in damage to TPP equipment, substations and transmission lines. Due to military actions, within Donbas regional power grid twelve main power lines with voltage of 220 kV, six of 330 kV and two of 500 kV remain damaged. The impact of the identified damage on the operation of the IPS of Ukraine as a whole, was localized. In the territory of the separate districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions (ORDLO), large generating capacities belong to Starobeshivska TPP (1.9 GW) and Zuyevska TPP (1.2 GW).

**6.6.2. Gas contexts of hybression**

Starting with the autumn-winter season 2013-2014, when the Russian Federation began practically a proxy phase of the hybrid war against Ukraine, on the eve of the winter cold Russian mass media actively broke the topic of insufficiency of gas reserves, accumulated in the Ukrainian underground gas storage facilities (UGS) to pass the heating season and maintain transit to Europe. Moreover, this issue is traditionally entangled not only by the Russians, but also by the worried Europeans who are easily exposed to Moscow’s propaganda reinforcing psychological effects.
GTS of Ukraine has a high level of interconnection of main pipelines, which provides security of gas supply in case of emergency. This is something that other transit routes named by Gazprom as alternative to the Ukrainian: Blue Stream and Nord Stream, lack. An accident on any of these routes will automatically lead to the disruption of gas supply and longlasting repair due to operational difficulties of offshore pipelines. At the same time, due to high level of Ukrainian GTS’ interconnection, it’s pretty hard to make it dysfunctional in a brace of shake, even in virtue of the aimed physical interference. For complete interruption of gas supplies to the EU from the territory of Ukraine, it is necessary to make simultaneous attacks on GTS in 29 points; that is practically impossible task under hybrid war. By comparison, in the case with the Slovak GTS five simultaneous attacks is enough. High level of interconnection is a guarantee of its continuous work even under extreme conditions. No other GTS in Europe has such a level of interconnection.

GTS of Ukraine became the object of diversions at the initial stage of the Russian invasion in Ukraine in May and June 2014. Sabotage actions on the objects of Ukrainian GTS, disguised under technical incidents, were to strengthen the
propaganda rhetoric of Gazprom aimed at discrediting Ukraine as a transit country for spectacular TV-picture. The comments were appropriate and were built in a logic chain: ‘Ukrainian gas transportation system in disrepair’, ‘An explosion - work of radicals from «Right Sector»’, ‘Unstable Ukraine is a threat to the Russian transit to Europe’, ‘Russia and Europe should build the bypass pipelines.’ However, the sabotage actions that have been committed on the main gas pipeline Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod did not result in the interruption of gas supplies to the EU for a second.

It is worth noting the decrease of gas consumption in Ukraine, the lion’s share of which has traditionally been imported from Russia and created a serious dependence. In Ukraine, a number of organizational, regulatory, technical and other measures were implemented that led to a reduction in gas consumption, as well as a zero import from Russia. The latter is extremely important as an element of minimizing the dependence on the aggressor in the context of its war against Ukraine.

Tab. 4. Dynamics of gas consumption and imports decrease in Ukraine in 2011-2017

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>Natural Gas:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumption, bcm³</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>50.358</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>33.727</td>
<td>33.200</td>
<td>31.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production, bcm³</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.998</td>
<td>20.5*</td>
<td>19.896*</td>
<td>20.290*</td>
<td>20.5*</td>
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* - without gas production of the Black Sea shelf

At the same time, despite the occupation of part of the territory and difficult economic situation, Ukraine managed to avoid a significant decline in the domestic gas production, despite the fact that due to Russia’s seizure of deposits of the Black Sea shelf between Crimea and Odesa region, Ukrainian gas balance has been deprived almost 1.7 billion cubic meters of annual production. Besides, NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine lost control over assets in the ATO zone, totaling 185 million cubic meters. In 2015, the largest gas production company in Ukraine – PJSC UkrGazVydobuvannya (UGV) - received twenty special permits for the exploration of new fields (from 2007 to 2014 only four special permits were received); the volume of seismic works has increased fivefold. Some measures were taken to increase financial efficiency
which allowed to intensify work on operational and exploration drilling. These and other measures have made it possible to avoid a larger reduction in production in 2015 and provide some prospects for further growth.

Over the past few years, Ukraine has also been successful in diversifying gas supplies, which drastically reduced the risks of economic blackmail by Russia as the former monopoly gas exporter, through the business structures under its control. To date, Ukraine has the opportunity to receive gas through the GTS of the neighboring countries: Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. Against a backdrop of significant reduction of gas consumption in Ukraine, reverse supplies from the west can fully meet the demand for gas imports. In 2016, available total reverse supply capacity (22.6 billion cubic meters per year) was almost twice the annual import volume of 11.1 billion cubic meters.

6.6.3. Nuclear energy diversification

Under reducing significance of gas and coal as primary energy resources, energy security of Ukraine is now more focused on the reliability and stability of the operation of the IPS. The core of the power generation is nuclear power plants. The continuity and efficiency of nuclear energy depends on diversification of fuel supply, technological multiplicity and reliable cyber defense. Ukraine is partially dependent on the supply of nuclear fuel from Russia. So far, problems with its supply have not arisen, and Ukrainian nuclear power plants have at their disposal nuclear fuel stocks. However, the government of Ukraine is concerned with nuclear fuel alternatives, as well as solving the problem of storing spent nuclear fuel for the future, when the situation may change, and Russia may resort to an atomic lever of influence. Some technical capabilities to diversify the supply of nuclear fuel in partnership with Westinghouse Electric, are available. After expansion of capacity in the Swedish city Västerås, the company can provide fresh nuclear fuel to half of the fifteen functioning power units of Ukrainian NPPs. The Ukrainian side is considering an increase of the share of non-Russian procurement to 40%, depending on the behavior of the Russian side and the market situation144. In 2016, the volume of purchases of nuclear fuel from Sweden increased in price equivalents to almost 1/3 of the needs of Ukrainian NPPs, while during 2011-2015 this volume was 7-8%. In 2016, four shipments of nuclear fuel were shipped from Sweden to Ukraine, and in the 2017 six shipments are expected. Moreover, the productivity of the Swedish fuel is higher than its Russian analogue. Taking into account the protracted nature of the hybrid war against Ukraine, creating of the bigger nuclear fuel stock is important.

At the end of March 2017, Russian mass media began to announce the bankruptcy of Westinghouse Electric, which has been subsidiary of Japanese Toshiba since

2006. In the typical Russian propaganda style, a picture of the stopping Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and the collapse of energy industry as a whole were depicted, as Ukraine lacks coal and does not buy Russian gas. This fake information has become widespread, despite the expert refutations and the official statement of Westinghouse Electric to continue the implementation of its contracts for the supply of nuclear fuel for all customers. Thus, NNEGC “EnergoAtom” under war condition had increased the stability of both nuclear generation and national energy industry in general, as well as reduced its dependence on Russia and got rid of monopoly of the external supplier.

6.6.4. Coal constraint

Ukraine was always independent in coal production, unlike gas, producing enough of coal, and even partially exporting it. Only a certain volume of coking coal was imported for metallurgy industry.

The separatist groups of LNR and DNR, controlled by Russia, and Russian troops failed to capture the whole territory of the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk regions). But they retained control over areas where anthracite mining is concentrated, which provides 7 out of 14 Ukrainian thermal power plants. Thus, anthracite dependence of Ukraine, before the start of the heating season of 2014-2015, was formed through military operations.

**Briefing note**\(^{145}\):

*With the start of Russian intervention in the Donbas, 69 out of 150 Ukrainian mines were forced to stop coal mining. 7 mines were destroyed during hostilities. In the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, there are 85 mines of all forms of ownership, which is 57% of the total number of Ukrainian mines of the prewar period. Sixty of them extracted energy coal - anthracite. From among 90 state mines, subordinated to the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry, only 35 are located on the territory controlled by Ukraine. In the Donbas area controlled by Ukraine, most of the state mines and half of private associations, which mainly produce gas-grade coal, are located (namely Dzerzhinskugillya, Dobropillyavugillya, Krasnoarmiyskvugillya, Lisichanskugillya, Pavlogradvugillya, Selidovvugillya, the mines Pivdenno-Donbas’ka No. 1 and Krasnolimanska). In the temporary occupied territories of Ukraine, the state owned and private mines of the anthracite coal, are located. Among them Makiiivugillya, Ordzhonikidzevugillya, Shahterskanthracite, Torezanthracite, Snizhneanthracite, Donbasanthracite, Luhganskvugillya, as well as the mines of DTEK (Rovenkianthracite, Sverdlovskanthracite, Komsomolets Donbassa)*

Anthracite dependence automatically caused electricity one, as if there is not enough anthracite coal in power plants, this means a shortage of electricity. So, it must be compensated by the supplies from Russia. At the end of 2014, Russia has created two alternatives for coal and no alternative for electricity. The shortage of coal either had to be covered by imports from the Russian Federation, or by purchasing it in the occupied territories of the Donbas. Regarding electricity, at the end of 2014, using non-transparent inter-oligarchic communications, the Kremlin not only imposed a contract for electricity supply to Kyiv in 2015, but also ordered the occupied and annexed Crimea to be provided. However, the Ukrainian side lost its temporary electricity dependency during 2015. Russia received an energy blockade of Crimea from Ukraine, that increased the price of occupation for the aggressor and forced it to start implementing a complex of high-value measures aimed at the energy reorientation of the peninsula to Russia.

6.6.5. Critical energy infrastructure: Plans of hard impacts

Donbass, occupied by Russia, is not energy self-sufficient, even taking into account coal surplus. In view of this, Russia has been inclined to expand the occupied territories to ensure their greater energy stability, which simultaneously would lead to destabilization of the work of the energy systems of Ukraine.

Basic objects of power generation and IPS of Ukraine.
The energy balance-imbalance band, which could lead to the energy self-sufficiency of the Novorossiia project, as well as Crimea, and could lead to Ukraine’s energy collapse, occupies space south of Kharkiv towards Zaporizhia, and then along the left bank of the Dnieper to Kakhovka. However, it is impossible to realize such a large-scale operation within the concept of a hybrid war. This requires a full-scale military operation involving all types of armed forces.

In the summer 2014, Russian experts had already been developing an option of the critical defeat of Ukrainian energy infrastructure. They emphasized an “Achilles heel» of power generation in the IPS of Ukraine: “It is about the power complex in Energodar, Zaporizhia region. In fact, it consists of Zaporizhia Hydro Power Plant with installed capacity of 3625 MW and Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant with installed capacity 6000 MW. Total installed capacity of the power complex makes 9625 MW. Both power plants are the largest in Ukraine in terms of installed capacities, while the nuclear power plant is the largest in Europe and the former Soviet Union”. Some recommendations “to damage transmission line interconnections”, or a fire attack supplemented by the cyber attack against the system of operational dispatch control of the IPS of Ukraine, were proposed.

This would have led to a ‘system accident across the entire Integrated Power System’. «The tool of attack could be artillery, or drones.» Moreover, it was supposed, through propaganda, to file this as a sabotage executed by the «Kyiv junta» for the purpose of accusing the «militias». Probably a hopeless situation with the energy supply of Crimea in the winter of 2014-2015 has become a deterrent to the realization of similar and other scenarios associated with severe impacts on energy infrastructure objects. The advantage was given to a fundamentally different, newest approach - to strike from the fifth space.

6.6.6. Attacks from the cyber space on energy grids
The energy infrastructure of Ukraine is considered by the Kremlin as one of the theater of military operations in Ukraine. Major attacks on energy grids and key power generation targets were undertaken from cyber space in order to achieve the same effect as in the case of direct sabotage - the collapse of power systems. However, unlike traditional sabotage, cyber sabotage is more difficult to identify and prevent. Similarly, a cyber attack does not provide a 100% guarantee of success, as any other sabotage action.

On December 23, 2015 the regional energy distribution companies Prykarpattyaoblenergo, Chernivtsioblenergo and Kyivoblenergo, were attacked. Consequently, 220 thousand consumers (about 1% of the total number) were
switched off in Prykarpattya, Chernivtsi and Kyiv regions for the period from one to six hours.

A study initiated after the blackout, showed that the attack on the energy system of Ukraine began yet in May 2014. Obviously, it coincides in time with the phase of Russian diffuse invasion of Ukraine in the course of Novorossiia project. On May 13, 2014, a targeted mailing was carried out installing a Trojan program - Backdoor. Fonten.Win32.4 (virus of Black Energy type), after having being activated. The program sent data about the system and the network to a remote operation center controlled by attackers.

The attack undertaken during the period from May 13, 2014 to December 23, 2015 had the following components:

- previous infection of networks with fake emails, using social engineering techniques;
- seizure of dispatching automated systems control together with operations of substations shutdown;
- disruption of the IT infrastructure (uninterruptable power supply systems, modems, routers, switches);
- erasement of information on servers and workstations by KillDisk utility;
- attacks on the telephone numbers of call centers, aimed to denial of service for subscribers facing a blackout.

One of oblenergo suffered a cyber attack that had been launched by the Internet networks belonged to the Russian Internet providers. The employees of attacked oblenergos quickly understood the situation. After having put out disabling systems, they transferred the electricity distribution process in manual mode and restored the electricity supply. The consequences of cyber attacks on oblenergos have been overcome; but in January 20, 2016, a new mailing of infected files was carried out on the power plants of Ukraine. An Excel-file was sent on behalf of the national operator Ukrenergo, which contained a Trojan program on open source. But this time the response was adequate and extensive damage was avoided.

It should be noted that in late December 2015 cyber attacks were also carried out on transport infrastructure objects, in particular on Ukrzaliznytsia and Borispol international airport. For example, Black Energy Trojan had been placed in the letter, which Ukrzaliznytsia received with recommendations for security allegedly sent by the Ministry of Industrial Policy. Also, three leading TV-channels have become the targets for cyber attacks.

The scale of cyber attacks allows to suggest that the operating systems of several critical objects could be afflicted by the virus. But the attack itself is put off to more
suitable time for aggressor. The suspicion falls upon the Russian Sandworm hacker group. The U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall on the results of work of the American experts in Ukraine on February 12, 2016 made a statement that Russia is responsible for the cyber attack on the Ukrainian energy grids\textsuperscript{146}.

A command of experts composed of representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of State and the FBI. The famous ESET company specializing in cyber security announced that an accident on the Prykarpattyoblenergo was a result of the external hacker attack\textsuperscript{147}. In an official statement, citing its own investigation, it was indicated that the attack had become part of a more global hacker activity against the enterprises of Ukraine and Poland. This information was confirmed by CERT-UA - specialized structural subdivision of the State Center of Cyber security and Counteraction to Cyber threats.

GTS of Ukraine suffered three powerful unsuccessful cyber attacks. The targets were dispatching centers and technological communication system of PJSC Uktransgaz.

These factors in combination indicate that under certain circumstances (full immersion of the West in its problems: elections in several major EU countries; internal American disputes; transatlantic misunderstanding), a hard impact scenario is possible with simultaneous escalation of both military and non-military means of influence, including massive cyber attacks on control centers and energy infrastructure as well as energy isolation of Ukraine, e.g. any supply of coal in Ukraine (from Russia or ORDLO), limitation of oil supplies from Belarus, interruption of gas transit through Ukraine to the EU.


7. PROGRESSIVE HYBRESSION

7.1. Russian vision of the future

A retrospective analysis of the records of pro-Kremlin analysts leads to the conclusion that one of Russia’s main goals is the destruction of the system of transatlantic partnership and solidarity, the repositioning of Europe towards Eurasia with a view to create the so-called Common Space Security and Trade from Lisbon to Vladivostok and from St. Petersburg to Colombo.

To predict the further actions of Putin’s Russia, it is necessary to understand the Russian coordinate system for the strategic decisions. “Russia is a self-sufficient country”, an ambiguous statement by V. Putin from his Valdai speech 2014. “Russia is much stronger, and the West is much weaker than many can think. ... Our country is finding its place in the world. Compare the Soviet armed forces, lumbering and expensive, with the nimble military of modern Russia”, – the assessment of one of the leading Russian political analysts S. Karaganov, who is one of the founders of the modern Putin policy.

**Figure 3. Military expenditure of Russia, EU and NATO Europe 2000–14**


At a time when the EU and NATO countries were reducing military expenditures, Russia was increasing them.
In an interview with Der Spiegel 2.5 years after the beginning of the Russian hybression, S. Karaganov frankly stated: “...we are seeking for great power status. Unfortunately, we cannot abandon it: this status has become a part of our genome over the past 300 years. We want to become the center of great Eurasia, a zone of peace and cooperation. This Eurasia will include the European subcontinent as well”\textsuperscript{148}. This is not just the opinion of one of the political analysts of the Kremlin pool. A similar idea can be found in the theses of the task force of the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy “Strategy for Russia. Russian foreign policy: end of 2010s – beginning of 2020s”, which were released in May 2016: “Russian foreign policy, as well as the society, is in the process of self-discovery. It returns to a new level of the traditional values, principles of its foreign policy, and policy in general. The main idea of these goals is to ensure absolute sovereignty and security. In the last 300 years, as a result of Petrine and Catherine’s reforms and due to the history of victories of the 18th and 19th centuries, one more value was added – the great power status ... The ideal foreign policy and economic position of Russia in the future is to be a big, economically developing, Atlantic-Pacific state that plays a central role in the Great Eurasian community, in the economic, logistical, military and political integration of Asia and Europe, and acts as a guarantor of international peace, exporter of military and political stability for Eurasia... According to the economic and mental set, Russia should be not the eastern periphery of Europe, but the northern part of the vast Eurasia”\textsuperscript{149}.

The preparation of the ruling elite of Russia for a possible conflict with the West has intensified since 2013. An unspoken decision about the readiness for this confrontation was made within the frame of informal consultative process of the Politburo 2.0 members\textsuperscript{150}, a group of V. Putin confidants among the Kremlin’s powerbrokers, members of his administration and oligarchs. The grounds for such decision were their own predictions of another world crisis, which will have not only an economic, but a complex character and will be followed by military and political conflicts.

“The analysis of the long cycles of economic and political dynamics shows that the most probable period for the major regional military conflicts with the participation of the United States and its satellites against Russia is 2015-2018”\textsuperscript{151} – says


\textsuperscript{150} Politburo 2.0 and Post-Crimean Russia. Shortened version [Electronic resource] / Minchenko Consulting. – Available at: http://www.minchenko.ru/netcat_files/File/Politburo%20in%20Russia%20after%20the%20annexation%20of%20the%20Crimea%20text(1).pdf – Screen title. – Publication date: 22.10.2014.

S. Glazyev, one of the founders of the Putin policy. Within the framework of the above-mentioned approaches, Russia is the target of the West aggression. It’s not Russia but the West that carries out expansion and aggression. Russia just defends itself. Accordingly, “in case of intellectual, economic and military mobilization, Russia has a chance to win the conflict of 2015-2018, as the United States and its satellites won’t be ready for overt aggression”\textsuperscript{152}. According to the Kremlin’s logic, attack is the best form of defense. According to the logic of S. Glazyev, the USA want to replace Russian gas with their own by supplying it to Europe, and to grab the traditional market of nuclear fuel from Russia by enforcing the diversification of the suppliers upon the EU. Russia considers the competition, which is the basis of a market economy, as a mode of war led by the West against it. Therefore, Russia will act in a preventive and aggressive manner.

The energy resources matter shouldn’t be underestimated in the frames of Russian policy. The views expressed by S. Glazyev reflected not only his own ideas, but those of the Kremlin.

The shale gas revolution in the US, which Russia ignored, considering it a temporary phenomenon and a “gas bubble” that would surely burst, led to the fact that the US not only became gas-sufficient, but subsequently turned into the gas exporter. Thus, the USA became a competitor to Russia. That wasn’t foreseen by any of the scenarios in Moscow. Gazprom scenarios, on the other hand, predicted that the United States would become an importer of the Russian gas. In the mid-2000s, following the trend of oil and gas prices increase, Gazprom had the outlook for 2015 of 54 billion cubic meters of Russian LNG export to the US.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Структура экспорта российского газа по регионам мира}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Конечное потребление газа на крупнейших мировых рынках}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Доля экспорта российского газа, % в объеме конечного потребления}
\end{center}

\textit{Taken from the Gazprom presentation. Source: Gazprom}

The situation, when the predictions didn’t just fail but turned out to be based on a completely erroneous model and realities, became critical, in the Kremlin’s view. Instead of “making the US gas-dependent on the Kremlin, like Europe was”, Russian strategists had to explore ways to eliminate a threat while the competitor was not just a country with rich gas deposits, but the most powerful state in the world.

Unlike Turkmenian gas, which has been excluded from Europe, and Iranian gas, which is successfully blocked by Russia in Armenia and Syria, the blocking actions against the US gas are not possible. In this regard, the Russian Federation is considering options to combat the American gas expansion by trying to impose its alternatives on Europe, in particular, the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, and to limit the non-Russian gas supply options for the EU. Thus, the polyhybression becomes necessary: subversive acts of the Russian Federation in those regions from which gas can flow to Europe and those that play an important transit role for promising gas flows. Russia will be able to act preventively.

The analysis of the Russian experts’ records in recent years shows that, unlike the period before the Second World War, when the USSR was preparing to respond to German attack (we use the officially accepted view of the Russian Federation upon the events), now Russia is ready to act preventively. It is worth remembering Putin’s words “be the first who attacks”, as discussed above, or the statement of his foreign policy adviser S. Karaganov: “Russia will never again fight on its own territory ...” 153 Moreover, it has already started doing so. It uses the territory of Ukraine for the war with the West, which, according to the Kremlin, is running the proxy invasion into the “historically Russian land”, using the “Nazi junta in Kyiv” as an aggressor.

As already mentioned, the beginning of the hybrid war is invisible. It becomes apparent after the activation of the military component in an explicit or implicit form. All this shows that the Kremlin is ready for a new, larger wave of geopolitical expansion, based on the strength of Russia (including the armed forces) and the weakness of the West. Actually, such pilot expansion began in August 2008 with 5-day war against Georgia. In 2014, it continued. Russia was determined to have a unique window of opportunity while the US president is B. Obama and Washington is overloaded with the problems of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria. One of the Russian think-tanks specializing in the US and Canada made a closed assessment for the Kremlin as far back as 2013.

In essence, the United States is at its weakest foreign policy since the presidency of B. Obama. There are some chances that the next US president will be at

Ronald Reagan’s level and will make the country again a global player. Drawing on the concerns experienced by the United States and Europe, NATO will be an ineffective instrument of the West. Therefore, Russia has a unique chance to take advantage of the weakness of the US, EU and NATO.

The assessment regarding the presidency of Obama proved to be true, but the “new Reagan” expectations’ did not materialize. However, the election of unpredictable D. Trump as a president opens even a wider window of opportunity for the Russian Federation due to the high probability of the internal American chaos. Although, the unpredictability of the 45th US president may lead at the same time to the increased risks for Russia. But if you remember Surkov’s expression “don’t be afraid of mistakes”, then the disappointment in Trump will obviously lead only to a certain correction of Russian tactics, but not a strategy to neutralize the US as a world power center.

The demonstrative disregard of the Western sanctions, counter-sanctions, and the denial of the armed incursion into Ukraine followed by the demonstration of nuclear power is a proof that Russia won’t stop. Moreover, the reactive and insufficient actions of the West against Russia during its continuing hybression against Ukraine, as well as the expected fatigue due to the sanctions against the Russian Federation, were predicted by the Kremlin. A reasonable description of the Western approach to the Ukrainian issue made by a German expert Andreas Umland is successfully used by Russia: “… the pacifist politicians want to establish good relations with Russia, even at the cost of Ukrainian sovereignty, the integrity of Moldova or Georgia. This is a trend. It is represented by a slogan: peace is above all and we need to do everything for peacekeeping”. The expert estimates that such approach “is shared by a large part of the German population, which is not very interested in the fate of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, but wants to avoid any conflicts”\textsuperscript{154}. And this is perfect for the Kremlin.

7.2. Scenarios from the Soviet past and the post-West future

Under our hypothesis, the Kremlin is developing a scenario of a new Caribbean crisis for the US and the West. The Caribbean crisis scheme is considered ideal to receive strategic advantages from the West. It is worth using “Khrushchev’s idea”, set forth in the research book “Kuzka’s mother” by the GRU officer of the USSR Viktor Suvorov (Volodymyr Rezun):

“So, what are the missiles in Cuba for? The answer is simple: for the overall solution of Berlin and Germany problem.

The principle purpose was to secretly deploy in Cuba the powerful Soviet forces overarmed with nuclear weapons in September and October 1962. And on November 12,

1962, Comrade Khrushchev was to come there on an official visit. Of course, on a cruiser. And he had to sign an agreement with Cuba on the deployment of the Soviet forces on this fertile island. He had also to announce to the world: look how much we’ve got in there! And the Soviet Union has got even more! If you, gentlemen, find such a neighborhood worrisome, let’s swap: you are withdrawing the US troops (as well as British and French) from West Germany, we are withdrawing ours from Cuba. Otherwise ...

... 164 charges and their carriers is an exchange fund, facilities to bargain the withdrawal of American and Allied forces from West Germany, and even from all over Europe”155.

The modern plan of the Kremlin may be the same – to create opportunities for the strategic bargaining with the USA. The failure to reach the goal in 1962 can be explained by the poor Khrushchev’s conflict management. Under the current circumstances, when Russia has Putin, when the West is unconsolidated as during the Cold War, when anti-Americanism is spreading more and more throughout Europe, a unique window of opportunity appears. At the same time, the Kremlin’s plan may involve the unexpected know-how.

The secret delivery of the nuclear warheads with a total capacity of several Megaton to the German coast will create for the Kremlin a so-called “exchange fund” in a similar way during the Caribbean Missile Crisis of 1962. This will be followed by the ultimatum on the withdrawal of the US troops and equipment from Europe and its transition to the zone of Russia’s influence with the corresponding changes in the EU architecture, as well as the dissolution of NATO.

Know-how lies in the perfect disguise of the nuclear warheads delivery for the turning point. It involves a peculiar “hybrid application” of a nuclear warhead without traditional carrier delivery in an unconventional way using non-military infrastructure. While all NATO and EU attention is focused on the provocative flights of the Russian strategic aviation and its interception, training launches of the carrier rockets, SSBN campaigns to the US shores, the delivery, in fact, can be carried out quietly. This will be further followed by a nuclear ultimatum expressed officially not by Russia, but by a certain “third force” that has received nuclear weapons at its disposal and seeks to “fairly reconstruct the world”, demanding the US withdraw from Europe. According to the logic of the Kremlin, Europe will capitulate immediately, and also will demand a rapid US withdrawal. The EU will be ready to sign any documents. After all, Europe is principally Germany.

Deputy Prime Minister of Russia D. Rogozin alluded to some nuclear armament secrets of Russia on September 22, 2014: “Should we surprise our colleagues and should we show all kinds of weapons we have to surprise them? Better keep some in

a quiet secret for yourself, and make a surprise at the most critical moment’’\textsuperscript{156}. Putin also alluded to some unfavorable ‘‘surprises’’ for ‘‘our Western partners’’\textsuperscript{157}.

We can only assume what ‘‘surprises’’ and for which regions of the planet these scenarios are developed. One cannot exclude the variant of anonymous, unauthorized use of low-power nuclear warheads. This can also become an innovation in hybrid war technologies in terms of the use of weapons of mass destruction. The best cover story for such actions is the activity of an unknown Islamist group that received nuclear materials at its disposal and managed to create a ‘‘retaliation weapon’’. That is, Russia can act in a manner characteristic of it – through the pseudo-actor created by it, which looks like an independent subject, but is completely controlled by it. This is a universal Russian practice, starting from the scheme of the RUE (‘‘independent’’ ‘‘Swiss’’ operator for a transnational gas trading scheme) and ending with ‘‘independent’’ DNR / LNR.

One of the reports by the US Congressional Research Service stated that Pakistan is the center of several terrorist groups. The report also emphasizes that the hypothetical possibility of militants to seize nuclear weapons, technology and materials from Pakistan is a great concern for the United States\textsuperscript{158}. Already in 2008, American experts concluded that in five years the probability of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction would be higher than 50\% (primarily, their assessments were based on the ‘‘nuclear supermarket of Abdul Qadeer Khan’’\textsuperscript{159}, the creator of a Pakistani atomic bomb, who actively traded secrets, materials and technologies of the nuclear weapons production). The Islamic state said in 2015 that it could receive nuclear weapons from Pakistan within 12 months. Although this didn’t happen, the expert opinion is quite clear: the access to WMD by extremists is only a matter of time.

The anonymous nuclear attack can be directed, for example, at the largest oil export terminal in Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia (and in the world). Almost 3/4 of Saudi oil exports pass through this terminal with a capacity of 300 million tons per year. A nuclear detonation, even of a relatively low power, may lead not only to the long-term failure of the terminal, but also to the collapse of the Kingdom’s oil exports.

\textsuperscript{156} Rogozin: Russia is to update the strategic nuclear arsenal by 2020 [Electronic resource] / RIA Novosti. – Available at: http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140922/1025064295.html#ixzz3RBTFueBC – Screen title. – Publication date: 22.09.2014.

\textsuperscript{157} Konstantin Dushenov. Missile surprise from Putin [Electronic resource] / K. Dushenov // Information and analytical Internet publication Segodnya.Ru. – Available at: http://www.segodnia.ru/content/148485 – Screen title. – Publication date: 01.10.2014.

\textsuperscript{158} Sources: There is no threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of militants [Electronic resource] / RIA Novosti. – Available at: http://ria.ru/world/20150528/1066908778.htmlhttp://www.segodnia.ru/content/148485 – Screen title. – Publication date: 28.05.2015

\textsuperscript{159} Viktor Agayev. Islamic nuclear bomb [Electronic resource] / DW. – Available at: http://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F-%D0%BD1%82%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F-%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B1%D0%B0/a-1116773 – Screen title. – Publication date: 14.02.2004
and to the rapid increase of the price on the global market. The main point here is a long-term nature of the consequences as the terminal can’t be recovered quickly after the nuclear attack. The oil market will react actively, and will maintain at least an increased price level if the influencing factor has a long-term nature. This is what the Kremlin needs. It is clear that the “Islamic atomic bomb” won’t do anything here. It will be simply used to cover the propaganda of the Kremlin. They will artfully invent some previously unknown Islamic terrorist group acting to avenge in the name of Allah. Moreover, this “hypothesis” may be spread by the Western media, not by the Russia Today. In fact, a modified nuclear weapon can be delivered to the terminal by one of the special force teams prepared for such actions. This is also one of the technologies of a new generation of wars using hybrid mechanisms, when it is impossible to identify an actor quickly. This means one can’t react quickly, let alone counteract the effects. In contrast to the market, the reaction of which will be immediate.

There are also serious challenges for the security of the Black Sea – Caspian space countries, in particular, for the South Caucasus, the Caspian and Turkey, despite the situational Russian-Turkish alliance against the background of growing contradictions between Ankara and Brussels, as well as a number of other European capitals. It is also relevant for the territories where the production and strategic energy communications play an important role, or have a prospective significance for the EU and, in the opinion of the Kremlin, are competitive for the hydrocarbons supplies of Russia to Europe. It is therefore no accident that in Turkey the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (largely a product of the First Chief Directorate) has intensified its activity. It carried out some acts of sabotage in all core trunk pipelines in July-August 2015. It is worth remembering that the State Duma deputy Vladimir Zhirinovsky in one of his interviews in 2009 “predicted”: “... the Kurds may rebel at any moment; the situation there is also volatile. They will cut all oil and gas pipelines, including Baku-Ceyhan”160. The event of August 6, 2008 – the detonation of the oil pipeline in Turkey near Erzinghan, which coincided with the aggression of Russia against Georgia, confirms the high probability of such a scenario under certain circumstances. The accident on the pipeline was arranged through remote cyber interference in the operation of the dispatching system, blocking the alarm system, invalid commands. And as a result, the overcritical pressure in the pipeline led to its explosive depressurization.

It is not coincidental the tension is growing in the areas where Russia has become more politically active – in the South Caucasus, Moldova, the Balkans, and Libya. Russia creates multicrisis scenarios for the West. In order to operate in the regions of the South Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Balkans, as well as to act against Ukraine and Europe, Russia is building up its military capacity in Crimea. Unlike the US Europe doesn’t have an adequate understanding of the importance of the Black Sea in geopolitical and geo-economic terms. “The region is an important

160 Zhirinovsky: The gas price for Ukraine should be 500 Euro. IA FORUM. 17.01.2009
transit corridor for goods and energy resources. The control over ports and sea routes will allow Russia to block these routes and to convince countries to cooperate with it. Moscow can also create difficulties or even cut off supplies of raw materials from the Caspian Sea basin to Europe. Such actions can jeopardize the supply of raw materials from such countries as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and, most importantly, discourage the EU to receive energy resources bypassing Russia. Such an assessment of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) is an adequate awareness of the regional risks and threats to Europe, a source of which is Russia and its technologies of subversive activity and hybrid wars.

To secure its position in the Balkans, Russia, despite the failure of 2016, inflates tensions in Montenegro, tries to exploit the internal political problems of Macedonia in favor of destabilizing the Balkans and to provoke a political crisis in Serbia in order to put an end to the already shaky European integration vector of Belgrade, or to integrate pro-Russian Serbia into the EU, making it the Trojan horse of Russia. At the same time, it intensifies the pressure on the closest ally, Belarus, as even its limited independence prevents the Kremlin from implementing its geostrategic plans in Central and Eastern Europe.

7.3. An attack from Cyberspace

2005, a year when Putin identified the collapse of the USSR as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe, is characterized by the creation of a state network multilingual television company Russia Today aimed at a foreign audience. It can be stated that this is not a coincidence. The Kremlin interpreted the victory of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as the defeat of Russia caused by the West in the post-Soviet territory, behind the Primakov’s “red line”. Alongside the open information and propaganda strategy of counteracting the West, the implementation of another strategy, a cyber war, has started. We estimated that it began in the mid-2000s simultaneously with the launch of propaganda projects.

The counter-attack against the West began immediately from the information and propaganda front, as well as from cyber space. Russia started to consider information and psychological and cyber operations as a kind of non-lethal weapons of mass destruction. The first powerful offensive cyber operation of Russian abroad was directed against the NATO and EU member state Estonia in April 2007. Three-week systematic hacker attacks on the state and private sites were the revenge for the intentions of the Tallinn’s authorities to move the monuments of the Soviet era, which provoked a negative reaction from the Kremlin. The next testing ground for cyber attacks, but already in military conditions, was Georgia during the 5-day war of 2008.

The Georgian campaign has stimulated Russia for a next step in building offensive cyber capacity. At the end of 2009, upon the instructions of the President of the

Russian Federation D. Medvedev, the Information Confrontations Training Center was established. The tasks of such a center are not only to protect from critical publications in the media and to highlight the actions of the Russian military forces in a proper perspective, but also to prepare and implement the hacker attacks on the media resources and important enemy objects, to work in the interest of the special services in order to obtain a wide range of unique information.

However, if the Russian special services, mainly, stole information, the Russian Defense Ministry went further. One barely noticeable fact is that on October 17, 2012, the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation and the Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School announced the all-Russian competition of research works. One of the topics was “Methods and means of bypassing antivirus systems, firewall, operating system protection tools”162. As the title of the topic suggested, Russian experts saw this competition as the selection of projects and recruitment for the development of the tactical offensive viruses with a view to overcoming the security systems of a potential enemy163. The Russian experts believe that “this approach to the issue radically differs from the purely defensive strategy in the field of information confrontation, which was specified in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010, and in foreign policy initiatives of Russia”164.

A dramatic shift in 2013 towards the offensive activities in cyberspace was reflected in the intensification of the new secret structures formation under the aegis of the military department. The organization of an information confrontation unit in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was announced on February 13.

On February 22, 2017 at a special meeting in the State Duma the Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu acknowledged the creation of the troops for information operations “four years ago”. Commenting on the Sergei Shoigu’s statement, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2004-2008 the Army General Yuri Baluyevsky said that the victory in the information confrontation often plays a bigger role than in the classic war: “To defeat the enemy in this war can be much more important than in the classic military confrontation, because it is bloodless, and the effect is impressive, it excarnates and paralyzes all the authorities of the enemy state”165.

The latest confession of S. Shoigu is the recent indication that Russia has been preparing for aggressive actions not only in the traditional theater, the information and propaganda dimension, but also in cyber space. This coincides with the beginning of the hybrid-type aggression against Ukraine. And now the cyber aggression against the US, EU and NATO, which became more expressed in 2016 during the presidential election campaign in the United States, can be definitely marked with the same start. The main cyber efforts of Russia are focused on the USA. Europe also receives attention, but the main front here is information and propaganda. However, as the high-profile elections in a number of Western European countries in 2017 approach, the Russian cyber attack against Europe will intensify.

As for the Ukrainian cyber front of the Russian hybression, in 2014 there was created a group called CyberBerkut. It became known when it assumed the responsibility for attacks on websites of state bodies and public organizations of Ukraine and Western countries. The first attacks were carried out in March 2014 during the occupation of Crimea, when a number of Ukrainian web resources were temporarily blocked and the attack on three Internet resources of NATO was announced. The significant acts of CyberBerkut in the information and cyber space:

- interruption to the CEC of Ukraine on the eve of presidential elections in Ukraine on May 23, 2014;
- blocking of the websites of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine on April 4, 2014;
- DDoS-attacks on the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on April 10 and 14, 2014;
- blocking of mobile phones of the government members of Ukraine;
- blocking of the leading Ukrainian news portals UNIAN and LIGA BusinessInform;
- blocking of the website of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko on July 29, 2014.

Thus, these actions can be time aligned with the diffuse phase of the RF invasion into Ukraine in the east of the Donbass. So, the cyber front against Ukraine was opened simultaneously with the military component of Russia’s hybrid aggression.

In February 2015, the Russian power bodies supported the establishment of the identical hacker organization called SPRUT (the so-called Counteraction to Ukrainian Terrorism). This organization conducts attacks on the official websites of the Heads of the regional state administrations, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

At the end of 2015 with a view to improve the effectiveness of the information warfare against Ukraine, the leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation created the Information Confrontation Center (CIP) in Novocherkassk as a part of the Territorial Forces Center of the Southern Military District of the Russian Federation. A powerful software and hardware complex designed to conduct distributed cyber attacks (DDoS-attacks) was delivered to Donetsk.

On December 29, 2016 in a common statement by the US Department of Homeland Security, the Office of National Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Russia was for the first time officially and publicly accused of hacking attacks on the United States. Russia’s activity is reflected in the Joint Analysis Report of the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. It is noted that Russian intelligence services have been conducting cyber operations against US government structures, important infrastructure, think tanks, universities, political organizations and corporations for ten years.

Thus, it took the United States and Europe almost a decade to officially recognize Russia’s unfriendly actions in cyber space against the West. Such sluggishness and slowness only plays into the hands of the Russian cybernetic Pearl Harbor scenario. Russia is working to create in a “turning point” a state of disinformation, chaos and disorganization of the public administration system, ideally of the management of the US strategic nuclear forces, and to get a window of opportunity for nuclear blackmail of the West according to the scenarios described above.

ON THE NECESSITY OF ENERGY AND FINANCIAL MEASURES OF "ENFORCEMENT OF PEACE ON THE KREMLIN"
8. ON THE NECESSITY OF ENERGY AND FINANCIAL MEASURES OF “ENFORCEMENT OF PEACE ON THE KREMLIN”

“Ukraine’s compromise-seeking policy towards the Russian Federation is seen by Moscow as a sign of weakness and lack of confidence and only encourages its demands. The experience shows that Ukraine’s every concession to the Russian Federation becomes a starting point for further pressure with the aim of obtaining more concessions which in the end extremely limits the room for Ukraine’s political maneuver. Besides, the ideas of revenge, the image of an enemy embodied in Ukrainians and a provocative idea that ‘there is no way the Khokhols will start a war’ are introduced more and more intensely into the mass consciousness of the Russian people. It is necessary and wise to implement a more rigorous approach, a containment policy towards the Russian Federation which is to be implemented not only within the bilateral relations but also in the international context”167. This is a fragment of the policy brief drawn for the Council of the National Security and Defense of Ukraine 20 years ago. The events that took place over the 20-year period and the current state of affairs demonstrate the relevancy of this conclusion as to the necessity of the rigorous containment policy towards Russia. If we replace the words “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” by “the European Union” and “Europeans”, this will reflect the current approach of Russia to the EU.

It is evident that Russia focuses on the problems caused for the EU by the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Migration crisis, terrorist attacks in the EU countries speed up further collapse of the common EU space starting from the Schengen area and leading to a domino effect. Russia’s use of crypto-war methods will contribute to these processes splitting the EU from the inside through bilateral relations. The EU’s inability to act proactively has already caused a multiple crisis scenario which could be too much for the EU to tackle. Due to the US being busy with domestic problems, Russia gets an additional chance for expansion in all directions; however it may fail to withstand the overload and may suffer from negative consequences even in 2017-2018. Russia has been preparing and continues to prepare for a confrontation with the West, which is, in fact, “headless” and incapable of an effective policy of deterring and incapacitating the violators of the international law. This is apparent both in the cases of Syria and Ukraine. The Syrian front is a logical extension of the “cold” European front of Moscow, where the information warfare prevails, as well as of the “hot” Ukrainian front. All this fits in the multi-crisis scenario for the EU and hybrid war technologies, which don’t have a military component at an early stage.

The failure of the United States, Britain, and France to comply with the Budapest Memorandum regarding Ukraine’s security guarantees, Germany’s active blocking of the defensive weapons supply to Ukraine, the hesitancy of NATO to provide Ukraine and Georgia with a security umbrella, silent watching of the Syrian tragedy,

the EU’s indifference towards events in Moldova, flirting with the Kremlin regime do not only lead to the world’s disillusion with the Western alliances and leading countries, but also to disgust, contempt and disregard of Western politicians. This, on the contrary, stimulates Russia’s further actions, a “victory over the West”. Russia’s multi-frontal war against the West will not bring victory to it, just as the energy resources of Russia have not made this country rich and prosperous. But Russia will forge ahead with its objective of the global geopolitical revenge until it is stopped in Ukraine, Syria and within the EU or until the international community creates the scenario of “crises multiplicity” for Russia through non-military means.

The last three years have shown that the West is unable to take preventive actions to deter Russia. The policy of the West is still reactive. Moreover, the Kremlin is receiving more and more signals about the possibility of lifting sanctions, if Russia changes its behavior, about the lack of an alternative to dialogue, the need for cooperation, etc. This is another strategic blunder of the West. Moscow perceives such approaches as lack of determination and indirect confirmation of the appropriateness of the chosen strategy and tactics.

It appears that asymmetric actions lacking the military component at this stage are appropriate, necessary and possible for the West. So, there is no need to enter into war with Russia in the future, Russia’s hybression against Ukraine shall be identified as aggression according to the UN definition of 1974 and stricter relevant measures shall be implemented against Russia’s state actors and political leaders abroad:

- to freeze the construction projects for new power units of the Russian NPPs in the EU countries;
- to abandon the Russian projects of non-transit gas transmission systems (Nord Stream-2, the 2nd line of the Turkish Stream in the EU);
- to substitute the import of Russian oil, oil products, gas and coal into the EU by non-Russian;
- unprecedented in the history of the EU, the actual verification of the ability of the EU economy to operate under conditions of minimization of imports of crude oil and petroleum products by engaging 90-day Strategic Oil Reserves168

168 Taking into account the volume of Russian oil exports of 254 million tons (2016) and the total maximum volume of crude oil tank farms that could be involved in oil storage process (Transneft, Transnefteprodukt, oil refinery tank farms) at the level of 34.3 mln., the filling of oil storages in the case of zero import will take 49 days, and in case of saving 40% of imports (Asia + Belarus) - 82 days. Then, extraction have to be stopped.

The strategic oil reserves of the vast majority of EU member states are actually 120 days rather than 90, which guarantees them even greater economic stability in case of the non-import: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies/eu-oil-stocks
- to disconnect Russian banks from the international banking system of communications and payments SWIFT (as it was done with Iranian banks in 2012);

- sending all payments from Western companies for Russian energy resources to a specially created account in one of the international banks that the Russian Federation will be able to use only upon return to the status quo in the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Paris Charter;

- freezing personal assets of the Kremlin pro-governmental oligarchy, including family members and the “circle of friends” of V. Putin in the West.

The last two positions are important. Real personal sanctions against the ruling elite of the Russian Federation and, above all, against V. Putin, rather than just against Russian officials, could be an effective mechanism for restraining the Kremlin’s expansionism. The assets of the Russian president obtained through highly questionable means is his “Achilles’ heel”. This suggestion is based on the estimates of one of the former biggest Western investors in the Russian economy Bill Browder: “I believe that it (Putin’s net worth) amounts to $ 200 billion”. According to him, the Russian president is “the richest person in the world or one of the richest people in the world, with the net worth of hundreds of billions of dollars stolen in Russia”.

The personal sanctions and a shift of European companies to the system of the “deferred payments” for Russian energy resources with the creation of a special account for receiving funds without the right to transfer them to Russia until the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied territories (ORDLO and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine, Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in Georgia) is a lesser evil than the military response which the West may have to resort to in the event of further Russian expansion in Europe. Rather than stop its activity, Russia makes it even more and more provocative.

At the same time, the EU should strengthen its energy sustainability by purchasing LNG and oil from the US and Canada. In the conditions of Russia’s polyhybression against Europe, the EU shall break the critical dependence on the Russian Federation. If Ukraine has managed to reduce the import of Russian gas to zero in three years, then Europe can minimize the import of Russian energy resources using the new hydrocarbon potential of North America.

These positions are extremely important for the effective deterrent to aggression. In mid-September 2014, the former Minister of Economic Development Alexei Ulyukaev noted that he did not believe that Russia would be excluded from the SWIFT. “I would say, this is a true act of war”, the minister said. At the same time,

the Russian minister noted that Russia should be prepared for low-probability scenarios\textsuperscript{170}. Also, Moscow does not believe that the EU will limit the import of hydrocarbons from Russia, since they are excluded from the sanctions regime due to the efforts of the former European Commissioner G. Ettinger.

Thus, the West shall focus its efforts on the areas sensitive for Russia, rather than on those that make it feel discomfort, but not only fail to stop its aggression, but rather stimulate it. The fact that Iran was exempt from the sanctions regime, the surplus production capacity of Saudi Arabia gives Europe a favorable opportunity to replace the Russian oil supplies, to a great extent.

There are other mechanisms of coercion, which have no less restraining effect and fit the formula of Russia’s hybrid response by non-state actors. If we use the energocentric approach to the hybrid technologies of warfare as the basis, then the main risks for the aggressor are its internal risks and internal conflict potential. This all will be transformed into the threats of its self-destruction, when the same cracking technologies that Russia uses when acting abroad are used by the external actors. Russia is neither monoethnic nor monoconfessional country. It has a dense network of infrastructure, and a large territory, which is difficult to keep under effective control. Therefore, the use of hybrid technologies of warfare as a double-edged sword can also hit Russia. “The Russian World” created a mix of energomilitarism and hybression, which can destroy it both from within and from the outside using the same technologies. Moreover, the chief technologist of the hybrid war a la russe may be the undertaker of the general customer.

\textsuperscript{170} SWIFT: We are not going to disconnect Russia [Electronic resource] / BBC. – Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2014/10/141006_swift_russia_refusal – Screen title. – Publication date: 6.10.2014
AFTERWORD

Primitive people used rudimentary tools such as sticks and stones as a weapon when hunting or confronting members of another tribe. The specialization began to develop gradually: they needed a sharper and longer sticks (pikes) for fighting than for picking fruit and roots from the ground. The stone used for fighting had also to be more pointed, to inflict a more serious damage on the enemy. However, this does not change the main point: rudimentary tools, taken by a man from the environment, have become in his hands both tools of labor and weapons for war with their own kind. Human evolution led to the specialization of tools and the allocation of weapons to the independent and priority areas of their creativity; the creation and development of tools for warfare arrived at the pinnacle of its development: weapons of mass destruction. And here is the end of the evolution: completely non-military tools can be used as a weapon for war. It is even not necessary to kill the enemy. Through the media and communication vehicles (Internet and television) propaganda can neutralize the enemy if not turn the enemy into an ally. The information for the enemy’s audience should be appropriately “pointed”, almost the same way as primitive people did to sticks and stones in their time. The damaging effect, as in the case of weapons of mass destruction, is massive. The only difference is that no one dies, but most catch the demobilizing propaganda virus. And if propaganda is combined with the disorganization through cyber-attacks and shutdowns of energy resources supply, the enemy can get the second level of neutralization: limitation of its ability and opportunity to actively counteract. That is, information and energy resources in the hands of modern man play the role similar to sticks and stones in the hands of primitive people. The scale, however, is quite different. The energy of any war, and especially of the hybrid war, induces the beginning of the aggressor’s self-destruction. The law of conservation of energy says that energy does not disappear; it changes from one form to another. Everything generates its like. War creates war.

The Russian Federation will not stop its expansionist actions, as it has not done so after the military aggression in Georgia and after 6 years launched the aggression against Ukraine. Europe is waiting for new, carefully disguised confrontational actions of Moscow in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the Caspian, the South Caucasus, the Balkans, the Baltic countries, the Western Arctic – wherever there are strategic communications and energy resources that can disrupt the dominating positions of Russia. Moldova, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia are in the epicenter of the subversive activity of the Russian special services. The use of forces by Russia against other countries cannot be ruled out, including the allied Belarus, despite the economic difficulties of the Russian Federation. The EU and NATO will be even more helpless in the future if they do not stop Russia’s hybression against Ukraine, since this is the basic element of the Russian polyhybression against the West. Moscow’s plan for
strategic exchange with the USA according to the formula «Ukraine in exchange for Syria» had not worked. Almost two years after the start of the Syrian intervention, the stakes are rising. Now the formula is «Ukraine and Europe in exchange for North Korea». It is believed that such an exchange, unlike the previous one, should work. Russia has been long preparing a North Korean case to replenish the «exchange fund» in order to address global issues in its favor. It is worth mentioning that in May 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has written off 90 percent of Pyongyang’s debt, equal to annual GDP of this country, and economically, it stimulated the DPRK to develop missile and nuclear programs. Syria did not pose a strategic threat to the United States, while the DPRK, with its dynamically developing nuclear missile potential, represents a threat. Therefore, according to the Kremlin’s logic, the United States will be ready for any action to neutralize the North Korean threat, but this will require cooperation with Russia. In Moscow, it is believed that if there is a large-scale military conflict on the Korean peninsula, the United States will have no concern for Ukraine and European affairs in general. The passive resistance of the West to Russia may not only stimulate its further expansion. It also, at a certain stage and under certain circumstances, can lead to the appearance of a hybrid of the nuclear-missile Eurasian power, Russia, and a new version of the “Islamic State”, or whatever it is called, with its North Caucasian (Kadyrov) fetus, which can gain power in Moscow. The polyhybression of Russia is gaining momentum...
ANNEXES
Annex 1

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ENERGY-CENTERED APPROACH TO THE PHENOMENON OF HYBRID WAR

Notional formula of the summarized energy potential of an initiator state (aggressor) for waging war of any type could look like this:

$$E_w = \Delta E_{\text{Epic}} + \Delta E_{\text{Ext}} + \Delta E_{\text{WMD}} + \Delta E_{\text{Unexp}} - \Delta E_{\text{TPS}} - \Delta E_{\text{Int}}$$

where:

- $E_w$ – summarized energy potential required for waging war;
- $\Delta E_{\text{Epic}}$ – potential for preparation / invasion / control;
- $\Delta E_{\text{Ext}}$ – potential for overcoming external support (if the enemy has defence agreements with third parties or is a member of military alliances);
- $\Delta E_{\text{WMD}}$ – potential for neutralizing enemy’s weapons of mass destruction (if available in the arsenal) and protect national territory from possible use of WMD;
- $\Delta E_{\text{Unexp}}$ – additional potential for neutralizing unpredictable factors;
- $\Delta E_{\text{Int}}$ – internal conflict potential of the enemy;
- $\Delta E_{\text{TPS}}$ – aggressor’s potential for being supported by third parties (allies);
- $K_{cw}$ – coefficient of hidden destruction (weakening) of the enemy’s potential during the period of the aggressor’s crypto enforcement (value $K > 1$);
- $K_{ec}$ – coefficient of containment of the enemy by a contour of external control (value $K > 1$) during the war.

Each component of this aggregated formula can be presented in a disaggregated form:

- $\Delta E_{\text{Epic}} = (E_p + E_i + E_c)$
- $E_p$ – potential for preparation (and concentration);
- $E_i$ – potential for invasion (and conquering) of new territories;
- $E_c$ – potential for control (and transformation) of territories.

Each component is a function of a number of basic factors.

- $E_p = f(F_{\text{geo}}; F_p; F_{\text{gdp}})$
  where:
  - $F_{\text{geo}}$ – factor of the size and peculiarities of territories of a victim state;
  - $F_p$ – factor of the population size;
  - $F_{\text{gdp}}$ – factor of the GDP of a state-object of aggression.
\[ E_i = f(F_{AF}; F_{MP}; F_{DI}) \]

where:
- \( F_{AF} \) – factor of the size of enemy’s armed forces;
- \( F_{MP} \) – factor of the enemy’s potential to mobilize;
- \( F_{DI} \) – factor of the enemy’s defense infrastructure;

\[ E_k = f(F_r; F_s; F_t) \]

where:
- \( F_r \) – factor of the expenditures for overcoming resistance in the occupied areas and support the rule of law;
- \( F_s \) – factor of expenditures for supporting the population and infrastructure of the occupied territories;
- \( F_t \) – factor of expenditures for transformation and absorption of the occupied territories of the enemy.

Two components: (1) additional potential for neutralizing unpredictable (unforeseen) factors (\( \Delta E_{unexp} \)) and (2) internal conflict potential of the enemy (\( \Delta E_{int} \)), deserve special attention. Unpredictable (unaccounted, underestimated) factors always have a place. Usually, they are the result of limitations and uncertainties of the chosen model of warfare. For example, Operation Barbarossa of the Third Reich against the Soviet Union underestimated the mobilization potential of the enemy and the speed of its deployment, as well as the level of its own losses of armaments and military equipment, overestimated the logistic capabilities of the Wehrmacht in the vast expanse of the east of Europe with poor transport infrastructure. Together, all these factors led to the failure of the Blitzkrieg and the transition of the war into a protracted phase, which sharply increased unpredictable costs. The economy of the Third Reich was not ready for this scenario.

Another important factor is the presence of allies who are ready to provide some kind of assistance in the implementation of aggression (providing armed forces contingent, supplies of logistical and other resources). The component \( \Delta E_{tps} \) can sharply reduce the necessary expenditures and aggressor’s potential for waging war. For example, the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was carried out not single-handedly, but acting jointly with several satellite countries, members of the Warsaw Pact. In the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, a number of Arab Gulf countries were on the side of Iraq, providing it with large-scale financial assistance. The United States shared the burden of military spendings with its allies, operating in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan. France has involved allies against Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, as well as during a military operation in Mali.
In a classic war, the winner is not necessarily the one who has more potential, but the one who provides greater concentration on the direction of the main impact focused on the most vulnerable place in the enemy’s defense. In this case, the suddenness of the attack plays a decisive role in achieving military success.

The formula for Russia’s energy potential in the war against Ukraine is reduced to three components:

\[ E_w = \Delta E_{\text{Pic}} + \Delta E_{\text{Unexp}} - \Delta E_{\text{Int}} \]

\[ \frac{K_{cw} \cdot K_{ec}}{} \]

In this war, the stake is made not on the basic component for classic war \( \Delta E_{\text{Pic}} \), but on the stimulation of the inner conflict potential \( \Delta E_{\text{Int}} \) of the victim state, which should cause the effect of self-destruction.

The product of the factors \( K_{cw} \cdot K_{ec} \) also has a significant effect, since it is inversely proportional to the required level of the aggressor’s aggregate potential for waging warfare. The long period of crypto enforcement of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has led to a significant reduction of Ukraine’s military potential, as evidenced by the well-known statement of Defense Minister Ihor Tenyukh on February 28, 2014 at the meeting of the National Security and Defence Council [ukr. RNBO]: «We are not ready for a full-scale war. I will speak frankly. Today we do not have an army ... from all over the country it is possible to assemble a military group of about five thousand servicemen capable to carry out a military task»\(^{171}\).

The contour of the hidden external control of the enemy, which the aggressor sets out (or applies an already existing pre-arranged one), can slow down the enemy’s actions, keep the enemy from active defense, counter-offensive, operations in the rear and on the aggressor’s territory.

In general, it allows the aggressor to get along with the minimum necessary forces and minimize the engagement of the military component in hybrid war. In conjunction with the propaganda campaign, it demonstrates aggressor’s «non-involvement in civil conflict» to third parties («our troops are not deployed there»)\(^{172}\).

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172 Translator’s note: “Ih tam net” - Euphemism of the Russian-Ukrainian war, used exclusively by Russian leaders, while lying about non-involvement of Russia in the conflict on Donbass.
Annex 2

RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE EAST OF UKRAINE
(Based on data of the International Intelligence Community InformNapalm)

Russian military equipment and armament systems, observed in the east of Ukraine. These types of armaments are not in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

- Tigr
- Vodnik
- Vystrel
- ETR-82A
- T-72B
- T-72BA
- T-72B3
- T-90A
- Ural-43208
- KarnAZ-4350
- R-166-0.5 Artak
- R-441-OV Liven
- Buk-M1
- 9K330/9K331 Tor
- 9K38 Pantsir-S1
- 9K5932-1 Barnaul-T
- Orlan-10
- Eleron-3SV
- Zastava
- Tachyon
- RB-341V Leer-3
- R-378B Borisoglebsk-2
Russian military equipment and armament systems, observed in the east of Ukraine. These types of armaments are not in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Military units of the Armed forces of the Russian Federation, identified by the Ukrainian side in combat in the east of Ukraine
Military units of the Armed forces of the Russian Federation, identified by the Ukrainian side in combat in the east of Ukraine.
Russian private military companies identified by the Ukrainian side in different conflicts beyond Russian borders, including in combat operations in the east of Ukraine.
Annex 3

GAS COMPONENT OF RUSSIA’S CRYPTO WAR AGAINST UKRAINE RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF «GAS-FLEET ISSUE»

Since the 1990s, the package combination of the issues of the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine and gas supply from the Russian Federation to Ukraine has become the basic element of Russia’s strategy in bilateral relations with Ukraine. The ambitious goal of achieving Ukraine’s energy independence has never been realized.

During the entire pre-war period, the Ukrainian side was dealing with business exploitation of the «gas-fleet package», covering national security issues including military, economic and energy dimensions. The Kharkiv agreements between the Presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on April 21, 2010 made this trend irreversible and served as an impetus for the Russian side on a number of «unifying» and in fact «absorbing» initiatives in economic relations.

On May 28, 1997 in Kyiv, heads of governments of Ukraine and Russia signed a package of three basic agreements, including an intergovernmental agreement on mutual payments related to the division of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR and presence of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. This was an unbalanced package of agreements due to the need to resolve the issue of «government loans granted to Ukraine by the Russian Federation in accordance with intergovernmental agreements of 26 May 1993 and March 20, 1995, should be repaid by the end of 2007, and recognized by the Parties as of May 28, 1997 in the amount of $3074.0 million, including interest on loans»173. The debt which exceeded $3 billion emerged due to the policy of Ukrainian government to involve the credit resources from the RF for energy supplies. The Russian side proceeded from the post-Soviet reintegration intentions, which deep essence aimed at preserving the status of dependence of the former republics of the USSR from the Russian Federation. Using the practice of free prices in the interstate trade, Russia practically formed the sovereign debt of the CIS countries during the first half of the 90s. From the total loans amounted to $ 5.26 billion, provided during 1992-1993 to 11 countries of the CIS, 47.6% fell to Ukraine174. The main purpose of credit resources was the purchase of energy. In essence, the oligarchonomy of Ukraine began to emerge according to the formula «profits - for myself, debts to the state». It has got its starting potential due to non-payments for gas. The well-known

174 Хеїфєц Б. А. “Mutual payments on debts and economic cooperation of the CIS countries and Russia”. Round table materials / “Contradictions of the processes of monetary and financial integration in the CIS region”. – Translated from the screen. – Moscow, 2005. Page 68
economist A. Aslund, pointed out that «Gazprom / Russia demanded that these non-payments, sometimes caused by the private Ukrainian importers, were guaranteed by the Ukrainian state”175. The state gained a critical mass of debts. In a certain «H-hour», the Russian side put the question decisively having made a package of naval-tax linkage through the scheme of mutual payments: “In 1997, the agreements with Ukraine were signed on the mutual payments linked to division of the Black Sea Fleet, fissile material and energy resources supplies and mutual payments under the procurement of fishing vessels, provided the settlement of accepted debt in the amount of $3074.0 million as of May 28, 1997, including interest on credits”176.

A peculiarity is that the package of draft agreements on the Black Sea Fleet proposed by the Russian side was not passed through the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. The NSDC was excluded from this process, as the then head of state was not sure that the NSDC’s apparatus would give a favorable assessment of draft agreements imperfect from a legal point of view and dangerous from the standpoint of national interests and security. In addition, Kyiv strove to sign an agreement on friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which should legally consolidate the territorial integrity of the states and inviolability of existing borders between them. Moscow was ready for this, under the condition of signing a package of agreements on the Black Sea Fleet.

In 2010, the similar process took place. Instead of a debt issue, the price issue was decided. The difference between two scenarios was that the fleet-debt exchange (stationing of the Russian BSF in exchange of the annual repayment of the public debt) changed to fleet-price exchange: the extension of the Black Sea Fleet’s stationing until 2042 in exchange for a 30% discount on gas prices by 2020. In fact, an initiator was not so much the Russian side as in the nineties, but the Ukrainian side. In addition, the level of elaboration of the issue by the Ukrainian side looked even more primitive than in 1997. And again, the NSDC was excluded from the process.

This approach was inherent for the Russian side within the imperial paradigm of the Kremlin, but unacceptable for Ukraine, as any foreign military presence a priori put a threat to national security.

**RosUkrEnergo: The Yalta start**

In order to understand the logic of the authorities’ actions in relations with the Russian Federation and an impetus that led to the signing of the Kharkiv accords, it is necessary to recall the events of 2004 that took place in Yalta, almost between

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1997 and 2010. Little is mentioned about Yalta-2004, but in vain, because it contains the key to understanding many processes in both the Orange and the post-Orange periods of Ukrainian politics.

On July 26, 2004 the meeting of the presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, L. Kuchma and V. Putin with top representatives of business circles took place. The parties reached an agreement on a common scheme for gas supplies to Ukraine. And on July 29, 2004 two events took place - signing of the protocol on the composition of the Coordination Council of the newly created company «RosUkrEnergo» and signing of a package of contracts for the supply and transit of natural gas for the period up to 2028. On the same day, Gazprom’s and JSC Naftogaz’s news sites posted a message, where in general both the marked events and their background - meeting between the presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation in Yalta, were outlined: “On July 26 in Yalta, at a meeting of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine with the business circles of two countries, agreements were reached on the formation of a single, prospective gas balance. In line with these agreements, a package of documents was signed at Gazprom’s central office today, defining the terms of cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in the field of natural gas supply and transit until 2028. According to the signed documents, newly created company RosUkrEnergo that would procure supplies of Turkmen gas for Ukrainian market, would operate transit of purchased gas and perform as an investor to gas transmission infrastructure, required for transit ensuring”177.

In media reports, the Ukrainian-Russian meeting did not look like a regular one. Some aspects point out its peculiarity in comparison with previous summits. “For the third time this year, Leonid Kuchma had hosted his counterpart Vladimir Putin in Crimea. The reason for the July meeting of presidents was a business forum with the participation of business elite circles of Ukraine and Russia. <…> By the appointed time in the Livadia Palace, the presidential motorcade arrived with a delay of exactly one hour. The spacious “protocol” limousine turned out to be unoccupied. This car Leonid Kuchma and Vladimir Putin preferred the black Mercedes 600, with armored glasses. They sat together in the back seat and on the way from the state residence in Foros to Livadia doted the i’s and cross the t’s in the conversation that had begun yet in the morning without witnesses”178.

Signing of agreements package between RUE and NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine restructured gas relations between Ukraine and Turkmenistan. In fact, Russia having regrappled the volumes of the Turkmen gas through the signing of Putin-Niyazov

agreement of April 10, 2003 excluded the direct supplies. Having established a Gazprom-controlled intermediary structure in the form of RUE, the Russian party put gas trade between Ukraine and Turkmenistan under its own control.

The analysis of the events in Yalta on July 26, 2004 with the subsequent signing of a package of gas agreements at the Gazprom office in Moscow on July 29, indicates that not only a legal transformation of the Turkmen gas trading scheme happened considering business interests of political heavyweights, but also a simultaneous correction of strategic priorities of Ukraine. It was a package approach from the Russian side, designed for the long-term period - until 2028. The financial potential of RUE scheme and the extensive network of lobbying and corruption communications allowed the Russian side to actively influence the branches of power in Ukraine, manipulating them and as a result obtaining certain strategic concessions. Here, we provide a media-illustration of the events of July 2004: “The military doctrine of Ukraine now excludes the provisions on joining NATO and the European Union as the ultimate goals of the Euro-Atlantic and European integration policy of the country. This is the issue in the decree of President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, signed on July 15. It was published only on July 26 - on the eve of the meeting between the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine in Yalta”.179

Kharkiv-2010 in the context of Yalta-2004

The Yalta episode is a key for understanding of many processes that took place after July 26, 2004 – a date of regular informal meeting of two presidents, already frequent before. On April 21, 2010, a similar scenario took place in Kharkiv. It should be noted that shortly before the Kharkiv meeting of two presidents, V. Yanukovich had liquidated the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine and the Interministerial Commission on the Preparation of Ukraine for access to NATO respectively. In practice, it was an action similar to the abovementioned step by President Kuchma to remove the provisions on Ukraine’s accession to NATO from the military doctrine.

Kharkiv-2010 was Yalta-2004 but in the larger scale. Gas discount provided by “Contract between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Ukraine” and “Contract No. KP dated 19 January 2009 regarding sale and purchase of natural gas between PJSC Gazprom and NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine in the years 2009-2019” will bring only extremely limited benefits to Ukraine while preserving Russia’s military presence by 2042. Making “gas bubble” took place again as it was planned to increase the annual volume of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine from 33.75 to 36.5 billion cubic meters.

In practice, Kharkiv accords made Ukraine dependent on the decisions of the Russian government, as gas discount was mainly determined by Decree of the Russian Government No. 291 of 30.04.2010 “On customs export duties under gas supplies from the territory of the Russian Federation to the territory of Ukraine”, approved ex post facto on April 1, 2010. The price formula fixed in “Contract No. KP dated January 19, 2009 regarding sale and purchase of natural gas between PJSC Gazprom and NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine in the years 2009-2019”, was not subject to change. “Contract between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on stationing of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Ukraine” dated April 21, 2010, has secondary role. However, being an intergovernmental document ratified at the parliamentary level, it virtually deprived the Ukrainian side of the maneuver in its revision, while the Russian side retained full freedom of action through the mechanism of government resolutions.

The discount did not apply to the entire volume of gas supplies to Ukraine, but only to the «preferential» part of it - to the volume of up to 30 billion cubic meters in 2010 and to 40 billion per year starting from 2011. Every cubic meter that exceeds this volume, for example, 6.5 billion cubic meters in 2010, - had to be paid for the full price without any discounts.

Kharkiv accords did not change the contractual price formula, where the «take or pay» clause remained unchanged. The essence of the fixed agreements was following: Naftogaz was provided a discount on gas in the amount of “reduced sum of customs duties” to Gazprom under condition that “such an adjustment is foreseen by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation concerning export duties for the supply of natural gas from the territory of the Russian Federation to Ukraine”. So, the gas price discount was not a direct subject to Gas contract (namely to the corporate relations of Naftogaz of Ukraine and Gazprom). The document contains only a reference norm, according to which Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine agreed to submit themselves to the decisions of the Russian government on gas price. This means, among other, that the Russian government, as a result of the agreement of April 21, 2010 received a legal opportunity to fix directly the gas price for supplies to Ukraine by changing or repealing its Decree No. 291.

Neither a gas contract nor an intergovernmental agreement on the extension of the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine, do not establish any legal consequences in case of abuse. It is also important that in the event of a dispute over a gas discount (for example, on its size or failure to provide) under participation of the Russian government, such a dispute could not be a subject to consideration by independent arbitration or judicial authorities, but will be doomed to get stuck in a rut of the intergovernmental diplomatic procedure.
The results of the Russian-Ukrainian «partnership-2010» become unexpected even for the Russian side. According to Russian foreign minister S. Lavrov, level of relations and the number of agreements between Russia and Ukraine over the past year «exceeded our expectations, as the scale of agreements and the speed of their approval probably are record-breaking»\textsuperscript{180}.

The relations that emerged throughout 2010 between official Moscow and Kyiv were less and less reminiscent of the «suzerain – vassal» model, as it looked at first. The «predator – prey» model was increasingly outlined. The bargain under a formula “national interests in exchange of cheap gas” after Kharkiv accords didn’t stop. Even though the position of the Russian Federation had become even more rigid in regard of new requirements to Ukraine (proposals for the actual absorption of aviation, shipbuilding, nuclear energy, and gas industry assets), the line of concessions continued. A vivid confirmation was the adoption in 2010 by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and signing by the President of the Law «On the Basic Principles of Ukraine’s Internal and External Policies», in which the provisions on accession to NATO were removed, and instead a provision on the non-aligned status of the country was introduced.

The Kharkiv accords have led to mitigation of bilateral relations, but not to the reduction of Moscow’s pressure on Kyiv, as expected. On the contrary, there was a growing squeezing out of new concessions from Ukraine without any counter-concessions and / or preferences from the Russian side. A vivid confirmation of this was realization of the South Stream project, the refusal to agree the real guarantees of loading Ukrainian GTS (based on the generally accepted clause of ship or pay), and so on. In fact, after the Kharkiv accords, the Russian Federation acted towards creating a foreign policy vacuum around Ukraine so that its post-Soviet integration and security projects (CIS, Eurasian Economic Community, Customs Union, Single Economic Space, and CSTO) would become a single option for Kyiv. In addition, blind following of Russia’s course will lead to the situation when the EU countries solve Ukrainian issues with Russia without Ukraine, because under this policy Ukraine would lose its international subjectivity.

\textit{RUE forever?}

\textit{Based on the abovementioned data, we can conclude that the scheme of RUE and its analogues will have an impact on the functioning of the individual European gas markets. Moreover, information on RUE itself and its beneficiaries is available in a bare minimum.}

The reason for this is rooted in the peculiarities of business dealing in Swiss (RUE is registered and established in the Swiss Canton of Zug). Under Swiss economic law, which has changed since January 1, 2008 (and not in the direction of transparency), keeping a register of shareholders is exclusively a corporate prerogative. That is, earlier the shareholder’s register was formed at the cantonal level, but since 2008 it had been carried out at the corporate level. The company maintains a register of its shareholders and is not obliged to inform anybody about it. Swiss legislation clearly fixes the limited obligation of the company to disclose its business data. For example, the annual report, the balance sheet, and the auditor’s report are presented only to the shareholders. Anyone who wants to view the Commercial Register of the Canton of Zug can get acquainted with the extent to which an «exhaustive» volume of information about RUE is available in an open official source181.

Under Swiss law, a company is deemed to be created since its entry into the Commercial Register. It contains information about the location, authorized capital, members of the governing body, who has signing powers and responsible persons. But the information about the shareholders is not disclosed, because this information is provided to third parties only with the consent of the shareholders. This is one of the key points to understand how certain statements of officials or politicians about their non-involvement in business registered in Switzerland match the reality. To ensure that a person is involved for example in RUE, one must receive the relevant protocols starting on July 22, 2004, when the company was listed in the Commercial Register and prior to that date. But even if it is provided, then one should bear in mind that this information will not be from the authority, but of the corporate level, even if notarized. That is, it is difficult to verify it from independent sources.

The second most important feature of the companies of the RUE type is existence of the shares of two types – nominal shares and bearer shares. The essence is that, by the decision of the shareholders, nominal shares can be transformed into bearer shares (in fact, anonymous) and vice versa. The bearer share certificate does not contain any information about the owner. The bearer of a share certificate is automatically considered to be owner. He is not registered in the company’s register. Neither a company, nor the shareholders’ meeting, nor any of the responsible persons are obliged to clarify how the owner had obtained it. Bearer shares are transmitted through the physical handing over of the share certificate. Selling such shares does not require the submission of any transfer information on the share certificate or the drawing up of an accompanying document. Anyone who owns them may deny any personal involvement because his surname does not appear there, but to demand and

181 http://www.hrzag.ch/webservices/inet/HRG/HRG.asmx/getHRGHTML?chnr=1703027441&amt=170&toBeModified=0&validOnly=0&lang=4&sort=0.
receive dividends on a regular basis. This opens wide opportunities for the company’s actions in favor of real owners.

A company of the RUE type under Swiss law may reject a request regarding the shares’ owners and the duration of their ownership period. It allows any person who is in the state service in one country or another and at the same time combines it with the company’s activities, to assert with «pure conscience» that he is not involved. This is a sophistication of similar business organization schemes. It gives practically unlimited possibilities to real owners and in effect protects them from criminal responsibility for corruption in their countries. It is possible that in the list of those who carries the bearer shares may be not only ministerial officials, but also some premiers, presidents acting through the trusted persons.

As one of the famous European gas experts quite rightly noted in his expert assessment for the Stockholm arbitration: «... in my opinion, it is odd that Ukrainian government has made so little effort to learn upon owners and investigate RUE activities». It is worth recalling that in October 2005 the problem of the unclear ownership structure forced the auditor of RUE (at that time, KPMG) to refuse providing of the audit services. It was stated that KPMG could no longer act as an auditor of RUE because of the reputational risks.

The survival history of RUE suggests that financial resources, circulating beyond the state and public control, have an extremely dangerous corruption potential. The registration of a company in the canton in Switzerland means that its activities are not under the control of any competent authorities of Ukraine, the Russian Federation or the EU. The funds by the decision of the governing body of the company of this type can be directed to various accounts of individuals and legal entities. A similar scheme is a perfect corruption instrument of the pan-European scale, when a part of the financial flow generated after the sale of hydrocarbons, is added through the mechanism of the «black box» to the accounts of lobbyists, politicians, officials, journalists, and to various political and extra-parliamentary forces in different EU countries for their assistance. It is a scheme of Russia’s crypto war, which the RF had tested at the training range called «Ukraine» and now successfully implements in Europe, while remaining «unnoticed».
This fact has implications for international relations of Ukraine and its companies with foreign partners. In the case of the oil and gas sector in Ukraine, this means that an external (shadow) management system is formed. Accordingly, the development of a foreign partnership is based not on the needs of Naftogaz, but on the needs of a private Swiss company, which is in fact an affiliated structure of Gazprom. Thus, the latter indirectly determines the level of cooperation of the Ukrainian state-owned company with European partners. Considering, that Gazprom is a branch of the Kremlin’s management structure, the entire chain of influences and restrictions for the Ukrainian side will emerge. The financial potential of opaque gas business scheme and the expanded network of lobbying and corruption communications enable the Russian side to actively influence the branches of power in Ukraine by manipulating them. But not only this explains the effectiveness of schemes like RUE. The transnationality of the RUE scheme is one of the explanations of success of the gas political business. If you look at the personal composition of the governing bodies of companies created in the image and likeness of RUE, then it is possible to find not only Ukrainian and Russian surnames, but also European ones. Therefore, all three components of the gas chain are represented: Production - Transmission & Distribution. The phenomenon of transnational «gas octopus» is no less unique than the phenomenon of drug mafia. The consequences of the life of the «gas octopus» are no less extensive than its drug counterpart.

Summing up, it can be argued that some questionable and opaque energy trading schemes in the Eastern European countries are unlikely to succeed without an offshore link. Many EU countries and Switzerland are the playground of ambiguous business groups that have gained strong capital in opaque transnational hydrocarbon
trading schemes, based on a corrupt basis of the Kremlin’s protectionism. Some illustrative examples of the Kremlin’s business tentacles, typical for Gazprom’s activities in Europe from the territory of Switzerland, are given below:

• «Gazprom Schweiz AG», registered 14.05.2003 by the adress: Pelikanplatz 15, 8001 Zürich
• «Rosukrenergo AG», 22.07.2004, Bahnhofstrasse 7, 6300 Zug
• «South Stream AG», 18.01.2008, Industriestrasse 13C, 6304 Zug
• «Shtokman Development AG», 21.02.2008, Baarerstrasse 8, 6301 Zug
• «Gazprom Marketing & Trading Switzerland AG», 07.12.2011, Industriestrasse 13C, 6304 Zug
• «Nord Stream 2 AG», 14.07.2015, Baarerstrasse 52, 6300 Zug

Specific energy players, which reproduce themselves in the Swiss cantons aiming at obtaining a superprofit, can indirectly affect the stability of the functioning of energy systems through manipulative algorithms not only in a single country, but also in European scale. Modern cyber capabilities and unlimited financial resources open unprecedented horizons for the wars of hybrid type.
Annex 4

SOVIET AND RUSSIAN PATTERNS OF THE KREMLIN.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS.

In many respects, Putin’s Russia acts in the same way as the Soviet regime acted in its time. Moreover, in many respects Russia uses the doctrinal heritage of the USSR in the international arena. For example, the doctrine of limited sovereignty in relation to the post-Soviet countries. Previously, it was applied to the so-called states of the Socialist camp. The behavior of the current Kremlin resembles the behavior of the CC CPSU Politburo during the Cold War.

In the context of aggression against Ukraine, it is important to look at how the decision on the deployment of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was taken and evolved. It is known that at first the Soviet leadership had not intended to deploy troops there, and when the decision was taken, in Moscow they believed that it was temporary, for several months. But the presence of troops in Afghanistan and the war that exhausted the USSR lasted for more than 9 years. The Afghan campaign, along with the missile-nuclear weapons race, the senseless infrastructure projects of the BAM type\textsuperscript{182}, had become one of the factors that accelerated the collapse of the USSR.

It is important to compare the mechanisms of strategic decision-making in the Soviet Union and the present-day Russia, as it will provide the key to a possible further model of Moscow’s behavior in relation to Ukraine, Syria, and in the world as a whole. It is not worth trying to compare the Kremlin’s Ukrainian campaign of Putin’s time with the Brezhnev era’s Soviet actions in Afghanistan. These are not comparable cases. Obviously, we can talk about comparing the Kremlin’s Afghan and Syrian interventions. However, the behavioral models of modern Russia and the former Soviet Union are very similar. They are based on an indelible irrational desire to show “Kuzka’s mother”\textsuperscript{183} to the whole world and first of all to the United States, as well as its neighbors. In the case of Ukraine, according to former Russian prime minister M. Kasyanov, “the main thing for Putin is to ‘make troubles’ for the Ukrainians who made their European choice and seek to build a modern prosperous

\textsuperscript{182} Translator’s note: BAM – The Baikal-Amur Mainline (railroad)

\textsuperscript{183} Translator’s note: On September 25, 1960, the head of the USSR Nikita Khrushchev, speaking at the 15th session of the UN General Assembly on questions of colonial peoples and disarmament, angrily criticized the policies of Western countries, and especially the United States. He demanded the dismissal of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and the transfer of the UN headquarters to another country. In the oratory fuse, the Soviet leader unexpectedly took off his shoe and began to shake it from a high rostrum, insisting that he would show the sharks of imperialism a "Kuzka’s mother", meaning in English “You’ll get your comeuppance".
state without oil, gas and corruption, but with freedom and democracy.”
So, let’s look at a short period, almost one month, from late November to late December 1979. This is exactly the period for which the political leadership of the USSR has undergone a rapid evolution in the question of “entering or not entering Afghanistan,” which led to a catastrophic step. As a source of expert assessments and official documents, we will take one of the most fundamental works on the Afghan issue, the book of the late Major-General Aleksandr Lyakhovsky, “Tragedia I Doblest’ Afgana” [The Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan], published in 2009. The author used to be an assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, and was engaged in many “hot spots” of the Soviet and Russian period (Czeckoslovakia, Ethiopia, Angola, Armenia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, the North Caucasus). By virtue of his position, he had an access to the documents of a higher degree of secrecy. In addition, during military service he received invaluable experience and knowledge of operational and strategic nature. Proceeding from this, his book is quite unique. The general was a flesh of the flesh of the product of his era, but differed in the complexity of the analysis. Despite the fact that by virtue of his position he was at the epicenter of fatal decision-making, he subjected everything to critical conceptualization.

Below, we present some excerpts from the book, together with fragments of previously classified documents. In our opinion, they resonate with the realities of the Ukrainian and Syrian campaigns and provide an opportunity to draw parallels as to the mechanisms of making strategic decisions. These excerpts are accompanied by our observations, comments and comparisons.

**Pattern 1. Political leadership’s opinion as a landmark for political decision-making process**

**Document**

*Top secret*

*Special folder*

*to the CPSU CC*

The situation in Afghanistan following the events of September 13-16 of this year (1979 – our note), as the result of which Taraki (the President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan who came to power as a result of the April (the Saur)

184 Translator’s note: U.S Army equivalent: Brigadier General
revolution of 1978 – our note) was removed from power and then physically eliminated, remains extremely complicated.

... 
Recently, signs have been noticed that the new leadership of Afghanistan intends to conduct a more “balanced policy” in relation to the Western powers. It is known, in particular, that representatives of the USA, on the basis of their contacts with the Afghans, are coming to a conclusion about the possibility of a change in the political line of Afghanistan in a direction which is pleasing to Washington...

... 
Upon the availability of facts bearing witness to the beginning of a turn by H. Amin in an anti-Soviet direction, introduce additional proposals about measures from our side.

A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev
29 November 1979

This document was signed by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs A. Gromyko, the KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov, and CPSU CC International Department head Boris Ponomarev. Such a combination was not accidental. In fact in the 1970s, such a government power structure was formed when these people dealt with all foreign policy issues at the highest level. They prepared proposals and submitted them for the consideration of the CPSU CC Politburo.

What was the mechanism of operation? Usually the rough drafts were made by representatives of these four ministries who prepared proposals for their ministers. For secondary issues no meetings were held. If the problem was important then Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev met together, inviting everyone who was attending to the materials, and worked out a common policy. When issues of special importance were decided, as a rule the Chief of the General Staff (Nikolay Ogarkov or his [first] deputy Sergey Akhromeyev), deputies to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (for example, Georgiy Korniyenko) or of the KGB Chairman (let’s say, Vladimir Kryuchkov), were present, reporting the proposals of the corresponding ministries and agencies. The leaders themselves then exchanged opinions and gave instructions, such as changes in the documents which had been prepared. Then, depending on the substance and the importance of the problem, they were signed in turn and were sent to the CC Secretariat in the form of a CPSU CC note.
proposals were then examined at meeting and final decisions concerning them were made. This was exactly how the decision to deploy troops in Afghanistan was made.

The system being used, it would seem, would maximally consider opinions of all parties and rely on arguments and suggestions of various agencies. However, the analysis and conclusions submitted by the corresponding agencies often turned out to be useless. The problem was that many leaders, having their own views regarding the solution of one or another problem, often ignored recommendations of analysts and experts. (hereafter, the highlighting of author’s text is made by us to emphasize it)

Parallel 1.
The current Russian system functions in a similar way. There is a narrow group of people around Putin (V. Surkov, N. Patrushev, S. Lavrov), who are working on drafting relevant decisions, based not so much on objective analysis and expert assessments, but on Putin’s point of view. This was confirmed by a rather clear statement of Putin’s spokesman regarding the annexation of Crimea: “This was a personal decision of the head of state, only he could, should have and had made this decision.”

Pattern 2. Searching for an external threat
After H. Amin had come to power and killed N. Taraki…the Soviet leadership found itself faced with a question: what to do now? Based on the long-term interests of the Soviet Union it was considered reasonable not to interrupt relations with Afghanistan sharply, and to act according to the situation in the country. But the CPSU CC Politburo members were especially concerned due to the intelligence gathered by the USSR KGB in October-November 1979, which said that Amin was investigating a possibility of a certain reorientation of his policy towards the U.S. and China. For instance, on 27 September H. Amin addressed the US charge d’affairs in Kabul with an appeal to improve relations, and two days after in New York, the Afghan minister of foreign affairs Sh. Vali expressed the same emotions to the U.S officials, David Newsom and Harold Saunders. A suggestion appeared about Amin’s involvement with the CIA.

Parallel 2.
The theory about “Hafizullah Amin is a CIA agent” was always unfounded, though it, together with intelligence about Americans’ preparation to enter Afghanistan after they had lost Iran, played a key role in the approval of the decision to deploy Soviet troops. Even now, some researchers debate whether Amin was a CIA agent or not. The obvious fact was ignored that the “agent of the CIA” somehow tried
to bring in Soviet troops to Afghanistan, and not the American. It is essential to draw a parallel with Putin’s statement in his interview to the French media on 4 June 2014: “We had no guarantee that tomorrow Ukraine would not be part of the North Atlantic Alliance.” This pretext was obviously far-fetched, especially given that Germany and France in 2008 blocked Ukraine’s path to NATO at the Bucharest Summit, refusing to grant the MAP. In addition, the member states of the EU have cut their armed forces to a maximum, and the U.S under Obama’s presidency, having revised its plans for the deployment of missile defense facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, and having obtained an opportunity to be based in Romania and Bulgaria, have covered their stationary needs in a non-strategic Black Sea region. But, according to the Kremlin’s “rules of the game”, NATO continues to be a “treacherous force” according to the ancient Soviet slogan “NATO is a threat to peace”. A complete analogy with the late 1970s — early 1980s, when, according to the Kremlin, the Americans sought to enter the “Soviet subterranean”, Afghanistan. In 2014, with the aid of propaganda, a “parallel reality” was formed, where NATO strives to enter “Russian subterranean” (Crimea) and squeeze out Russian BSF, or according to Putin: “military infrastructure is a step away from the Russian border. We could not remain insensitive”.

**Pattern 3. Catching the moods of the leaders**

In the assessments of the Soviet analysts, events in the DRA had become part of the world revolutionary process. **It was recommended that the USSR leadership does not allow the export of counterrevolution. Such a position harmonized with the moods of the Soviet leaders.** The possibility of having a reliable ally on their southern borders tied to the Soviet Union by a common ideology and interests seemed too tempting. Apparently, therefore, they ultimately took such a difficult step, although they did not understand what revolution they wanted to protect.

**Parallel 3.**

Unlike Afghanistan, where the Kremlin supported the April Revolution of 1978 (although it was a classic coup d’etat), in Ukraine the Kremlin tried to suppress the revolution twice: the Orange Revolution in 2004, and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. Then and now, in the Kremlin they were convinced that “insidious” US and NATO stayed behind “colored revolutions”, but not the desire of society to get rid of parasitic corrupt kleptocratic regimes. Of course, Putin’s regime, which has established a regional clan-criminal economic basis for itself (the St. Petersburg’s [Chekists] - Putin’s friends - organized criminal groups), being by its nature also kleptocratic and parasitic, can hardly think differently. Moreover, it is rapidly evolving towards the neo-Soviet totalitarianism. In principle, the Kremlin, as in the Soviet period, opposes everything that does not correspond to the “mood of the
leaders” and does not fit into their “outlook”, and equally blames the United States in everything that does not reflect the Kremlin’s templates. A vivid confirmation is an interview with Secretary of the Russian Council of Defense M. Patrushev on June 7, 2014, in which he states: “Events in Ukraine, in my opinion, are initiated from the outside ... I think, nevertheless, there was a pressure, organized mainly from the US territory”.

**Pattern 4. “To see which way the wind is blowing”**

**Document**

*Top secret*

*Special folder*

*to the CPSU CC*

The Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, General Secretary of the PDPA CC, and Prime Minister of the DRA H. Amin has been insistently raising recently the issue of the necessity of sending to Kabul of a motorized rifle battalion for the defense of his residence.

Taking account of the situation as it has developed and the request of H. Amin, we consider it expedient to sent to Afghanistan the detachment of the GRU of the General Staff which has been prepared for these goals, with a complement of about 500 men, in a uniform which does not reveal its belonging to the Armed Forces of the USSR.

…

Cde. Ustinov, D.F. is in agreement

*Yu. Andropov, N. Ogarkov. No. 312/210073 4 December 1979*

According to reports from Kabul, up to December the situation in Afghanistan was not in favor of the government. In addition, the fierce struggle in the Afghan leadership on the issue of the attitude to the army led to considerable disorder in the DRA armed forces. The constant personnel shakeups, purges and repressions among generals, the forced conscription of youth into the army and other issues substantially undermined the cohesion and combat effectiveness of the troops. The Afghan army ended up considerably weaker and, from Amin’s statements, was not in a condition to defend the ruling regime and the sovereignty of the country by

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itself, though the Soviet military advisers had an opposite opinion, and the solutions proposed were polar opposite. Moreover, there was an unwritten rule: send primarily the information which would suit the leadership, the information in harmony with its positions, and “guess” the information corresponding to the leaders’ notions about one or another issue and confirming their prescience. Analysts always tried to “see which way the wind was blowing” by trying to find out the leadership’s opinion ahead of time and tailoring their opinions to it.

Parallel 4.
“To see which way the wind is blowing” is customary in the Russian establishment, as in the Soviet times. The implication seemed to be total approval of Putin’s actions of occupation and annexation of Crimea. It is worth recalling March 1, 2014, when at the urgent meeting the Federation Council of RF unanimously supported Putin’s request to use armed forces on the territory of Ukraine.

But further developments in the invasion of eastern Ukraine have shown that the analytical assessments, adapted to Putin’s point of view and developed with an account to “which way the wind is blowing”, led to unpredicted scenarios. The reality appeared to be quite different from a publicity picture based on the “parallel reality”.

A bright example was an appeal of May 17, 2014 of the “Commander-in-Chief of the DPR rebels” Ihor Strelkov (Girkin) to the people “…But what can we see? Anything rather than a crowd of volunteers near our headquarters. In Slovyansk, the population is 120 000. In Kramatorsk, the population is twice as big. In total in the Donetsk region 4.5 mln people live. I should be frank that I haven’t expected that for the whole region at least one thousand of people wouldn’t be found, ready to risk their lives not in the town street barricades, from where you should go half-day by car to meet the nearest National Guard serviceman, but at the front line, where shots sound every day. Three days ago, a group of twelve Artemivsk heroes has come, selected and recommended by a well-respected man. Having got to know that they would have to serve directly in Slovyansk, but not on native soil in Artemivsk and that service duration was not limited to a few days, they refused to receive weapons. Yesterday, the story repeated: from among thirty-five Donetsk volunteers that have just arrived and heard the throb of distant gun-fire, having got to know that in three days they could not just go home with the arms they’d got, twenty-five just went home…Where are those twenty-seven thousand volunteers described by journalists?”
Pattern 5. Stake on power

On 8 December a meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office, in which a “narrow circle” of the CPSU CC Politburo members took part – Yu. Andropov, A. Gromyko, M. Suslov, and D. Ustinov. For a long time, they discussed the situation in Afghanistan and weighed the pros and cons of deploying Soviet troops there. As the evidence for the need for such a step Andropov and Ustinov could cite: the efforts of the US CIA (particularly Paul Henze, the Chief of Station in Ankara) to create a “New Great Ottoman Empire” including the southern republics of the USSR; the lack of a reliable air defense system in the south and thus, in case American “Pershing” missiles were stationed in the DRA, many vitally important objects such as the Baykonur Cosmodrome would be placed in jeopardy; the possibility of the use of Afghan uranium deposits by Pakistan and Iran to create nuclear weapons; the establishment of an opposition government in the northern regions of Afghanistan; the joining of this region to Pakistan and so on…

As a result, they decided to work out two options: remove Amin from power using the KGB’s capabilities and transfer power to Babrak Karmal; if this didn’t work, then send a certain number of troops to the DRA for these purposes.

On 10 December 1979, the USSR Minister of Defence D. Ustinov informed Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov that the CPSU CC Politburo had made a tentative decision to temporarily deploy Soviet troops in Afghanistan and assigned him the task of preparing about 75-80,000 troops. Ogarkov was very surprised at this information and said that such a number of troops would not stabilize the situation, that he opposed such a step, and that it was reckless. But the Minister stopped him abruptly and said, “What are you saying, are you going to teach the Politburo? Your job is to follow orders...”. That same day Ogarkov was suddenly called into Brezhnev’s office, where the “small Politburo” (Yu. Andropov, A. Gromyko and D. Ustinov) was meeting. Ogarkov, now in Brezhnev’s presence, tried once again to convince the Politburo members that the Afghan problem needed to be solved politically, not relying of force. He referred to the Afghan tradition of resistance against foreigners on their land, warning about the probability of our troops being involved into combat actions, but all this turned out to be in vain. At the end of the conversation, it was agreed that for now the final decision would not be made regarding the immediate introduction of troops, but that the troops would prepare just in case.
Parallel 5.
When the Putin regime collapses, and after some time archives will be opened concerning one of the most shameful pages of Russian politics, the war against Ukraine, we will see that not everyone supported the Kremlin’s adventure. But those who did not support this move were simply silenced as their predecessors in the 1980s regarding the deployment of troops to Afghanistan.

The voting procedure in the Federation Council of the RF, which was analyzed in the investigation of “Lenta.Ru”, is indicative. From the record posted on the official channel of the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament, it is clear that after the registration of senators at the meeting there was no quorum. Then, Chairperson of the Federation Council, Valentina Matvienko, said that some of those senators who had been late were asked to “attach their voices.” After a minute, there were already not 78 registered senators, but 85, one more than the minimum necessary for the quorum, and Matvienko announced the meeting open. However, 90 senators had already voted for the introduction of the Russian troops in Ukraine.

To rely on power methods both inside and outside the country is a long tradition of the Kremlin. It is worth mentioning Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, two Chechen campaigns of the 1990s-2000s, Georgia in 2008. Thus, the “predator model” in the Kremlin’s behavior is hereditary.

Pattern 6. Joint responsibility
On 12 December at the meeting of CPSU CC Politburo (more precisely of its elite), on the proposal of Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko, a final decision was adopted unanimously: to deploy troops in Afghanistan, though regarding secrecy it was called the “measures”. The Soviet leadership was convinced that such a step should have to contribute to the aim of state enforcing, and didn’t follow any other aim. In the CPSU CC’s special folder, a protocol of this meeting written by K. U. Chernenko’s hand had been secret for a long time, prohibited to read even for the highest state leadership and held in a secret storage.

Top secret document

Top secret
Special folder
Chaired by Cde. L. I. Brezhnev

CPSU CC Resolution № 176/125 of 12 December

187 Translator’s note: an image of this decree with translation and source information can be found in CWHIP Bulletin, Fall 1994 p. 46]
This document broadly explains who was an initiator and an executive of the Soviet troops deployment in Afghanistan. A protocol was signed by all members of the CPSU CC Politburo. At that time, nobody spoke against it. Every member of the Politburo knew how a disagreement with the opinion of the General Secretary of the CPSU CC is perceived, so all his proposals “have met unanimous support”. The “joint responsibility” was in action.

It is noteworthy that the meeting was not attended by A. N. Kosygin, whose position on this issue was negative. The document used the letter “A” for Afghanistan, and the word “measures” meant the entry of Soviet troops into this country. This removes all the rumors and discrepancies about who is responsible for deciding to deploy troops to Afghanistan.

A Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council (Soviet) of the USSR or another government document on the issue of the introduction of troops was never adopted. All instructions were given verbally because of the interests of secrecy ...

At that time, the implementation of such actions was possible because of the then prevailing practice of making important political decisions: in fact, after approval of the CPSU CC Politburo (the supreme body of the ruling party), they were basically only formally “approved” by state bodies and announced to people. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that if this issue were put before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at that time it would have been unanimously approved. It was an era of “unanimous thinking”, and a clear system of subordination, created by the party nomenclature, did not allow to take a single step away from the line drawn up by the CPSU CC Politburo. People holding key positions in the state were under total control of this system.
The then leadership of the CPSU did not consider it necessary to take this issue to the discussion of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. They announced “the international assistance”, and discussion ended.

Parallel 6.
As we see, there is still a certain “progress” in the case of the introduction of Russian troops into Ukraine. If during the Soviet era the political leadership (Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU) did not consider it necessary to address the Parliament at all, in Russia this was done with an absolutely predictable result. However, it was noted that the president of Russia could apply military force abroad personally, without any approval from the parliament since 2009, when the law “On Defense” had been amended.

“In accordance with clause 2.1 of Article 10 of the law ‘On Defence’, the President was able to ‘use the armed forces abroad “to repel an attack” against Russian troops outside the territory of the Russian Federation, to repulse or prevent “aggression against another state”, to protect their citizens abroad and, finally, to combat piracy and security of navigation,’” writes Lenta.ru”.

“In the near future, it will hardly be clear why Vladimir Putin decided to ask permission in the Federation Council of RF to use force. One can equally assume that the Kremlin was to be secured by the consent of the senators as an instrument of pressure on political partners, including foreign ones, and that the president wanted to share with the senators the responsibility for the possible introduction of hardware and soldiers into the territory of Ukraine.”

Pattern 7. Personal ambitions
Academician Yevgeniy Chazov, Head of the 4th General medical department (“the Kremlin hospital”), who had been examining the state of health of L. Brezhnev for many years, stated that for approximately seven last years of his life, the General Secretary of CPSU CC had diseases of the central nervous system that hindered him in accomplishing assigned tasks. The memoirs of Academician Yevgeniy Chazov shed light on many circumstances:

«… Brezhnev, despite the decline in the ability of critical perception, had strong feelings about this event (the murder of Taraki - our comment). Most of all, he was indignant at the fact that as recently as September 10, shortly before these events, he accepted Taraki, promised him help and support, assured that the Soviet Union fully trusted him. ‘What a bastard Amin is: to strangle the person with whom he participated in the revolution together. Who is at the head of the Afghan revolution?’ he said at the meeting. ‘And what will they say in other countries? Can they really believe Brezhnev’s word if his assurances of support and protection remain just
words?’ As Andropov told me, approximately in the same spirit Brezhnev expressed himself in Andropov’s and Ustinov’s presence. It is unlikely that these Brezhnev’s words played a role of a catalyst for invasion in Afghanistan, but there is no doubt that events following the murder of Taraki and the loss of trust to Amin from Brezhnev and his circle played a role in deploying troops in Afghanistan. Exactly after these events, preparation for invasion began…

…

… The leadership of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff (in particular, N.V. Ogarkov, S.F. Ahromeev, V.I. Varennikov), and also the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces General of the Army Ivan Pavlovskiy spoke out against the deployment of troops to the DRA before the final decision was made, warning the political leadership of the country away from the temptation to throw our troops into the fight with the Afghan opposition. The military leaders thought that Afghan leadership should resolve inner conflicts solely by itself, and our military presence would provoke the initiation of combat actions and lead to strengthening of the rebel movement, which would be directed against Soviet troops, and poor knowledge of local customs and traditions, especially Islam, and national ethnic relations would force us into a quite difficult position. This, in fact, did happen later, but at the time the political leadership did not pay attention to the arguments of the military. Weightier were the arguments cited by party functionaries, who were more based on ideological considerations than on objective realities and the state interests of their own country.

Document

*Top secret*

to the CPSU CC

**Regarding events in Afghanistan during 27-28 December 1979**

After a coup-d’etat and the murder of the PDPA CC General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan N.M. Taraki, committed by Amin in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan sharply exacerbated and acquired crisis proportions.

H. Amin has established the regime of personal dictatorship in the country, effectively reducing the PDPA CC and the Revolutionary Council to the status of entirely nominal bodies.

…”

188 Sergey Fedorovich Ahromeev, Marshal of the USSR [US Army equivalent: General of the Army], Adviser to the President of the USSR on military issues.

189 Translator’s note: [source: TsKhSD, f.89, per. 42, dok. 10; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]; Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r11.pdf
… efforts were made to mend relations with America as part of the “more balanced foreign policy strategy” adopted by H. Amin. H. Amin held a series of confidential meetings with the American charge d’affaires in Kabul. The DRA government began to create favorable conditions for the operation of the American cultural center; under H. Amin’s directive, the DRA special services have ceased operations against the American embassy.

…

In this extremely difficult situation, which has threatened the gains of the April revolution and the interests of maintaining our national security, it has become necessary to render additional military assistance to Afghanistan, especially since such requests had been made by the previous administration in DRA. In accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, a decision has been made to send the necessary contingent of the Soviet Army to Afghanistan.


The arguments put forward in the document are reduced mainly to the fact that the main reason for the introduction of troops was the need to eliminate the power of H. Amin. But was it important? It is not yet known how the events in Afghanistan would develop, stay H. Amin head of the DRA. … According to all estimates H. Amin … definitely would not have abandoned the USSR. But the Soviet leadership was strongly influenced by the intelligence services of the involvement of H. Amin with the CIA.

On top of that, the personality factor played a role of no little importance, e.g., the ambitions of individual Soviet politicians (they could not forgive Amin for ignoring the appeal of the CPSU CC Politburo and Brezhnev “personally” to spare Taraki’s life). The ambitions of the CPSU General Secretary himself had a certain decisive effect on the rest of the Soviet leadership, depriving them of government wisdom…

…

Now the question is often asked: “Was it possible to prevent the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and should they had been introduced at all?” It is easy, of course, to foresee everything when events occurred. And yet we must say that there was no fatal inevitability of sending troops to the DRA. No objective circumstances, even at that time, forced to do it. The subjective, “personality” factor was decisive. Moreover, we went there to secure peace, but brought war.
Parallel 7.
Vladimir Putin was also upset by the personal ambitions. His words about “the collapse of the USSR as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century” show his system of coordinates, where there is no place for a human dimension. Having achieved virtually single-handed and undivided rule, becoming de facto ruler-monarch and the richest of oligarchs-in-power, he decided to immortalize himself by a geopolitical reconstruction of the Eurasian space. When in 2004 the Orange Revolution broke the prospect of bringing his vassal to power in Ukraine, and then EuroMaidan again destroyed its reincarnation, as without Ukraine reconstruction was impossible, then his personal ambitions deprived him of government wisdom.

Pattern 8. The glut of propaganda and lack of analysis
… From about mid-December (1979 – our note), the formation of an expeditionary contingent of troops for entering Afghanistan began to increase at an accelerated pace. Its basis was made up of military formations deployed in Turkestan Military District, which were almost all scaled up. They were deployed at the expense of local reserve resources. The general directive on complete mobilization and putting into combat readiness was not given. The troops were prepared in an orderly manner, on the basis of orders of the General Staff, after receiving appropriate oral instructions from D. F. Ustinov. In just three weeks, more than thirty orders were issued. This testifies to the fact that by mid-December, the USSR Ministry of Defense had no concrete plans for the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. “Events” in TurkMD [Turkestan Military District] and the Central Asian Military District began after the political leadership had taken the decision “to help the southern neighbor”.

Document
Regarding Paragraph 151 of Protocol No. 177
Top secret
Special folder
Appendix No. 6

On propaganda support for our operation regarding Afghanistan
In the coverage by our propaganda, in the press, on television, on the radio, undertaken by the Soviet Union, at the request of the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, assistance actions regarding external aggression should be guided by the following.
…
To emphasize that because of acts of external aggression, growing interference into internal Afghan affairs from the outside, there was a threat to the conquests of the April Revolution, to the sovereignty and independence of the new Afghanistan. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union, of which the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan over the past two years has repeatedly requested assistance in rebuffing aggression, responded favorably to this request, in particular, in the spirit and letter of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty on Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation.

... To give a solid and argued rebuff to any possible insinuations about the alleged Soviet interference in internal Afghan affairs. To emphasize that the USSR did not have and has nothing to do with changes in the leadership of Afghanistan. The task of the Soviet Union in connection with the events in and around Afghanistan is to help and protect the sovereignty and independence of friendly Afghanistan in the face of external aggression. As soon as this aggression ceases, the threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Afghan state will disappear, Soviet military contingents will be immediately and completely withdrawn from the territory of Afghanistan.

Ten years later, Georgy Mirsky, a senior researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, professor and doctor of historical sciences, one of the leading Oriental experts in the country, will say: “It can be said that our current leadership, which at that time showed its inability to properly manage internal affairs, behaved accordingly in the international arena. At the heart of the decisions made there was no scientific, objective analysis, not related to any changing considerations.”

The lack of such analysis has affected all levels. Many, including myself (Olexander Lyakhovsky - our note), suggested that the Mujahedin could not resist the Soviet forces, that they could still survive for a while, but then they would be crushed. And the Kabul government, although it would lose some of its authority by inviting foreign troops for its salvation, would still hold. Some time would pass, a new generation would grow up, everything would be forgotten, and Afghanistan would generally follow the course drawn up by the April Revolution. That is, “history would justify us”. Although internationally I and my colleagues, we did not find any convincing arguments to justify the introduction of troops, we believed that the specific course of events in
Afghanistan would be different than what had happened. This is just indicative of the fact that we wrongly analyzed the situation, did not notice the factors that led to the fact that resistance inside Afghanistan not only had not weakened after the introduction of our troops, but on the contrary, began to grow.

If our analysts underperformed, then what was to be said about the Soviet leaders who took the decision to send the troops. They hoped to win in this conflict, acting on the principle that the winners are judged neither by history, nor by people. Although it is fair to say that analysts’ conclusions and forecasts were not considered carefully. Such a conclusion can be drawn based on the extracts from the analytical paper of the Institute of Economy of the World Socialist System:

Some ideas about the foreign policy results of the 1970s: Points.190

With the introduction of troops into Afghanistan our policy… crossed the permissible bounds of confrontation in the “Third World”. The advantages of this action turned out to be insignificant compared to the damage inflicted on our interests:
- In addition to the confrontations on two fronts – in Europe against NATO and in East Asia against China – a third dangerous hotbed of military and political tension on the USSR’s southern flank has arisen in unfavorable geographic and sociopolitical conditions…
- A considerable expansion and consolidation of the anti-Soviet front of countries surrounding the USSR from west to east has taken place.
- The influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, has suffered considerably, especially in the Muslim world.
- Détente has been blocked and the political prerequisites to limit the arms race have been destroyed.
- Economic and technological pressure on the Soviet Union has risen sharply.
- Western and Chinese propaganda have received strong trump cards to expand campaigns against the Soviet Union in order to undermine its prestige in Western public opinion, developing countries, and also the socialist countries.
- The burden of economic aid to Afghanistan has rested on the Soviet Union…

(sent to the CPSU CC and the KGB of the USSR on January 20, 1980)

190 Translator’s note: Wilson Center http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111790
These arguments are clear and concrete. And the main thing is that the analysis was made and reported to the Soviet leadership when it was not too late to stop and quickly withdraw troops. By the way, Americans always do it skillfully and achieve success. Even based on this analysis, it would be possible to feel the depth of the abyss in which the Soviet Union was sliding by introduction of troops into the DRA. There were other proofs, too. However, the arguments of competent military leaders and expert analysts were rejected.

Parallel 8.
The real reasons for the aggression of Russia against Ukraine did not exist, however this war became real, as in due time the USSR invasion of Afghanistan. In the USSR, military analysts were asked the question “do we properly analyze the situation?”, but this question is not asked in contemporary Russia. This is not necessary, because in the conditions of artificially created “parallel reality” there is also a “parallel analysis”, which always gives the right answers. It does not matter that the answer is wrong in terms of “reality”. After all, when in the brain of the consumer of the Kremlin’s information resource to replace the “real picture” with “parallel” through the Kremlin-TV, then the consumer will receive the desired “picture of the world” and consider it the only correct picture. Evidence of the falsity of this picture, “cargos 200”\textsuperscript{191} from Ukraine to Russia, will be ignored. This was the case with Afghanistan, too. The Soviet press told the citizens of the USSR that the soldiers of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan [OKSVA, Ogranichenny contingent sovetskih voisk v Afghanistane} planted trees, transported and distributed flour in mountain villages, in a word, carried out international duty. And it was unclear why many of them returned in zinc coffins. In the case of Ukraine, the Kremlin has got (in words of A. Illarionov, former assistant to the president of the RF):
- Restoration of the deployment of missile defence elements in Eastern Europe, postponed on Russia’s demand a few years ago;
- Increasing the military presence of NATO in the space from the Baltic States to the Black Sea;
- Placing units of the US Air Force in Poland on a permanent basis;
- A new US affiliate program to strengthen the armed forces and military potentials of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia;
- Appeal of the President of the United States to the congress with a request for the allocation of 1 billion dollars for military operations in eastern Europe;
- Campaign by the US and NATO to increase military budgets of member countries to at least 2% of GDP;

\textsuperscript{191} Translator’s note: [gruz 200] military radio code that appeared during Afghan war and means a zinc container with human remains or the body of dead serviceman, transported to the burial place. Approximate weight is 200 kg.
- Accelerating the energy export projects from the US to Europe and promoting US diversification of energy supplies in Europe;
- Failure of the South Stream gas pipeline;
- US statement about commitment to provide full support to Ukraine and its new president;
- US refusal to recognize the Russian status of Crimea;
- Statement of US President B. Obama that any neighbor of Russia that suffers from Putin’s act of aggression, be it Ukraine, a NATO member state, Moldova or any other country, would get support from the US.

... Vladimir Putin, through his military campaign in Ukraine, accomplished things almost impossible and unthinkable a few months ago: he broke his 15-year-long effort to counter NATO’s movement toward Russian territory, and in fact maximally brought NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders.

Pattern 9. Inertia of thinking
According to documents kept in the archives of the General Operational Directorate of the General Staff (for some reason they are not yet declassified, so I do not bring them up), at the end of February 1980, the Soviet leadership was studying (presumably, on the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev) the ways of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, as it was believed that, having overthrown Amin and consolidated the new Afghan government of B. Karmal, they had fulfilled their primary responsibility. But at that time, they did not do it because of various circumstances. Against the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan were D.F Ustinov and Yu.V. Andropov (and possibly A.A. Gromyko). In their view, at that time, the withdrawal of troops would mean a concession to the aggressive policy of the United States; would strengthen the supporters of the tough course towards the Soviet Union in the United States and in other Western countries; would damage the prestige of the Soviet Union as a state faithful to signed agreements; would cause further destabilization of the situation in the DRA due to the weakness of the state party apparatus and the armed forces, which could eventually lead to the loss of Afghanistan; would lead to a sharp rise in Muslim extremism near the borders of the Soviet Union. In view of this, it was proposed to return to the consideration of the issue of withdrawal of troops later, as the party, state bodies and the armed forces would strengthen and stabilize the political situation in the country. Perhaps, their solution was also influenced by the exacerbation of the situation in Kabul at the end of February, but anyway, leaving the Soviet troops in Afghanistan inevitably led to their entanglement in the civil war.…

… The main justifying motive for the introduction of Soviet troops was repelling the aggression against the DRA. In connection with this, they “assumed” that, perhaps,
Soviet troops would have to fight a regular army of countries adjacent to the DRA. When it became clear that nobody is going to openly attack Afghanistan, and that it would be necessary to fight with rebel partisan detachments, then most of the tanks, missile and anti-aircraft missile launchers were brought back to the Soviet Union.

\[\ldots\]

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov ahead of other political leaders understood his mistake and the lack of prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the “Afghan war”. He was painfully looking for a way to get out of this war without loss of prestige.

As *The Times* wrote on March 3, 1983, Andropov was really preparing ways for possible diplomatic steps in Afghanistan, for the first time officially recognizing in the press what they had whispered earlier: “Our guys in Afghanistan are dying from the bullets of the rebels. Forces of resistance are so powerful and experienced in the conduct of hostilities in the mountains, that they are able to effectively act against the Soviet infantry and tanks.”

\[\ldots\]

The UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, Diego Cordovez, who was sent to the USSR for talks, said concerning Andropov: “He finished his speech, raising his hand and bending his fingers, listing the reasons why the Soviet Union seeks to resolve the Afghan issue as quickly as possible. The conflict has had a negative impact not only on relations with the West, but also with the socialist and Arab countries and countries of the third world. And in the end, he noted, this has affected the domestic life of our country, our politics and the economy.”

**Parallel 9.**

It is noteworthy that one of the main initiators of the invasion of Afghanistan, the head of the KGB, Y. Andropov, realized his mistake, but he could not fix anything anymore. The war, once initiated by one side, continues to live according to its own laws, not obeying the will of those who had initiated it. Remarkable is the hysterical philippic of Alexander Dugin, the “father” and theorist of modern Eurasianism: “Either Putin introduces the troops, or it will be his personal suicide. No Novorossiya - no Crimea. No Crimea - no Russia. No Russia - nothing. Our name is Strelkov. Our capital is Slavyansk. Putin, enter the troops! Time has elapsed. The story falls on your head with a granite slab.”

**Pattern 10. Human life is worth nothing.**

The Soviet leadership not only paid no attention to the fact that on its order Soviet soldiers died in the battles with rebels in Afghanistan, but rather preferred not to publish this fact.
Working record of CPSU CC Politburo meeting

SUSLOV. I would like to consult about one issue. Cde. Tikhonov has submitted a note to the CPSU CC and a draft instruction regarding immortalizing the memory of the soldiers who have died in Afghanistan. It is proposed to allocate a thousand rubles to each family to put an epitaph on the headstone. The matter is not the money, of course, but whether if we immortalize the memory of soldiers who died in Afghanistan, what will we write about this on the epitaph of the headstone; in some cemeteries there could be several such headstones, so from the political point of view this would not be entirely correct. What do you think, comrades?

ANDROPOV. Of course, I think we need to bury soldiers who died in Afghanistan with honors, but it seems to be that it is a bit early to immortalize their memory right now.

KIRILENKO. I think that it would be inadvisable to erect epitaphs right now.

TIKHONOV. Of course, they always need to be buried. It’s another matter whether inscriptions ought to be made.

SUSLOV. We should think also about notifications to parents whose children died in Afghanistan. There must be no liberties. Replies must be terse and more standard…

The Soviet soldiers, who fell on the battlefield, were denied even the last human honors, guided by some kind of “political point of view” invented by the officials out of touch with reality. In general, the destinies and lives of people in the history of the Soviet Union were never considered. They were “put on the altar of the Fatherland”, when it was necessary and not necessary. After all, for a long time, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was built largely on the basis of ideological dogmas.

192 Translator’s note: Wilson Center http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111793
Parallel 10
In Russia, they continue to tell about absence of the Russian troops in Ukraine, based upon the “parallel reality”, developed by the Kremlin through the formula “they are not deployed there”. First, this was the case in Afghanistan. The Soviet troops there simply “rendered international assistance”. The Kremlin operates in accordance with the traditions of the Soviet past. “Cargos 200”, coming from Ukraine to Russia, are buried quietly, without honors and reports from the federal mass media, with the warning for relatives to “keep silence”. This is the case if the body would not be “utilized” in the mobile field crematorium. At the end of the analysis of the parallels it is possible to quote the words of General O. Lyakhovsky: “… the Afghan war once again proves that the stake on power as a means of achieving a political goal is often ineffective.”
# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, Which Are Found in the Text and Annexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Anti-terrorist Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAM</td>
<td>the Baikal-Amur Mainline (Russian:Байкало-Амурская магистраль, tr. Baikalo-Amurskaya magistral'), railway line from Eastern Siberia to the Russian Far East which was built in Soviet time as a strategic alternative route to the Trans-Siberian Railway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSF RF</td>
<td>the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC CPSU</td>
<td>Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoCom</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control, the international organization of Western countries for the multilateral control of the export to the USSR and other Socialist satellites of the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRA</td>
<td>the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EurAsEC (EAEC)</td>
<td>the Eurasian Economic Community, the economic association of the post-Soviet countries with the dominant role of the Russian Federation (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Armenia) initiated by Russia in 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (Russian: Служба внешней разведки, SVR RF, tr. Sluzhba vneshney razvedki).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMS</td>
<td>the Gas Metering Station (Russian: газоизмерительная станция (ГИС), tr. gazoizmeritel'naya stanciya, GIS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRU</td>
<td>the Main Intelligence Directorate (Russian: Главное Разведывательное Управление, tr. Glavnoy Razvedyvatel'noe Upravleniye).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTS</td>
<td>Gas Transsmission System.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>GULAG</td>
<td>the government agency affiliated to NKVD that controlled the network of concentration camps on the territory of the USSR in 1934-1956 (Russian: Главное управление исправительно-трудовых лагерей, поселений и мест заключения, tr. Glavnoe upravlenie ispravitelno-trudovykh lagerej, trudovykh poselenij i mest zaklyucheniya).</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHS CERA</td>
<td>Cambridge Energy Research Associates, which has been branded IHS CERA, USA since 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Integrated Power System of Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSR-5</td>
<td>the supersonic Soviet air-to-surface missile (Russian: Крылатая Самолетная Ракета, tr. Krylataya Samoletnaya Raketa), NATO reporting name: AS-6 Kingfish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGB</td>
<td>Ministry for State Security of the USSR (Russian: Министерство государственной безопасности СССР, tr. Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti SSSR) in 1946-1953 that was separated from the system of NKVD. Since 1954 – Committee for State Security of the USSR (KGB). In the post-Soviet Russia, a successor of NKVD-MGB-KGB is the FSB– the Federal Security Service.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola).</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKVD</td>
<td>the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Russian: Народный комиссариат внутренних дел, tr. Narodniy komissariat vnutrennih del), name of the Soviet government agency for internal affairs and security from 1917 to 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDC</td>
<td>National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblenergo</td>
<td>Ukrainian name of the regional energy distribution network operators.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OKSVA</td>
<td>Limited Contingent of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan (Russian: Ограниченный контингент советских войск в Афганистане (ОКСВА), tr. Ogranichennyj kontingent sovetskih voisk v Afganistane).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDLO</td>
<td>the official name (according to Minsk arrangements) of the occupied by Russia and its illegal armed formations regions in the east of Donbass, which in line of the Russian interpretation are referred to as the DPR (Donetsk People's Republic) and the LPR (Luhansk People's Republic), (Ukrainian: Окремі райони Донецької та Луганської областей, tr. Okremi Rayony Donetskoi ta Luhanskoii Oblastey). It covers 10 fully occupied districts out of a total of 36 existing district units of both regions of Ukraine, as well as several partially occupied areas. In total, 2.5% of the territory of Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGU KGB USSR</td>
<td>the First Main Directorate of the Committee for State Security of the USSR (Russian: Первое главное управление Комитета Государственной Безопасности, tr. Pervoe Glavnoe Upravlenie Komiteta Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti), structural subdivision of the KGB that conducted foreign intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Russian Orthodox Church.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the official name of the Bolshevik Russia from 1918 to 1937, was later changed to RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUE</td>
<td>RosUkrEnergo, Gazprom’s affiliated company registered in the Swiss canton Zug, used as the proxy instrument of the gas component of the Rusia’s cryptowar against Ukraine during 2004-2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMB</td>
<td>Separate Air Mobile Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWIFT</td>
<td>Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, international interbank system of information transmission and financial transactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANAP</td>
<td>TransANCEtolianPipeline, the gas pipeline that runs through the territory of Turkey to Europe and designated to transport the Azerbaijani natural gas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>thermal power plant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TurkMD</td>
<td>the Turkestan Military District in USSR (Russian: Туркестанский военный округ, tr. Turkestanskiy Voennui Okrug).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGS</td>
<td>underground gas storage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UkrSSR</td>
<td>the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITA</strong></td>
<td>the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: <em>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</em>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UOC</strong></td>
<td>Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the self-designation of the Ukrainian metropolitanate of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UPA</strong></td>
<td>the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainian: Українська повстанська армія, tr. <em>Ukrayins'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, UPA</em>), the armed wing of the Ukrainian resistance movement against the German and Soviet invaders during the WWII and after it (1942-1956) under the political leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists led by Stepan Bandera.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CEC</strong></td>
<td>the Central Election Commission of Ukraine (Ukrainian: Центральна виборча комісія, tr. <em>Central`na Vyborcha Komissiya</em>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TAP</strong></td>
<td>TransAdriaticPipeline, the gas pipeline that branches off the TANAP and runs through the territory of Greece and Albania to the south of Italy.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” is an independent research organization, created in 2008 in Kyiv. Its research focus is directed on problematics of global energy and security, regional and global trends of energy security, international energy relations and security in Azov-Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, Central Asia, Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf and the Arctic. Special attention is devoted to Russian studies, Russia’s activities in the occupied territories of Ukraine and other countries, subversive actions in different parts of the planet, hybrid warfare technologies etc.

The Centre continues with the research, based on methodological traditions of security issues analysis through interdisciplinary approaches, which proved to be effective within research frameworks of “Strategy” and “Strategy 1” foundations, starting from 1996. The Centre is a working place for experts with experience of governmental, military and diplomatic service, employment in energy corporations and scientific institutions.

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Since 2017, the Centre restarted to publish “Black Sea Security” journal, founded in 2005 in Sevastopol and devoted to topical security matters in Black and Caspian Seas region. Find more about the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” on http://geostrategy.org.ua
Wars-XXI: Russia’s Polyhybression

Based on the researches of the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”
In the framework of Antares project

The author of the idea and Project Director – Mykhailo Gonchar
Project expert team: Andrii Chubyk, Sergii Dyachenko, Oksana Ishchuk,
Pavlo Lakiichuk, Oleh Hychka, Sergii Mukhrynskii.

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